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                        A b s t r a c t   
 
One of the frequently observed issues related to fiscal decentralisation in developing 
and transition countries is that subnational governments may not have adequate 
resources to finance the expenditure responsibilities decentralised to them. This often 
results in expenditure needs not being met in poorer areas. In China, fiscal 
decentralisation has taken place in an extreme form, where the social security 
responsibility, a conventional central government function, has been devolved to 
subnational governments during the fiscal reforms.   
 
While existing studies have anatomised the problem of unmet fiscal needs in poorer 
areas of China using economic and political economy theories of fiscal federalism, 
they tend to under-estimate or neglect the fiscal needs induced by market 
transition—the increasing demand for social security by workers from state and 
non-state sectors since the mid-late 1990s. This research illustrates that excess fiscal 
decentralisation, as in the case of China, could also create serious fiscal burdens for 
relatively affluent local areas and generate unmet social security needs in these 
localities. It is discovered that in response to the emerging social security burdens, 
even the relatively affluent local governments are forced to adopt measures that may 
counter the intent of social benefit programs or produce other detrimental 
consequences. 
 
In addition, this dissertation applies statistical analysis to ascertain a few inconclusive 
issues raised by the China-specific literature. It is perceived that the negative 
correlation between the share of consolidated provincial budgetary spending on social 
security and health sector has become stronger and more significant in more recent 
time. This suggests that the expansion of social security expenses at subnational levels 
might have bid away budgetary resources for health. The result from the multiple 
regression analysis indicates that the degree of market transition has explanatory 
power on the size of provincial government, even when a number of other 
independent variables are controlled for. However, the explanatory power of market 
transition on the size of central-provincial fiscal transfer is not robust. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The Research Context and Research Problem 
Dramatic fiscal decentralization reform has taken place across the world over the past 
three decades. In the developed countries, fiscal decentralization serves as a useful 
tool to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of public services provision (Wildasin, 
1997). Many developing nations embrace this policy option in order to escape from a 
variety of economic problems such as ineffective governance and inadequate 
economic growth (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1999). Fiscal decentralization in transition 
countries is the natural result of the transformation from over-centralized socialist 
system to market economy (Bird et al, 1995a). This policy choice has been firmly 
backed by the international development agencies. The World Bank, for instance, 
emphasizes fiscal decentralization as one of the major governance reforms in its 
World Development Report (1999/2000).   
 
Given the widespread implementation of fiscal decentralization in developing and 
transition countries, an increasing number of scholars and policy-makers have started 
to scrutinize not only the potential benefits but also the challenges of this policy 
experiment. Based on the economic theory and political economy theories of fiscal 
federalism (begins with Oate’s Decentralization Theorem, 1972), the virtues of fiscal 
decentralization are better allocative efficiency and enhanced government 
accountability. On one hand, local governments, being closer to the local residents,   11
may have more knowledge with regard to the preferences of local residents than the 
central government; on the other hand, the pressure of re-election and mobility of 
individuals to move to other jurisdictions may make local governments more 
responsive. From the normative economic theory of fiscal federalism, the scope for 
fiscal decentralization is within the efficiency branch (the role of government to 
correct market failures by providing public goods). It is also suggested that the other 
two common government functions macroeconomic stabilization and income 
redistribution are best performed by the central government, since local governments 
have limited ability to influence the levels of employment and prices (Oates, 1968) 
and their attempts to introduce a higher level of redistribution may be restricted by the 
mobility of tax base (ibid).   
  
Arguably, even if fiscal decentralization is intrinsically valuable, the adoption of this 
strategy may bring in challenges or problems for developing and transition nations, 
which to some extent, have qualitatively different institutions from the industrial 
world. One of the frequently reported issues is that subnational governments in 
developing and transition nations may not have adequate resources to finance the 
expenditure responsibilities decentralized to them, which may be the consequence of 
under-developed local tax base (such as property tax and user charges), the limited 
autonomy to levy taxes by subnational governments or the central government’s 
monopolized claim over too much tax revenue (Bahl, 1994, Bird et al, 1995; Shah, 
2004; Shah and Thompson, 2004). This often results in important fiscal needs in   12
poorer local areas not being met, if a proper intergovernmental fiscal transfer system 
is not in place. In the literature, poor local area means locality with low fiscal capacity 
(the ability to raise revenue from own resources). Unmet fiscal/expenditure needs may 
only be measured against certain benchmarks (such as minimum per capita spending 
on certain services or minimum service standards) or criteria (such as whether there 
are social exclusions or restrictions on access). The problem of unmet fiscal needs at 
the local levels may also be the outcome of poor local governance. When the 
institutions of local democracy are weak or absent, which is often the case in many 
developing countries, there is a greater risk that local governments and resources are 
captured by the local elites or interest groups (Bardhan, 2002; Shah,1998, 2004). This 
could undermine the provision of services for the residents at large (when the 
resources are siphoned away for other uses). These two distinct lines of reasoning 
derive from the economic theory and political economy theories of fiscal federalism 
respectively (also called first generation and second generation theories of fiscal 
federalism, see Oates 2005). In the literature we surveyed, the term local governments 
may refer to subnational governments or the levels of government that below the 
province/state level. In this dissertation, we use this term to describe subnational 
governments.    
 
In the context of China’s fiscal decentralization and economic reforms (began in the 
late 1970s), the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the subnational levels has also been 
observed and studied by an increasing number of scholars (such as Wong 1991, 1992,   13
1997; Bahl 1999; Wong and Bird 2005; Tsui and Wang 2004, Liu et al 2006). The 
academic enquiry on this issue emerged in the early 1990s. Wong’s studies (1991, 
1992) of the fiscal contracting system in the 1980s raise the issue of fiscal inadequacy 
in poorer areas of China, as she finds that local governments had become financially 
self-reliant while at the same time they had been given greater expenditure duties. 
Fiscal inadequacy describes a situation where a government unit has insufficient 
revenue to meet its expenditure needs. Subsequently, several studies (such as West 
and Wong 1995, Part et al 1996, Rong and Shi, 2001) confirm the early concern that 
poor local areas could not deliver a satisfactory level of services (in particular 
education service) to the residents. Other researches (such as O’Brien and Li 1999; 
Tsui and Wang 2004) highlight that some poor local authorities tends to make 
unlawful extractions from local households and enterprises in order to cover their 
expenditure needs. In addition to these research findings, there are ample evidence 
(such as Tsui, 1996; Tsui, 2005; UNDP, 2005) that horizontal fiscal inequality (the 
disparity of fiscal capacity across local governments) had been growing in a fast pace 
during the 1980s and such trend has not been reversed after the 1994 Tax-Sharing 
reform.  
 
Adopting the first generation fiscal federalism theory as the analytical framework, a 
number of scholars such as Wong (1997, 2000,2005), Bahl (1999), Shen et al (2006) 
see the coexistence of large unmet fiscal needs in poor local areas and high level of 
horizontal fiscal inequality as a severe intergovernmental fiscal coordination failure   14
arising from China’s piecemeal decentralization reforms. It is pointed out that similar 
to other developing and transition nations, the subnational governments in China have 
become dependent on central-local fiscal transfers after the Tax-Sharing reform, as the 
subnational governments are entitled to a much smaller share of the productive tax 
bases while carry out a much larger portion of the consolidated expenditure 
responsibility. Whilst stronger fiscal capacity of the central government may imply its 
ability to support the poor areas via higher level of transfer payment, the existence of 
several “bad” practices such as tax rebates (which benefit rich area), non-predictable 
and non-transparent rules of intergovernmental transfers have compromised such 
important objective (Wong, 2005). Since 2004, fiscal inadequacy may have become 
more serious in jurisdictions that are agricultural-based; as in 2004 some of the 
agricultural taxes were abolished and were only partially compensated by new 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers (Whiting, 2007).   
    
In more recent years, another tranche of arguments (represented by Tsui and Wang 
2004, Liu et al 2006) added to the discussions of this research issue by applying the 
conceptual frameworks of the political economy theories of fiscal federalism.  For 
Tsui and Wang, the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels is attributable to 
low fiscal capacity but the unmet needs in social services such as education and health 
are also attributable to the perverse government incentive structure (embedded in 
China's cadre management system). The system, devised to evaluate the performance 
of cadres, places too much weight on economic growth, making local governments   15
pursue short-term GDP growth blindly. The point is that when more resources are 
spent on capital investments--the GDP generating projects, fewer resources are 
available for financing services such as education and health. According to Tsui and 
Wang (2004), altering the government incentive structure and prioritize the services 
provision may help mitigate the problem, but for poorer local areas higher fiscal 
transfers from the higher levels of    governments are required in the first place.    The 
viewpoints from Liu et al (2006) are more pessimistic and controversial. They borrow 
the concept of “Leviathan” government assumption from the pubic choice literature 
developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), which presumes that government 
officials are rent-seekers and are inclined to extract resources from the economy for 
their own benefits. Liu et al contend that in poorer areas, local governments could be 
far more predatory than their counterparts in rich areas, because they face less 
constraint from the market than governments in rich areas. Thus the governments in 
the transfer-dependent poor areas often use the “unrealistic” central mandates such as 
birth controls and grain procurement as excuses to add more personnel, consuming 
large amount of fiscal resources that could otherwise be used to cover the important 
expenditure needs (Liu et al, 2006). They, however, do not define the term “unrealistic 
central mandates”, so one is no clear what are the other unrealistic mandates apart 
from the two given examples. The implication of this line of analysis is that removing 
unrealistic top-down policy burdens would reduce the chance of local government 
expansion, which in turns may help alleviate fiscal inadequacy in poor local areas. 
They further argue that higher fiscal transfers alone would not solve the problem.     16
These two strands of research contribute enormously to the understanding of fiscal 
inadequacy and unmet fiscal needs at the local levels. It is justified that jurisdictions 
with very low fiscal capacity would require additional fiscal transfers so that they are 
able to provide a minimum level of services that are of national concern. This is the 
case even if the two “governance” problems identified by political economy 
perspectives are solved. However, existing studies while extensively analysing the 
unmet fiscal needs in poor areas (with a focus on education and health sectors), tend 
to under-estimate or even neglect (the political economy approaches) one of the very 
important fiscal needs induced by market transition—the expenditure needs of the 
widespread introduction of social security since the mid-late 1990s. The social 
security needs induced by market transition is an insight from the regulation theory. In 
the Chinese context, social security refers to state-mandated social insurances, 
means-tested social benefits and subsidized employment services such as 
re-employment training services. Although social security is a conventional central 
government responsibility (from fiscal federalism perspective and in practice), in 
China it has largely been devolved to the subnational governments during the fiscal 
reforms. Since the mid-late 1990s, there have been two additional noteworthy changes. 
First, the social security responsibility previously assumed by the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) has been transferred to the local governments, as part of the SOE 
restructuring process (employees now also need to assume part of the responsibility 
via mandatory social insurance contributions). Secondly, social security schemes have 
since then been gradually extended to non-state sectors, in which we witness a   17
continuous expansion of wage-labour. While a few authors such as Wong and Bird 
(2005), Wong (2005) raise the concern that decentralized provision of social security 
could be a serious problem for local public finance and discover that sizeable amount 
of the central-local transfers were used to subsidize local social security (in particular 
the SOE sector), to our knowledge, there is no systematic enquiry on the magnitude of 
fiscal needs in social security sector at the local levels. Studies of social security 
reforms such as Guan (2000), Saunders and Shang (2001), Duckett (2003, 2004) , 
Duckett and Hussain (2008) clearly illustrate the evolution of the social security 
system in China. Yet they provide little quantitative evidence (no quantitative 
evidence at the local levels) for one to properly assess the fiscal impacts. In other 
words, these studies have not analysed the social security issues from the public 
finance perspective. When the social security needs at the local levels are overlooked 
or under-estimated, one is inclined to conclude that unmet fiscal needs only occur in 
poor local areas (a frequently observed problem arising from fiscal decentralization). 
Given the decentralization of social security function, the widespread introduction of 
social security since the mid-late 1990s and local diversity in the pace and scale of 
market transformation, it is possible that even relatively well-off areas have suffered 
from fiscal inadequacy and struggled (or not been able) to meet the emerging social 
security responsibilities.   
  
This dissertation seeks to investigate the impact of market transition on local social 
security spending and verify whether there have been unmet fiscal needs in social   18
security sector in relatively affluent local areas during the post Tax-Sharing reform era 
(1994-2008). Relatively affluent areas refer to areas with both per capita GDP and per 
capita fiscal revenue above the median of the population. We are aware that there 
could be other important fiscal needs arising from market transition, such as the 
requirements to invest in infrastructure and urban services (e.g. water supply and 
public transport), which are the basic ingredients of a well-functioning market 
economy. Studies (e.g EBRD, 1996) have revealed that in many transition countries 
the infrastructure inherited from the old regime often reflects the misplaced priorities 
(tilted toward heavy industry sector with little consideration of the environmental 
impact). Therefore there have been substantial needs of infrastructure investment in 
telecommunication, water treatment and road transport in those countries during 
market transition (ibid). This research does not concern with the infrastructure 
spending needs induced by market transition in China, as there have already been 
several studies (such as Carsten and Feng, 2004; Fan and Zhang 2004; Su and Zhao, 
2006) covering China's public investment in infrastructure. We are also aware that in a 
few Eastern European transition countries and former Soviet Union such as Hungary 
and Russia, part of the budgetary responsibility for social security was also transferred 
to subnational governments during their marketization reforms, a process Bird et al 
(1995a) called “pushing the deficit down”. Yet, there are sharp differences between 
the situation in China and in these countries, in particular in terms of the economic 
structure. The Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union introduced market reforms at 
a time when the economies were urban and over-industrialized, with virtually the   19
entire population covered by an extensive social welfare system that is beyond the 
financial capacity of the state (Sachs and Woo, 1994). The stagnant economic 
situation after the “shock therapy” reform significantly increased the number of 
persons claiming the social benefits while at the same time the tax base was shrinking. 
Thus decentralization of social security created deep problems for local areas (usually 
the poor areas) that are more stagnant (see Bird et al 1995b for a discussion of this 
issue in Hungary). In contrast, China began reform as an agricultural society with a 
much smaller industry sector (in 1978, 71% of the labour force was in agricultural; 
only 15% was in industry and half of which was in SOEs, see Sachs and Woo, 1994). 
Only the staff and workers in the bureaucracy and SOEs, a very small section of the 
population, were covered by the state welfare system. The second difference is that 
China had not thoroughly reformed its SOE sector until mid-late 1990s, after the 
economy experienced near twenty-year’s fast growth. Therefore, unlike the social 
security reforms in Eastern European and former Soviet Union, where there was no 
much change in the coverage of social security, the social security reforms in China in 
the mid-late 1990s involve the transfer of social welfare responsibility borne by the 
SOEs to the government, as well as the introduction of social security to the non-state 
sectors. It might be tempted for one to argue that the fiscal burden of social security 
could not have been a problem in China, given its fast economic growth and a smaller 
SOE sector for resturcturing. But on one hand, the evidence (from Wong and Bird, 
2005) that some of the central-local transfers were used to subsidize local social 
security sector may indicate fiscal inadequacy at the local levels; on the other hand,   20
the expansion of social security coverage may also require subsidies from the 
governments. Hence, it is difficult to reach a coherent conclusion without doing an 
empirical research. This research might help enable further comparison between the 
excess decentralization experience in China and in those Eastern European countries 
and former Soviet Union.     
 
This research also recognises that, while the two political economy approaches are 
relevant to the issue of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels, especially in poorer 
areas, they have neglected other important variables such as market transition, income 
growth and urbanisation. Liu el al (2006) argue that local government over-staffing 
problem would be much more serious in poor areas than in rich areas, as factor 
mobility in developed areas constraints the expansionary tendency of local 
governments. This is still a contestable argument (discussed in more detail in Chapter 
3). Even if government staff expansion is the case, the explanation for this 
phenomenon may go beyond the unintended consequence of those two central policy 
mandates. An alternative explanation might be that market transition, urbanisation and 
income growth have created demand for various forms of public services and 
investment that require additional administrative capacity (more staff). Tusi and Wang 
(2004) point out that spending on capital investment may have siphoned away the 
resources required for financing the standard public services such as education and 
health. An alternative explanation may be that the pressure to cover social security 
issue bid away resources that would be otherwise available for education and health.   21
The secondary intention of this research, therefore, is to statistically test these two 
alternative hypotheses derived from the political economy perspectives. Statistical 
analysis is also employed to test the variation of central-provincial transfers could be 
explained by the variation of relative sizes of the local SOE sector. This test is used to 
ascertain an untested proposition from Wong and Bird (2005), where they argue that 
the aim of fiscal equalization via central-local fiscal transfers may have been 
compromised by sizable transfers that went to social security subsides (in particular in 
the SOE sector). 
 
The overall conclusion of this dissertation is that devolution/decentralization of social 
security (redistribution) function to local governments during market transition is 
intrinsically problematic. This is because market transition provides a context in 
which the social security needs could grow in a fast pace and could be underestimated. 
The consequence is that even the relatively affluent regions have not been able to 
cover the social security needs and forced to adopt measures that counter the intent of 
social security programs (such as restrict the access for those who need the services 
most). It may also give rise to the problem of social security fund mismanagement. In 
one extreme case, we find that a very rich local government unit was forced to use the 
loan from a state-owned bank to settle social security arrears for employees of a 
distressed corporation and engage in risky real estate business in order to pay back the 
loans. Part of the risk, thus has been shifted to the state-owned banking system. The 
original contribution of this dissertation is that first it has a systematic enquiry of the   22
social security sector at the subnational levels of China using fiscal federalism 
perspective, which has not been done before; secondly it provides concrete evidence 
of unmet social security needs at the subnational levels (for all the provincial units) 
using unpublished and published statistics as well as some government internal 
reports, to our knowledge such evidence has not yet been presented by other scholars. 
  
1.2 The Geographical Research Area and the Structure of this Thesis 
The research problem is tackled by using a combination of quantitative approach and 
an in-depth case study. The quantitative part of the research covers the provincial 
governments (all 31 provincial units in mainland China are considered). See Figure 
1.1 for the government structure of China. In the case study of Fujian province 
(highlighted in Figure 1.2), the focus is on the provincial and prefecture level. There 
are several reasons to concentrate on these two levels of government and the Fujian 
province. First, the social security services are mainly the responsibilities of 
provincial and prefecture-level governments(the contribution-based social insurances 
are normally pooled at provincial or prefecture-level and these two levels of 
government are the major providers of social benefit programs).  Secondly, the 
provincial level statistical data are much more accessible than prefecture-level or 
county-level data. This is because China Statistics Yearbooks (which provide some 
statistical indicators the 31 provinces) are published over the internet and the statistics 
yearbooks of each province are easier to collect as there are only 31 provincial units   23
and some provinces also publish the data over the internet; and even using sampling 
methods, collecting a representative sample for the 333 prefecture-level municipalities 
can be extremely difficult. Thirdly, the in-depth case study in Fujian province is used 
to further explore and ascertain the issues (e.g. the more detailed breakdown of social 
security expenditure and the government's decisions in implementing social benefit 
programs) not covered by the cross-sectional provincial analysis. Fujian is a coastal 
province that has managed to develop its economy at a faster-than-average rate over 
the reform era. Its per capita GDP and per capita budgetary revenue have consistently 
ranked within the top 10 places out of the 31 provincial units since the mid-1980s. In 
this regard, Fujian is a relatively affluent province. In the case study, we seek to study 
at the provincial level and one of its more affluent municipalities (there are nine 
prefecture-level units within Fujian). The detailed research methods as well as the 
validity and reliability issues are discussed in Chapter 4.   
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Figure 1.1 Mainland China’s Government Structure (by the end of 2005) 
 
 
Figure 1.2 the location of Fujian Province   
 
Centre 
Provincial Level 
(31) 
Prefecture Level 
(333) 
County-Level 
(2862) 
Township-Level 
(around 43250) 
Source: Based on China Statistical Yearbook 2006 
22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions 
and 4 provincial level municipalities 
283 prefecture level municipalities and 
50 prefecture level urban districts   
374 county level cities, 2488 counties 
and county level urban districts 
Thousands of towns and villages 
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The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: the next chapter critically reviews 
the debates of the two generation theories of fiscal federalism in order to understand  
the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels under fiscal decentralization (in 
developing and transition countries). Chapter 3 provides a brief review of China’s 
fiscal system between 1949 and 2008 (the contextual background), analyses the 
current perspectives on the research problems in China and attempts to advance the 
debates by providing our nuanced conceptual framework and hypotheses. In Chapter 
4 Research Methodology, we clearly illustrate the research methods employed, 
including the detailed research areas, choices of research techniques, research time 
span and the validity and reliability issues. Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 present 
the analysis of the research findings. Chapter 8 summarizes the research findings, 
discuss the policy implications and limitations of this research. 
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Chapter 2 Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations: a Review of the Theories and Debates 
 
This chapter reviews the economic theory and political economy theories of fiscal 
federalism, the theoretical perspectives underlying fiscal decentralization and 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. But before moving on, it is necessary to clarity the 
specific type of fiscal decentralization is referred to by this thesis . Three broad forms 
of fiscal decentralization could be distinguished (Bird et al 1995a; Ebel and Yilmaz, 
2002). Delegation is the weakest form of fiscal decentralization, which means that 
local governments only act as agents of the central government in carrying out 
expenditure and tax-collecting functions and they have little autonomy in 
policy-makings. Delegation is sometimes named as administrative decentralization. 
De-concentration refers to a situation where the central government disperses some of 
the responsibilities to its regional branches. Devolution is the most extreme form of 
fiscal decentralization, where subnational governments gain independent decision 
making power over a range of expenditure and taxation responsibilities. The spirit of 
fiscal decentralization is reflected in devolution, as the two generations of fiscal 
federalism theories suggest. In this dissertation, we follow the convention to treat 
fiscal decentralization synonymous to devolution.   
 
The purpose of this review is to specify the rationale of fiscal decentralization and   27
illustrate how the normative theories are applied to deal with the problem of unmet 
fiscal needs at subnational levels, in particular in developing and transition nations. 
Since fiscal federalism is a subfield in public finance, we begin the review with the 
broader public finance theory, then narrow down to the two generation theories of 
fiscal federalism as well as the principles of intergovernmental fiscal relations.   
 
2.1 The Economic Roles of the Government under Public Finance Theory 
Although the original fiscal thoughts could be traced back as far as to Adam Smith’s 
The Wealth of Nations (published in 1776), the more sophisticated public finance 
theory emerged around half a century ago. Proponents (such as Nozick, 1974) of the 
“minimal state” believe in the market’s roles in efficiently allocating all goods and 
services and merely assign the role of the government to property right protection and 
enforcement. Samuelson’s (1954) discovery of market failure challenged the view that 
competitive economies would always lead to Pareto efficient outcome under standard 
conditions. Musgrave (1959) in his famous book Theory of Public Finance goes a step 
further to propose an active role for the public sector as to correcting various forms of 
market failures (the Efficiency Branch), stabilizing the macroeconomy (the 
Stabilization Branch after Keynes) and establishing an equitable distribution of 
income (the Distribution Branch). These three economic roles of the public sector are 
the core concerns of public finance theory. The economic theory of fiscal federalism 
(or so-called the first generation theory of fiscal federalism, developed after Oates   28
1972) goes one step further to address the hierarchical structure of the public sector 
within the efficiency branch. It lays out a normative framework to address the 
questions of which functions of the public sector should be assigned to which levels 
of the government (if there is more than one level of government). The theory also 
justifies the use of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to correct various kinds of 
coordination failures in a decentralized setting. Under Musgravian Paradigm, the 
government is assumed to be benevolent or a social welfare maximiser. This basic 
assumption is removed by the second generation theories of fiscal federalism (the 
political economy perspectives), which models various kinds of political processes to 
consider the trade-off between centralization and decentralization. The economic 
theory of fiscal federalism provides the rationale for fiscal decentralization by 
distinguishing national public goods from local public goods. In reality, public goods 
or services only make up a very small proportion of the government budgets. A large 
amount of the public expenditure items (such as education, health care and welfare 
services) are not public goods, but publicly provided private goods or quasi-private 
goods (Boadway et al, 1994). Since the intergovernmental fiscal relations do concern 
with expenditure needs wider than the narrowly defined public goods/services, it is 
imperative to give a brief accounts of the economic rationales underlying the 
provision of these services by the government.       
 
The public goods or collective goods theorized by Samuelson (1954) are known as 
Pure Public Goods. They have the property that “one man’s consumption does not   29
reduce some other man’s consumption” (ibid). In other words, the marginal costs of 
an additional person consuming pure public goods are zero and it is extremely costly, 
if not entirely impossible, to exclude any individual from enjoying the pure public 
goods. The most common cited example is national defence. The reason for 
government to intervene to provide the pure public goods is that private provision of 
such goods is inefficient: given the zero marginal cost of extending the goods to 
additional users, the necessary user charges from private producer would make some 
potential users to forgo consumption, “creating a deadweight efficiency loss” 
(Oakland, 1987, p485); in addition, if exclusion is not possible (the free-rider problem) 
or the cost of exclusion is prohibitive, the private producer would be either unable to 
collect user charges to finance the production or would incur large loss in collecting 
user charges, which is a source of inefficiency. Therefore, there is a need for the 
“coercive enforcement of cooperative behaviour among self-seeking agents” (Inman, 
1987, p653), so that consumer preferences for the public goods could be revealed.   
 
There are goods or activities that could create either positive or negative externalities. 
For example, inoculation against communicable diseases generates positive spillover 
effects for the others, because it reduces the chance of other persons being affected; 
pollution, on the contrary, has negative externalities for the others living in the 
community. Like the case in pure public goods, the presence of externalities could 
make market allocation of these “goods” or “bads” inefficient. Goods with external 
benefits tend to be under-produced, while goods with negative spillovers can be   30
over-produced (all because private producer would “overlook” these spillover effects). 
Thus, there is a role for the government to play: rewarding or penalizing the agents to 
reflect the true benefits or costs of their externality-producing activities. The 
difference between pure public goods and goods with externalities is that for pure 
public goods, there is no rivalryness  among  consumers,  while there is rivalry among 
consumers for goods with externalities (Musgrave, 1959).   
 
Unlike pure public goods, certain public goods may be subjected to congestion or 
crowding. Although larger membership could reduce the per capita cost of the public 
goods or services, it could also lead to deterioration in the quality of these goods or 
services. An example is a local park (Oates, 1968): the admission of additional 
residents to the park benefits existing community by allowing the costs of the 
construction of the park to be divided among more persons, but there would be a point 
where the marginal benefits (cost-sharing) equal the marginal costs (congestion). This 
class of goods comes to be known as local public goods or club goods, because its 
benefits accrue to the group of the local community only and are subject to congestion. 
Club theory, introduced by Buchanan (1965), models how individuals with the same 
tastes sort themselves into groups to share the public goods under the Tiebout’s (1956) 
framework. The meaning of local public goods is not entirely consistent. Some 
scholars (such as Oates 1968) argue that local public goods do not necessarily need to 
have the feature of congestion, as long as they have a limited spatial dimension (this 
seems to be the case in the much of the fiscal federalism theory).     31
There may be cases where the production of certain goods or services require 
considerable economics of scale (or says a very large amount of fixed capital), a 
situation known as natural monopoly commodities. Market failure arises when the 
average cost of production exceeds marginal cost at any levels of output. Inman (1987) 
summarizes that there would be two inefficient outcomes under such situation. In the 
case where no threat of market entry exists, the firm would charge the price higher 
than the marginal cost and under-produce the goods. In the case where a threat of 
entry exists, the firm would charge the price at long-run average cost, not the marginal 
cost. In both cases, the outcomes are not Pareto efficient. The solution requires the 
government to extract demand information from all consumers.   
 
The development of information economics in the past three decades has improved 
the understanding of the market process. Asymmetric or incomplete information is 
such a situation that sellers know more about the quality of the goods than the buyers. 
There are two potential problems: moral hazard and adverse selection. The seller may 
have the incentive to under-provide quality, knowing that the consumer may have less 
knowledge of the products they are selling (the moral hazard problem) (Inman, 1987). 
Adverse selection arises when the consumers choose to forgo the consumption as a 
result of not being able to distinguish between good or bad products (ibid). The 
market may collapse when these two problems are serious. The role assigned to 
government here is to regulate or provide certification about the sellers to the 
consumers.    32
Education, health and various forms of social insurances are not public goods in the 
sense that these goods are excludable and “rival”. They are quasi-private goods. 
Although there seems to be no single dominant answer as to why these goods are 
provided by the public sector, several lines of reasoning do exist. For the public 
provision or financing of education, some contends that there are positive externalities 
arising from an educated person. Others believe that education is a merit good—it is 
good for the children to go to school, no matter how they think. Feldstein (1975) 
introduces a concept of categorical equity to justify government’s involvement in 
financing/delivering these services: the consumption of these categories of 
goods/services should not be linked to individual’s ability to pay (the level of 
consumption is not allowed by society to differ substantially between individuals). 
Thus, there involves an element of income redistribution. Similar arguments may be 
applied to health care. But for social insurances, there are different reasons. According 
to Stigliz (1989,1991 and 1992), the public pension insurance is introduced partly as a 
response of a market failure—the imperfection of the annuity market (annuity is the 
financial product which perpetually pays fixed nominal amount of return to the 
investors on a annual basis; unlike bonds, annuity has no maturity dates). 
Theoretically, annuity is a suitable insurance product against old age, as it pays every 
year no matter how long an individual lives. But individuals may opt for government 
guaranteed bonds that have certain maturity dates (says 30 years); if they think they 
are unlikely to live longer than another 30 years. There is also adverse selection 
problem: the insurance company worries that those annuity insurance buyers are those   33
most confident that they will live long (ibid). The potential unprofitability would 
make the private insurance company reluctant to provide these products. The second 
possible reason why a public pension scheme is needed is that people may decide not 
to save enough or fail to save enough for their old ages. So it may be desirable for the 
government to act paternalistically to force individuals to save for their future 
(Atkinson, 1987). This reason is similar to merit good argument. Income 
redistribution is another consideration, given that the link between what individuals 
contribute and what they receive in future is not so strong. Although the economic 
rationales provide some justification for the provision of various forms of social 
security, they do not give a historical account as to why these services were 
introduced in the first place. The insights from regulation theory provide better 
answer to this question (briefly discussed in Chapter 3).     
 
2.2 From Public Finance to Fiscal Federalism   
The first generation theory of fiscal federalism (FGT) and some empirical evidence 
suggest that the two branches, Stabilization and Distribution (the distribution here 
refers to interpersonal income redistribution), are best performed by the central 
(national) governments. The case against local redistribution is that migration or the 
mobility of capital and high income individuals would distort or prevent a successful 
distributive goal. Suppose that when a local jurisdiction actively imposes higher taxes 
and redistributes more income to the poor, more poor are likely to be lured to this area   34
in response to the policy change, but the higher income individuals and households 
are also likely to move out of this community to avoid a higher level of taxation. 
Musgrave (1997, p68) argues that “federal government with its nationwide coverage 
can afford the use of progressive taxation while state and local jurisdictions, fearful to 
lose tax base, must rely on flatter income and larger regressive sales taxation”. This is 
not to say local governments could not be involved in any kinds of redistribution. It 
simply implies that local governments have limited capacity to offer their own 
redistribution agendas. In fact, in the US, the state governments are also involved in 
certain social security provision. There are, however, some arguments for local 
redistribution. Pauly (1973) considers income redistribution from a utility perspective. 
He suggests that rich individuals are more inclined to help the poor in their own 
communities than in other areas and local redistribution satisfies both rich and poor in 
the local community. But when the income redistribution preference is a national goal, 
distribution policy is no longer a local public good (Musgrave, 1997). In the real 
world, most countries assign this function primarily to the central (federal) 
government; yet some of the transition countries, including China and a few East 
European transition countries, have decentralized this function to subnational 
governments during their economic reforms.   
 
The stabilization function of the government specified by Musgrave is that the 
government needs to maintain near full employment with stable prices in an 
inherently cyclical economy. Such responsibility should also be rested on the central   35
government because the local governments do not have the access to monetary tools 
and are open to trade and migration. Therefore, they have limited ability to influence 
the levels of employment and prices. Oates (1968) uses a simple local income and 
payment model to demonstrate that local governments could not stabilize the local 
economy without harming the neighbouring jurisdictions. Specifically, he shows that 
leakages to imports and exports could render local stabilization policies ineffective.  
Thus remedying unemployment and stabilising the price are to be conducted on a 
national scale.   
 
Therefore, the scope for fiscal decentralization in FGT is in the Efficiency branch. 
There is consensus that national public goods, such as national defence, must be the 
responsibility of the federal government. In a country where there is more than one 
level of government, should the provision of local public goods or services (benefits 
accrued to a limited geographical area, e.g. local police services) be left to local 
public sector or should it still be delivered by the central government? The 
“Decentralization Theorem” formalized by Oates (1972) offers a very straightforward 
answer.  
 
“…in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a local 
public good and of inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will 
always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of 
consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform 
level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions” (Oates 1972, 
p54)   36
Such argument for fiscal decentralization, labelled as first generation theory of fiscal 
federalism (FGT) is grounded on economic efficiency consideration: the local 
governments, being closer to the residences, have better knowledge than the central 
government to acquire the information of local preferences; therefore they could be 
more efficient than the central government (which tends to provide uniform level of 
output). Thus decentralization of local public goods provision provides opportunities 
for social welfare gains. An extended line of argument for fiscal decentralization is 
that it could encourage the experimentation of public policies in different jurisdictions 
(often called laboratory federalism) to promote innovations and cost-effectiveness in 
public programs (Oates, 1999). As a result, new knowledge and innovations could 
lead to diffused benefits to the country as a whole, since various localities can learn 
from the failures and successes of others (Garzarelli, 2006).   
 
The famous Tiebout (1956) model to some extent strengthens the case for fiscal 
decentralization. Tiebout senses that competitive local governments could provide 
bundles of local public services at different tax rates (prices) and the competition 
process could be analogical to the competitive markets for private goods. Therefore, 
mobile households can “vote with their feet”, selecting the locality that perfectly 
matches their tastes. Such decentralized government competitions suggested by 
Tiebout would ultimately lead to optimal mixes of communities and group choices, in 
particular when local public goods and services are subjected to congestions. The 
Tiebout’s assumptions (see Rubinfield 1987 for the summery and comments of the   37
nine assumptions), however, may be unrealistic. Oates (2005) in his recent paper to 
update the FGT of fiscal federalism, points out that Tiebout’s model as the impetus for 
fiscal decentralization may be exaggerated. He envisions a situation where the 
households are absolutely immobile, the efficient output level of local public goods 
would still vary from one jurisdiction to another. It is questionable that why should 
households migrate solely because of the local tax-expenditure differentials rather 
than other factors such as employment opportunities. Researches (see Boadway 2001) 
in industrial nations show that local tax differentials often have only a marginal 
influence on migration choices. In the setting of many developing countries, the 
assumption that households move across regions in searching for higher welfare 
benefits is far too stringent (Bardhan, 2002). A more balanced argument is made by 
Boadway (2001), which states that the main message of the Tiebout model is useful, 
because when there are heterogeneous communities and some potential mobility, 
decentralized decision-makers will strive to provide the best mix of public goods and 
services that they could.   
 
According to FGT, there are potential costs of fiscal decentralization. When 
economics of scales exist in public goods provision, centralization is said to be more 
cost-effective. But provided that local public goods only require the finance, not 
necessarily the production, from the local public sector, local governments could still 
enjoy scale economics by using private contractors (Tullock, 1969). Secondly, since 
the boundaries of local jurisdictions are fixed, there will be inevitably some spillover   38
effects (the benefits or costs of certain public goods or services produced in one 
jurisdiction may spill over to other localities). When there are expenditure 
externalities, we know that local provision of these public goods and services would 
be sub-optimal (under-producing the goods and over-producing the bads). There are 
basically two solutions. One is to assign the provision of these services to higher 
levels of government. A more favourable solution (according to most of the 
economists) is to utilize central-local subsidies or taxes to offset the externality 
problems. In the case of positive externalities, the higher level of government could 
provide an open-ended matching grant (with matching rates proportional to the level 
of externalities) to simulate the recipient to extend the output of local public goods to 
the point where marginal social benefits equal the marginal cost. A tax could be levied 
by the central government to penalize for negative externalities. Empirically, the 
levels of these externalities are difficult or even impossible to measure.   
 
Similar to expenditure externalities, tax externalities occur when taxes levied in one 
region spill over to other regions, which could also have positive or negative effects. 
Positive tax externalities are induced from tax competitions. When decentralized 
governments use tax incentives to attract business, the result may be a “race to the 
bottom”; where all regions charge tax rates that are too low from an efficiency point 
of view (Boadway, 2001). Negative tax externalities could happen when a local 
jurisdiction could export the taxes to non-residents (for instances, taxes levied on 
products that are purchased by residents from other states). In theory the matching   39
grants may also be used to correct for tax externalities, in practice, however, it is very 
difficult to measure the net effect arising from tax externalities. An important 
implication is that decentralized levels of government whenever possible, should only 
charge benefit taxation (such as user-charges) to mobile units and that non-benefit 
taxes (such as taxes on capital and businesses) on highly mobile unit are better 
assigned to the central government. Another reason for assigning personal income tax 
to the central level is for income redistribution. According to this principle, the theory 
suggests that taxes on immobile units, such as land or property qualify for good local 
taxes, as they do not create locational inefficiencies (Oates, 1999).   
 
2.3 Principles of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations under FGT 
In additions to the expenditure and tax externalities problem mentioned above, there 
are other cases that may require intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. These 
problems include three forms of horizontal fiscal inequity, fiscal inefficiency and the 
vertical fiscal imbalance. We briefly review these issues in turn. This section benefits 
enormously from Boadway (2001), Bird (2002), Bird and Smart (2002), Bird and 
Tarasov (2004), Shah (1997,2004,2006).   
 
The notion of fiscal equity differs from conventional interpersonal equity. It concerns 
with redistribution of financial resources between regions rather than redistribution of 
income between individuals. Although is still a subjective concept deserving some   40
kinds of value judgment, horizontal fiscal equity may call for: comparably equal 
treatment of individuals no matter where they live (Buchanan, 1950; Buchanan and 
Goetz, 1972; Boadway 2001); a national minimum standards of certain public goods 
and services such as basic education, the consumption of which should not be based 
on individual’s ability to pay (named as categorical equity by Feldstein 1975) and 
finally a more levelled playing field for different regions to compete (this point 
receives the least support from the economic perspective and it has much more to do 
with politics see Oates 1999 for elaborated discussion). Intergovernmental fiscal 
relations normally address the first two kinds of horizontal fiscal inequity.     
 
Fiscal decentralization would inevitably create differences in fiscal capacities among 
local jurisdictions. It could then result in differences in net fiscal benefits across local 
communities. Net fiscal benefit is known as the difference between what a resident 
receive (the services provided by the local public sector) and what he/she has paid 
(Boadway 2001).  In some relatively well-off local communities the residents may 
be levied at a lower tax rate but still get the same or more public services than those 
who residing in poorer community. Therefore, otherwise identical persons are treated 
different simply because they live in different places. This is a source of horizontal 
fiscal inequity to the extent that poorer residents do not relocate to these communities 
with higher net fiscal benefit. It becomes a fiscal inefficiency problem when the poor 
relocate to these communities in response to higher net fiscal benefits differentials.  
But as discussed earlier, household relocation based on net benefit differentials is not   41
usual, in particular in developing countries. Boadway (2001) points out: the principles 
of horizontal fiscal inequity and fiscal inefficiency are self-reinforcing. But when net 
fiscal benefits are reflected in differences in property prices, the argument for 
equalizing fiscal capacities could be weakened. This is because the individuals living 
in higher income communities may consume certain public services at low tax-price; 
but they may have to pay higher housing prices for these benefits. The theoretical 
solution of this kind of horizontal fiscal inequity is to introduce an equalization grant 
(unconditional grant) to bring up the fiscal capacities of poorer regions to certain 
standards so that they are able to provide the public services at comparable tax rates 
(though the recipients may not choose to do so).   
 
Under the decentralized settings, some poorer areas may not be able to provide even a 
minimum level of public services that are of national concern. These public goods and 
services such as basic education and health care are merit goods in nature  and are 
also considered as in-kind transfers. The consumption of these public services may 
not be allowed by society to differ substantially between individuals. To effectively 
enforce a national minimum standard, the central government could provide a 
conditional non-matching grant to these poor areas (with the condition being that the 
transfer could only be spent on the targeted public services).   
 
In addition to efficiency and equity considerations, there is a practical need for 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, which is to close the vertical fiscal imbalance.   42
Vertical fiscal gaps/imbalance (thereafter VFI) arises when some levels of government 
raise more revenues than the corresponding expenditure needs, while other levels of 
government have expenditure responsibilities exceeding their revenue-raising 
capacities (Bird and Tarasov, 2004). In such situation, transfer of financial resources 
between different levels of government is required to close the gap. Empirical studies 
(notably Bird and Tarasov, 2004) find that the size of VFI varies substantially across 
countries and there is no well-established theory to determine the right level of VFI. 
Vertical fiscal imbalance is quantitatively the largest need for intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers in most countries, especially in developing countries (Shah, 2004). The 
central government tends to raise more revenue than it needs for several reasons 
(because the mobile tax bases are better assigned to the central level in the interest of 
tax harmonization). If the VFI is large enough, the central government may 
incorporate equalization elements in the central-local fiscal transfers to correct for 
both VFI and fiscal inequity problems.   
 
The adoption of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in individual countries may not 
fully follow the economic principles (in some cases it may even contradict with the 
economic principles). In the USA, there is no equalization grant; but specific grants 
(spending is restricted to certain category such as education) from the federal 
government to the states do have an equalization element, where poorer state would 
get a larger share. For many years, the Canadian, German and Australian governments 
have been using formula-based equalization transfers (taking into account both the   43
needs and capacities) to help boost the fiscal capacities of less-developed regions as 
well as to maintain the minimum provision of certain public services (see the 
dedicated analysis by Bird 2002; Bird and Smart 2002; Bird and Tarasov 2004). But 
as pointed out by Bird and Tarasov (2004) and Shah (2006), the amount of resources 
transferred may be much larger than economic theory (i.e. horizontal and categorical 
equity consideration) could explain. A study (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez 2005) 
surveying the determinants of the incidence of intergovernmental grants across twelve 
countries confirm that horizontal allocations of intergovernmental grants are not just 
determined by economic considerations but more by political factors (see Grossman 
1994 for detailed discussion of political factors in determining the grants). It is very 
difficult for the developing and transition countries to introduce a sophisticated 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system (as required by the FGT theory). Because the 
formula-based transfer system requires significant amount of data collection and data 
computation, which are costly and the implementation of such a system may 
introduce incentive problems such as local manipulation of the data inputs to obtain 
more resources (Bird, 2002).   
 
Given the diversity of institutions across countries, it is also unrealistic to lay out a 
uniform prescription for the implementation of an optimal intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer system for developing and transition countries. Suggested by a number of 
authors (such as Shah 2006; Bird and Smart, 2002; Bird, 2004), at the broadest level, 
the desirable characteristics of intergovernmental fiscal transfers are simplicity,   44
transparency and objectivity. Fiscal transparency sends a clear signal to both recipient 
governments and their citizens about where the resources come from and for what 
reasons, thus it promotes accountability (Shah 2006). In addition, fiscal transparency 
in resource distribution to a great extent avoids unproductive and inequitable political 
bargaining for more resources. A simple and objective formula to resource allocation 
reduces the chances of local manipulation in order to receive more resources. In 
practice, adhering to these three “basic” rules is by no means easy, however.   
 
2.4 The Second Generation Theories of Fiscal Federalism (SGT)   
By assuming uniform level of output by the central government and a Pigouvian view 
of government as social welfare maximiser, the first generation theory of fiscal 
federalism (FGT) sees greater welfare gains from fiscal decentralization and proposes 
various forms of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to correct for potential 
inefficiencies and promote fiscal equity. These two key assumptions have however 
been criticized by the political economists, who justify fiscal decentralization from 
different angles. Moreover, some of the empirical effects of intergovernmental grants 
seemed to deviate from the predictions by FGT; for example, there are some 
unintended consequences of the grants such as the “fly paper effect”, “common pool 
problem” and “soft budget constraint problem”. The political economy approaches to 
fiscal decentralization (second generation theories of fiscal federalism, SGT) could 
shed some lights on these issues and generate some caveats for the design of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations.     45
In a nutshell, the political economy perspectives differ from traditional public finance 
analysis in that they treat governments as endogenous social institutions that have 
their own agendas; so even if there are roles (e.g. correcting market failures) for the 
governments to play, the governments themselves may not automatically adopt 
Pareto-improving policies, because their decisions are influenced by voters’ 
preferences, politicians, pressure groups, special interest groups, the bureaucratic 
machinery and any other participating agents(Inman, 1987; Rubinfeld, 1987). In other 
words, the adoption of any policy by the governments is the balanced result of 
rational political agents participating in the decision-making process. Another 
difference is that the political economy approach emphasizes political process in 
revealing individuals’ preferences for public services (Boadway, 1997), while the 
traditional public finance theory assumes the government has full information. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) were among the earliest scholars studying and 
mimicking (by using models) the various aspects of the political process (for instance, 
lobbying, legislative bargaining, and electoral competitions). The development of this 
strand of research helps to understand government failure and propose policy 
remedies to improve the political outcomes. The political economy literature is 
enormous (see for example, Persson, 2000 for a review) and we could only discuss 
some of the most relevant ones on fiscal decentralization.   
  
Political economists often question the ad hoc assumption made by traditional 
economic theories that politicians are benevolent social planners. By considering the   46
worst case, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) developed a “Leviathan” hypothesis that 
treats politicians as rent-seekers who tend to maximize the extraction (tax revenue) 
from the economy (the politicians have strong incentives to stay in power, augment 
the salaries and control more money and people). Since the voters have little 
knowledge of the cost function underlying the public services provision, they could 
only control the tax side. These two authors offer several principles to constrain the 
Leviathan. One of the potential solutions is fiscal decentralization. They envisage that 
the horizontal government competitions in a decentralized system may be used as the 
disciplining forces to restraint the expansionary tendencies of local governments: 
when the tax bases are mobile, an increase in tax rates may lead to exodus of mobile 
factors. This view contrasts stridently with the Pigouvian approach of government 
competitions, which suggests that local tax rates are likely to be too low, given the 
existence of various kinds of spillovers. In a similar vein, Qian and Weingast (1997 ) 
Qian (1998) develop a so-called “market-persevering federalism” theory, seeing fiscal 
decentralization as an effective way to constrain the expansionary government and 
preserve the private market, which could lead to higher economic growth. However, 
the empirical evidence that fiscal decentralization could constrain the expansionary 
tendency of the governments are at best mixed (see Oates 1985, Rodden 2003a, 2003b 
and Zhu and Krug 2005a). The empirical evidence that fiscal decentralization leads to 
higher economic growth are also hybrid (see Oates, 1999 for a discussion).   
 
The recent development of the SGT has managed to model both Leviathan and   47
Pigouvian elements into the theoretical analysis of fiscal decentralization 
(governments are assumed to be in-between Leviathan and Pigouvian). In addition, 
they depart from the early assumption (proposed by Oates, 1972) that the central 
provision of public goods is uniform. They emphasize political processes under which 
voters provide an endogenous disciplining force on politicians within political 
jurisdictions (Epple and Nechyba, 2004). Many of these papers make the use of 
Tiebout framework. Some of those scholars follow the line of incomplete-contract and 
principal-agency framework. Incomplete contracts originally referred to the 
incomplete control rights allocated to different stakeholders (of a company): managers, 
debtors, shareholders and so on (Oates, 2005). Elections are also examples of 
incomplete contracts. Central to incomplete-contract and principal-agency perspective 
is information asymmetry and imperfect monitoring. While SGT considers a range of 
different political processes using different assumptions, it generally justifies fiscal 
decentralization from two aspects: efficiency and political accountability. Models of 
legislative decision-making with centralization (such as Lockwood, 1998; Besley and 
Coate 2003) stress the cause of efficiency loss under centralization. Models of 
electoral control (e.g. Besley and Case 1995) study the degree to which incumbents 
are accountable to voters under the situation of centralization and decentralization. 
The insight from these theoretical researches is that if the probability that bad 
(rent-seeker) incumbent losses the election is sufficiently high, fiscal decentralization 
(due to increased government competitions and enhanced local control) could result in 
higher voter welfare.     48
What would be the case when voters have insufficient knowledge about the political 
choices they face? Besley and Case (1995) adopt the term yardstick competition to 
study the behaviour of competitive governments under the situation of information 
asymmetry. In this type of model, voters endeavour to maximize their welfare by 
comparing the outcome in neighbouring jurisdictions with performance of their own 
local governments. So if the voters observe a disproportionate (relative to other 
jurisdictions) rise in local taxes, a signal that local officials are engaging in 
rent-seeking or are ineffective, they may challenge the politician when they are up for 
re-election (ibid). Yardstick competitions allow voters to more easily identify local 
Leviathan politicians (Epple and Nechyba, 2004; Belleflamme, 2005) but the premise 
is that transparency in government decision-making is in place and a mass media that 
are not subject to censorship (Lockwood, 2005).   
 
Most of the SGT literature is indifferent to the solution of coordination problems 
arising from fiscal decentralization (i.e. the failure to internalize spillovers and the 
failure to address fiscal inequity under fiscal decentralization). But the insights from 
some of the SGT literature do help understand the potential negative effects of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. For instance, the widely known “fly-paper 
effect”— a dollar increase in intergovernmental transfers lead to much higher local 
public spending than a dollar increase in residents’ private income (see Hines and 
Thaler 1995 for a comprehensive review) could be explained by the SGT literature: 
the bureaucrats are far from benevolent (if not outright Leviathan) and they do seek to   49
enlarge their power by expanding the budget (Shah, 2006). Thus it is suggested that 
vertical fiscal imbalance is better keep to the minimum—so that the local 
governments would have to raise the revenue at the margin (establishes a clear 
connection between revenue and expenditure to hold them accountable). Another 
justification for lower level of vertical fiscal imbalance (self-financing) is that when 
the link between expenditure and taxes are obscured (voters become less likely to spot 
overspending by the local government) or intergovernmental grants can be easily 
obtained by negotiations or lobbying, local government may have a fiscal illusion that 
they can easily exploit the national common fiscal resources (the common pool 
problem) and expect the central government to bail them out for their own fiscal 
indiscipline—soft budget constraint problems (Rodden, 2002, 2003a; de Mello 2000). 
 
2.5 Fiscal Decentralization in Developing and Transition Nations: the Problem of 
Unmet Fiscal Needs at the Local Levels     
While the theories of fiscal federalism suggest that fiscal decentralization may 
improve allocative efficiency and accountability, the FGT also recognizes the possible 
costs of fiscal decentralization as a result of economic externalities, horizontal fiscal 
inefficiency and fiscal inequity. From a normative standpoint, the FGT proposes a 
series of intergovernmental fiscal transfers to deal with these issues, with the basic 
assumption that government is benevolent with full information. Departing from this 
assumption, some of the SGT recognize the potential negative effects of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Both FGT and SGT are relevant for understanding   50
the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels in developing and transition 
nations.  
 
A number of authors, notably, Bird et al (1995b), Bird and Vaillancourt (1999), Shah 
(1998, 2004), Dabla-Norris (2006) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) have offered 
extensive studies of this problem on a cross-country basis, applying the fiscal 
federalism theories as the analytical framework. Some common findings could be 
summarized from these studies. It is reported that subnational governments in 
developing and transition nations often have inadequate own source of revenues to 
finance the expenditure responsibilities devolved to them, which may be attributable 
to under-developed local tax base (such as property tax and user charges), the limited 
autonomy to levy taxes by subnational governments or the central government’s 
monopolized claim over too much tax revenue. In the context of transition nations, 
revenue inadequacy may also be the result of marketization, where the old soviet-type 
tax bases have been eroded while new market-conforming tax bases not being 
introduced on time. In a nutshell, there tends to be a much larger vertical fiscal 
imbalance in developing and transition countries than in developed nations. Shah and 
Thompson (2004) argue that while in most countries the central government often 
raise more revenue than its expenditure needs, in developing and transition economies, 
centralization of taxing responsibilities is much more pronounced than would be 
based on economic considerations.    Thus subnational governments of these countries 
are usually more dependent on the central government for the transfer of fiscal   51
revenue.  
 
In these nations, it is a common practice for the central government to return part of 
the tax revenue it collected to subnational governments on the basis of the geographic 
origin of the revenues. This is called derivation-based tax sharing and the implication 
is that higher income areas get higher tax returns because these areas normally have 
higher tax bases. So provided that the budget in rich areas could be balanced after 
receiving the tax returns, some poorer localities may still not have enough resources 
to carry out the important decentralized expenditure functions, resulting in fiscal 
needs not being met in those areas. This is especially the case when the economic 
development in local areas is so diverse in many developing and transition countries. 
Even if all the locally generated revenues are retained at their respective areas, it may 
still be unrealistic to expect smaller, less developed areas to carry out many costly 
functions such as education, health care and social welfare without additional fiscal 
supports. Of course, given the same level of fiscal capacity, some areas are likely to 
have higher financial needs in these sectors than other areas because of demographic 
differences such as higher proportion of school age population or aged population. As 
reviewed in section 2.4, the principles of intergovernmental fiscal relations provide 
three different normative justifications for the central government to transfer 
additional fiscal resources to support the local governments. If difference in net fiscal 
benefits across local governments is the problem, equalization grants can be used to 
boost the fiscal capacity of poor areas and the recipient governments are free to spend   52
the grants on any sector (this honours the objective of fiscal decentralization—better 
preference-matching). If provision of a minimum level of services that are of national 
interest is the purpose, conditional non-matching transfers are often used and the 
recipient governments must spend the transfers on the pre-determined expenditure 
items. The third reason is to correct for positive externalities, using conditional 
matching grants. It is found by those studies that the problem of unmet fiscal needs at 
the local levels may be mitigated if properly designed intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers are in place. But the extents to which the fiscal capacities between different 
local areas are equalized and the minimum level of service is defined are still a matter 
of central government’s fiscal capacity. In other words, a higher level of equalization 
and a higher minimum national standard would require more fiscal transfers, which 
may not always be feasible if the central government’s fiscal position is not that 
strong. Shah (2004) states that although central-local fiscal transfers in many 
developing and transition countries do incorporate equalization and expenditure need 
elements, lack of explicit equalization standards tend to compromise the objective.         
 
Apart from the failure in division of expenditure and revenue responsibilities and 
intergovernmental fiscal coordination, the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local 
levels may also be attributable to political reasons. It is revealed that when the 
institutions of local democracy are weak or absent, which may be the case in many 
developing countries, there is a greater risk that local governments would be captured 
by the local elites or interest groups (Prud'homme, 1995; Tanzi, 2001; Bardhan, 2002;   53
Shah, 1998, 2004). This could undermine the provision of social services for the 
residents at large, when the scarce fiscal resources are siphoned away for other uses. 
Strengthening local democracy institutions (where citizens could voice and exist) is 
the perceived solution to this local governance problem.   
 
While the original fiscal federalism theory (Oate’s Decentralization Theorem 1972) 
was broadened to deal with decentralization of quasi-private goods and services such 
as education, health and welfare services, it has not been developed to address 
decentralization of social security function (redistribution). Moreover, as the theory 
was developed in the context of industrial nations in particular the US and Canada, it 
to some extent implicitly assumes that a welfare state is the starting point (assumes 
that a well established redistribution system is already in place). As reviewed at the 
beginning of this chapter, fiscal federalism theories suggest that local governments are 
unlikely to be able to carry out active redistribution when the tax bases are mobile. 
Contrary to the conventional approach, in a few transition countries such as Hungary, 
Russia and China, a large part of the social security function has been decentralized to 
subnational governments during their market transition processes. The study of local 
public finance in Hungary by Bird et al (1995 b) suggests that decentralized provision 
of social security would also justify the use of central-local fiscal transfers.    Because 
on one hand, when the taxing responsibility is relatively centralized, decentralization 
of any expenditure function would need to come with the fiscal transfer to close the 
vertical fiscal imbalance; on the other hand, redistribution is normally of national   54
interest and also subject to certain minimum national standard. They point out that 
shifting the social security responsibility to lower levels of government in those 
Eastern European transition economies and former Soviet Union is the central 
governments’ strategy to push the deficit downward. This is largely because the 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union introduced market reforms at a time when 
the economies were urban and over-industrialized, with virtually the entire population 
covered by an extensive social welfare system that is beyond the financial capacity of 
the state (Sachs and Woo, 1994). The stagnant economic situation after the “shock 
therapy” reform significantly increased the number of persons claiming the social 
benefits at a time when the tax base was shrinking. Thus Bird et al (1995b) find that 
decentralization of social security created deep fiscal problems for local areas, usually 
in the poor areas, where much of the social security needs could not be properly met.   
 
We argue in the next chapter that while there are paralleling studies of the problem of 
unmet local fiscal needs in poorer areas of China, unmet fiscal needs in social security 
sector at the local levels tend to be under-estimated and under-researched. This 
research aims to fill in this small gap by investigating and verifying whether there 
have been unmet fiscal needs in social security sector in relative affluent local areas 
during China’s post Tax-Sharing reform era (1994-2007). In comparison to the 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, China began reform as an agricultural 
society with a much smaller industry sector (in 1978, 71% of the labour force was in 
agricultural; only 15% was in industry and half of which was in SOEs, see Sachs and   55
Woo, 1994). Only the staff and workers in government institutions and SOEs, a very 
small population section, were covered by the state welfare system. The second 
difference is that China had not thoroughly reformed its SOE sector until mid-late 
1990s, after the economy experienced twenty-year’s fast growth. Therefore, unlike the 
social security reforms in Eastern European and former Soviet Union, where there 
was no much change in the coverage, the social security reforms in China in the 
mid-late 1990s involve transfer of social welfare responsibility borne by SOE to the 
government, as well as the introduction of social security to the non-state sectors. It 
might be tempted for one to argue that the fiscal burden of social security could not 
have been a problem in China, given its fast economic growth and a smaller SOE 
sector. But on one hand, the evidence (from Wong and Bird, 2005) that some of the 
central-local transfers were used to subsidize local social security sector may indicate 
fiscal inadequacy at the local levels; on the other hand, the expansion of social 
security coverage may also require subsidies from the governments. Hence, it is 
difficult to reach a coherent conclusion without doing an empirical research. This 
research might help enable further comparison between the excess decentralization 
experience in China and in those Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union. 
In Chapter 3, we critically review the research problem in the Chinese context and 
make a small step to propose an extended framework to help better understand the 
problem.  
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Chapter 3: China’s Fiscal Decentralization in the Context of Market 
Transition: Toward an Extended Framework to Recognize the 
Problem of Unmet Social Security Needs at the Local Levels 
 
In Chapter 2, we review the theories of fiscal federalism and principles of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations and illustrate how the normative theories deal with 
the problem of unmet fiscal needs at subnational levels in developing and transition 
nations. In this chapter, we discuss the research problem of unmet fiscal needs at the 
local levels of China. In the first three sections (3.1 to 3.3) of this chapter, we briefly 
review the evolution of China’s fiscal system since the founding of People’s Republic 
of China in 1949. From the late 1970s, several rounds of reforms have been 
introduced to the fiscal sphere, which gradually converted the highly centralized 
Soviet-style fiscal regime (established in 1949) to a more market-conforming and 
decentralized fiscal system. But the conventional view is that the reforms are not fully 
complete, as the division of expenditure responsibilities between different layers of 
governments is not clarified and a transparent and rule-based intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer system is still not in place.  It is in such a contextual background that the 
research problem has been raised. The review aims to capture the important changes 
and continuities in the fiscal system over the period and the emphasis is on the more 
recent period, in particular the post-1994 Tax-Sharing system. Specifically, we discuss 
the revenue and expenditure assignments, central-local fiscal relations and fiscal   57
administration in three distinguishable periods, namely, the pre-reform system 
(1949-1979), the Fiscal-Contracting period (1980-1993) and the Tax Sharing System 
(1994 till now). From section 3.4 to 3.8, we critically review current debates on the 
problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels, identify the research gap, and 
propose an extended theoretical framework to complement existing studies. Four 
testable hypotheses are generated at the end of this chapter.   
 
3.1 The Pre-Market Reform Fiscal Regime (1949-1979) 
During Mao-era, the fiscal system in China was highly centralized and compatible 
with the Soviet-type economic system, with its primary objective being the fulfilment 
of the central plans. On the revenue side, most of the government income derived 
from taxes and profits from industry sector, which comprised of State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs, the dominant form) and a small number of collective enterprises. 
The tax structure was simple: a commercial-industrial tax (i.e. the turnover tax, tax 
rates differentiated by products) applying to all enterprises and the enterprise income 
tax levying on collective enterprises (Wong et al, 1995). There were no property tax, 
personal income tax or resources taxes that are common in market economies. In 
addition to the tax levies, SOEs were obligated to remit most of the profits to the state, 
so the effective tax rates on SOEs would be over 90 percent (Perkins, 1988). The 
SOEs were essentially part of the bureaucracy because like local governments, they 
were also the budgeting units. By 1979, around 80 percent of the government revenue   58
came from industrial profits and taxes and the government revenue as share of 
national income reached 40 percent (Finance Statistic Yearbook of China, 2001). The 
secret of this revenue buoyancy from industrial sector was the result of what Wong 
(1991) called the “price scissors”. Under central planning, the prices of all products 
and material inputs were set by the central government. The state set quotas and 
artificially fixed low prices for the delivery of crops (Perkins, 1988). This allowed the 
state to transfer the surplus from agriculture to industrial sector (Wong, 1991).   
 
On the expenditure side, priority was given to capital construction (particularly in 
heavy industry) and national defence projects, both were national responsibilities. 
Throughout the period, these two items jointly consumed more than 60 percent of the 
budgeted spending (ibid). This was similar to the experiences of Soviet-Unions in the 
1930s. The composition of government spending (including both the central and local 
governments) was determined at the national level in the Five Year Plans and annual 
plans. Budgeting process was used to decompose the plan targets down to production 
units and lower levels of governments. Therefore, though local governments were 
given the responsibility over day-to-day administration and the provision of social 
services (such as education, health, public safety and transportation), they had little 
right to decide the spending structure. In other words, there was only delegation 
(administrative decentralization), where local governments acted as agents of the 
central government.   
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The tight political control enabled the central government to rely on local 
governments for the collection of most revenues. The central government only 
collected profits and taxes from a few large SOEs as well as the exercise taxes on its 
own (Zhang, 1999) and up to 1993 there had no independent National Tax Bureau. 
Local governments collected and transferred the fiscal revenues to the central 
government, which then decided the allocation of resources among local government 
units and across different sectors. The only discretionary resource the local 
governments had was the extra-budgetary revenue (EBR). In the pre-reform era, the 
size of EBR had been quite small: around 5 percent of the budget (Wong, 1992). Five 
major types of central-provincial revenue sharing arrangement were experimented in 
the 1960s and 1970s, at a time when the central government was searching for better 
central-local fiscal relations. The central government, by controlling most of the 
government revenue, was able to transfer financial resources to poorer provinces to 
promote interregional equality in both income and fiscal revenue. The link between 
expenditure and revenues at the local levels was very weak. For instance, Shanghai 
would normally surrender 80 percent of the revenue it collected to the centre while 
some poor provinces could spend much more than the revenue they collected, as a 
result of fiscal redistribution (ibid). According to Yang (1990), much of the fiscal 
redistribution was used to eradicate regional industrial disparities via interior-oriented 
investments.    In a nutshell, the fiscal regime under Mao-era was redistributive at the 
expense of economic efficiency. Local governments had little incentive or scope to 
promote local economic development or collect additional revenues.       60
3.2a The Changing Fiscal Regimes (1980-1993) 
The introduction of market reform (first in rural sector then expanded to industrial 
sector) since 1978 had placed significant challenges on the fiscal system, in both the 
revenue and expenditure sides. Between 1980 and 1993, the central-provincial fiscal 
regimes were frequently adjusted, making it increasingly intricate. It makes more 
sense to firstly discuss the shifting central-local fiscal arrangements as well as the 
logics behind these alterations and then move on to consider the changing 
composition of government revenue and expenditure, including the extra-budgetary 
revenues (EBR) and off-budget revenues (OBR). The major types of central-local 
fiscal arrangements over the period are highlighted in Table 3.1.     
 
‘Eating in Separate Kitchens'; Five Main Arrangements
  1.Lump-sum Transfer (in Guangdong and Fujian)
  2.Sharing Total Revenue,sharing rate alterred annually by the central      government (in Beijing,
Shanghai and Tianjin)
  3.Sharing Total Revenue, sharing rate fixed for five years (in Jiangsu)
  4.Dividing Revenue by Sources and Remitting the Surplus (in 16 provinces)
  5.Dividing Revenue by Sources and Receiving Subsidies (in 8 provinces)
Enterprise Tax Reforms; Frequent revisions in Revenue-Sharing
  1.Sharing Total Revenue replaced Dividing Revenue in 24 provinces in 1983
  2.Tax-for-profit reform launched in 1983 but withheld in 1986
  3.Enterprise Contract Responsibility System reintroduced in 1986
Contracting Extended to Central-local Fiscal Arrangements in 1988; Some Minor Changes in 1989-
1992
  1.Basic Sharing with Growth:province retains growing portion of locally collected revenues (10
provinces)
  2.Basic Sharing: province retains fixed proportion of revenues (3 provinces)
  3.Lump-sum Transfer: extension of 1980 Guangdong-Fujian type (4 provinces)
  4.Fixed Quota with Growth: contract nominal amount for the first year and increase at certain rates in
subsequent years (2 provinces)
  5.Fixed Quota with Central Subsidies: province receives fixed amount of subsidies from the center
(11 provinces)
Source: summarized from Oksenberg and Tong(1991), Agarwala(1992) and Wong et al(1995)
Table 3.1 Major Reforms in the Fiscal Sphere (1980-1993)
1980 to
1983
1983 to
1987
1988 to
1993
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The five types of central-provincial fiscal arrangements enacted in the early 1980s 
were either the extension or continuation of the experiments in 1960s and the late 
1970s. The key purpose of these experiments was to give local governments greater 
incentives in revenue collection and developing local economies. The provinces 
gained more power to decide the composition of local spending, as the ministries 
replaced the mandatory targets (used under central planning) with reference targets for 
the local governments. Moreover, the provincial governments obtained the right to 
determine the intergovernmental fiscal relations within the provinces. Thus fiscal 
decentralization began formally. This paralleled the reforms in SOE sector, where the 
enterprises were given marginal authority in production output (provided that they 
had already met the planned output targets, they could trade the additional products at 
market prices), were allowed to keep a larger portion of profits for their disposal and 
were given control over the depreciation funds (Wong, 1991). Unchanged from the 
previous system, local governments were prohibited from issuing bonds. Under these 
fiscal arrangements, sufficient funds would be retained at the local levels to cover the 
budgeted expenditure (Oskenberg and Tong, 1991) but the level of autonomy the 
provinces would enjoy differs significantly (see Table 3.1).   
 
Two southern coastal provinces, Fujian and Guangdong enjoyed the greatest 
autonomy and highest revenue collection incentives, because every year they either 
received (in the case of Fujian) from or transferred (in the case of Guangdong) 
revenue to Beijing on a lump-sum basis (such term would be fixed for five years and   62
the incentives came from the upward potential of revenue that could be retained at the 
local areas). This contrasted with the conditions of the three provincial level 
municipalities Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, which must negotiate with the centre to 
determine the revenue-sharing rates every year and were subject to tight central 
control. They ended up with retaining the smallest share of locally generated revenues. 
The fiscal agreement between Jiangsu province and the centre differed from the 
Fujian-Guangdong case in that the proportion of revenue remittance rather than the 
amount was fixed for five years. Such agreement ensured that both the centre and 
provinces would share the gain and share the pain—they would get the same revenue 
growth/decrease rates. Two other similar types of fiscal arrangements applied to the 
remaining 24 provinces. The rationale for both was that the sharing rates were not the 
same across the sources of revenue. Enterprises profits were shared on the basis of 
ownership: central enterprise profits accrued to the central government, local 
enterprise profits accrued to local authorities and enterprises under dual leadership 
sent 80 percent of the profits to the centre and 20 percent to local governments (Wong 
1992, p 209). Those minor taxes were assigned to the central (e.g. customs duties) and 
local governments (e.g. income tax on collective enterprises) respectively. The most 
important tax—the industrial and commercial tax became the “adjustment income”: 
the level of retention depended on the interaction between local fiscal capacity (the 
ability to generate revenue from enterprise profits and the minor taxes) and the 
expenditure requirements (the past levels of spending). Thus the 24 provinces could 
be subdivided to two group: 8 provinces (dominated by ethnic minority) with chronic   63
fiscal inadequacy would keep most share of the industrial-commercial tax plus central 
subsidy, while the other 16 provinces may have to surrender most part of this tax plus 
sending a proportion of local enterprise profits and minor taxes (ibid). Scholars 
described these central-local fiscal divisions as “eating in separate kitchens”, as 
opposed to “eating in the same pot” of the pre-reform system. An important 
implication, first noted by Wong (1992) is that local government budgets became 
increasingly dependent on the surplus generated by local enterprises. Apart from the 
fiscal arrangements used in Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, these fiscal regimes tended 
to strengthen the links between local expenditure and local revenue.     
 
The implementation of these fiscal regimes was not smooth in an era of “turbulence”. 
The rural economic reform initiated in 1979 (the introduction of household 
responsibility system and the dual price system) pushed the crop prices up (toward the 
true market prices) yet the grains sold in urban areas were fixed by the state at very 
low prices decades ago (Perkins, 1988). The fear of potential political unrest (should 
there be a sudden price rise) made the government introducing the price subsidies. In 
the early 1980s, price subsidies consumed near 10 percent of budgetary expenditure 
and contributed to central government budget deficits (Lardy 1983, cited by Perkins, 
1988). Almost at the same period (1980-1982), industrial profits started to fall, 
because on one hand the production costs increased (a result of the increase in input 
prices) and on the other hand, the entry of non-state enterprises started to put 
competitive pressure on less efficient SOEs. The five fiscal regimes collapsed to three   64
in 1983, with the fourth and fifth types being converted to the Jiangsu type—sharing 
total revenue. However, the sharing ratio was subject to the review of the central 
government, which essentially gave the central government greater flexibility in 
extracting revenues to close the deficits. In 1983, a uniform enterprise income tax (the 
first stage of the supposed tax-for-profit reform) was introduced to replace the SOE 
profit remittance approach, in order to reduce the bargaining between the government 
and the SOEs. This experiment was short-lived because of the hefty criticism from the 
disadvantaged SOE sector. The profitability rates differed across SOEs and to a large 
extent this was due to administrative measures (e.g. the input and output prices were 
fixed by the state). A uniform enterprise tax created a very unequal distribution of 
retained profits among SOEs. From 1986, the enterprise income tax system, along 
with other types of proposed taxes such as capital tax was suspended, since the profit 
rates of SOEs continued to fall. Resource taxes were only applied to coal, petroleum 
and gas production (Wong, 1992). A so-called enterprise contract responsibility 
system came into effect. Such system was not fundamentally different from the old 
profit remittance approach of the Soviet-type system, where SOEs signed contracts 
with its supervisory agency specifying the amount of profits to be remitted. This made 
the effective tax rates vary substantially across the SOEs. By abandoning the 
tax-for-profit scheme and returning to enterprise contracts, the government hoped the 
profitability of SOEs (its main tax base) would restore.   
 
Returning to enterprises contracting did not yield the expected outcome. The two   65
widely cited ratios—the government budgeted Revenue-to-GDP ratio and the central 
government’s share of budgeted revenue declined from 1986 onward (see Table 3.2 
columns A and B).  In 1988, the practice of enterprise contracting was extended to 
central-local fiscal arrangements. Under the fiscal contracting system (1988-1993), 
the central government negotiated with individual provinces to determine the amounts 
of payments to be transferred upward (or subsidies to be received from the centre) and 
each province signed contractual agreements with lower level governments for the 
same purpose.  Five major types of central-provincial arrangements could be 
identified (summarized in Table 3.1). The provinces, apart from those requiring fixed 
central subsidies (11 provinces) could retain part or all of the above quota fiscal 
revenues. This gave local jurisdictions strong incentives in revenue mobilization. The 
fiscal contracting system lasted for 6 years until the implementation of 
Tax-Sharing-Reform in 1994. It is generally recognized that the fiscal system became 
further decentralized with the introduction of fiscal contracting system, in terms of 
both expenditure and revenue assignments (Wong, 1991).   
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AB CD E FG
Central BR/GDP EBR/GDP EBR/BR Central
share of BR Subsidy/GDP B+C+D share of EBR
% % % %%% %
1952-1960 64.98 29.48 0 3.36 32.84 11.40 n/a
1961-1970 28.9 27.05 0 4.59 31.64 16.97 n/a
1971-1980 15.95 28.47 0 8.55 37.02 30.03 n/a
1980 24.5 25.50 n/a 12.26 37.76 48.09 n/a
1981 26.5 24.00 n/a 12.29 36.29 51.20 n/a
1982 28.6 22.80 n/a 15.08 37.88 66.14 33.7
1983 35.8 22.90 n/a 16.23 39.13 70.87 37.2
1984 40.5 22.80 n/a 16.49 39.29 72.32 39.6
1985 38.4 22.20 5.62 16.97 44.79 76.44 41.6
1986 36.7 20.70 3.16 16.91 40.77 81.68 41.2
1987 33.5 18.20 3.12 16.82 38.15 92.44 40.8
1988 32.9 15.70 2.97 15.69 34.36 99.96 38.4
1989 30.9 15.70 3.52 15.65 34.87 99.66 40.3
1990 33.8 15.70 3.10 14.51 33.31 92.42 39.6
1991 29.8 14.50 2.34 14.89 31.73 102.69 42.6
1992 28.1 12.90 1.65 14.32 28.87 110.99 44.3
1993 22 12.30 1.16 4.05 17.52 32.96 17.2
1994 55.7 10.80 0.76 3.86 15.42 35.78 15.2
1995 52.2 10.30 0.54 3.96 14.80 38.43 13.2
1996 49.4 10.40 0.47 5.47 16.34 52.60 24.3
1997 48.9 11.00 0.47 3.58 15.05 32.53 5.1
1998 49.5 11.70 0.40 3.65 15.75 31.21 5.3
1999 51.1 12.80 0.32 3.77 16.90 29.49 6.8
2000 52.2 13.50 0.28 3.86 17.64 28.57 6.5
2001 52.4 14.90 0.27 3.92 19.10 26.32 8.1
2002 55 15.70 0.22 3.72 19.64 23.71 9.8
2003 54.6 16.00 0.17 3.36 19.53 21.01 8.3
2004 54.9 16.50 0.14 2.94 19.58 17.81 7.5
2005 52.3 17.20 0.11 3.03 20.33 17.61 7.3
2006 52.8 18.40 0.09 3.04 21.52 16.52 7.3
C= Subsidies to loss-making SOEs as a percentage of GDP
Table 3.2 Budgeted and Extrabudgetary Revenue-to-GDP ratios and Central Government's Share
A= Central government's share of total government revenue
B= Budgeted Revenue-to-GDP ratio
Note:
D= Extrabudgetary Revenue-to-GDP ratio
E= the sum of item B, C and D
F= Extrabudgetary to budgeted revenue ratio
Source: author's calculation from China Finance Statistics Yearbook 2007
G= Central government's share of total extrabudgetary revenue
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   67
3.2b The Budgetary Decline   
The cause and implications of the budgetary decline since the 1980s need to be further 
elaborated. While the budgeted revenue-to-GDP ratio started to drop as early as in 
1980, the central government’s share in budgeted revenue first rose in 1980-1984 then 
plummeted.  The rise during 1980-1984 was largely an outcome of revenue 
reclassification. For instance, as detailed by Wong (1991), the central government 
incorporated some of the most profitable enterprises in industries such as tobacco, 
petrochemicals into national corporation in 1982-1983. The central government hoped 
to close its deficits by gaining a larger part of the revenue. But since the mid 1980s, 
the effect of these measures had been offset simultaneously by the deterioration of 
SOEs profitability and more importantly, the failure to adjust the tax structure to 
capture the growth of non-state sector (Zhang, 1999). The expenditure patterns had 
also changed, with growing expenditure burdens bone by the local governments. The 
combined effect of budgetary decline and decentralization of expenditure 
responsibilities was that the governments became increasingly reliant on 
extra-budgetary revenues (EBR) and even off-budget revenues (OBR).   
 
As the market reform deepened, capital constructions and national defence, two 
largest spending sectors in Mao-era experienced the sharpest reduction. Wong (1991) 
reported that capital construction as a percentage of total expenditure downed to 23.4 
percent in 1988 from 40.7 percent in 1978, while national defence downed to 8.1 
percent in 1988 from 15.1 percent in 1978. Both items were responsibilities of   68
national government and this trend seemed to be quite in line with the budgetary 
decline. The cutback in capital allocation by the government does not imply a 
reduction of investment in economic activities. Because the SOEs began to use bank 
loans to finance working capital, while in the past the working capital of SOEs was 
covered by the budget. The spending needs in education, government administration, 
price subsidies and subsidies to loss-making SOEs had emerged or increased in the 
same period. Price subsidies on urban food had grown at a fast pace that the central 
government could not afford to. The response was that the central government 
allocated a fixed amount of subsidy to provinces and each province would need to 
make up the gaps from its own budget. Effectively, this meant over 70 percent of the 
price subsidies became local responsibility (Wong, 1991). Subsidies to loss-making 
SOEs emerged in the 1980s for the first time and in the Chinese budgeting practice 
this item is subtracted from budgeted revenue and not shown on the expenditure side. 
Column C of Table 3.2 reports the amount of this item against GDP. It shows that the 
relative importance of this spending was decreasing, but how this responsibility was 
divided between the central and local governments is not clear. The expansion of 
higher-educational system, which was still fully funded by the state, resulted in higher 
share of budgetary spending in education in both the central and local budgets. So this 
component’s weight in the consolidated budget jumped to 18 percent in 1988 from 
10.1 percent in 1978 (ibid). Finally, the increased spending also came from the 
establishment of offices at the township level in 1985. The reason was that the 
operation of rural household responsibility system had sharply increased the number   69
of tax payers in rural areas (6 million collective production units in pre-reform era and 
200 million households since market reform), which required more tax-collectors 
(ibid). It should be noted that the budget at township level was not fully consolidated 
to formal local government budget: a significant part of the township budget was 
called “self-raised fund”, an OBR item (this item was re-categorized in EBR in the 
late 1990s). We could see that the fiscal decentralization process in the 1980s was ad 
hoc rather than well-planned. Neither the revenue nor the expenditure responsibilities 
between different levels of government were clearly defined. Table 3.3 depicts the 
broad division of expenditure responsibilities between the centre and local 
governments.  
 
Another noticeable trend between early 1980s and 1993 is that the size of both EBR 
and OBR were greatly enlarged. As mentioned, the growth of the informal finance 
was in part a response to the increasing government responsibilities and the shrinking 
formal tax base. So what exactly are EBR and OBR and how significant they were? 
The explanatory notes of China Statistics Yearbook 2005 (chapter 8) indicate  that:   
 
“Extra-budgetary fund refers to financial fund of various types not covered 
by the regular government budgetary management, which is collected, 
allocated or arranged by government agencies, institutions and social 
organizations while performing duties delegated to them or on behalf of the 
government in accordance with laws, rules and regulations.” 
 
Off-budget revenues are fees and surcharges levied by local government departments 
and the single largest part of OBR is the land transfer fees. EBR is earmarked for   70
specific expenditure categories and is subject to the oversight of correspondent 
Finance Department, while the operation of OBR was opaque and there was no 
readily available statistics for OBR. In a recent conference on China’s central-local 
fiscal relations, some participants reveal that most of the OBR is dedicated to basic 
infrastructure investment at the local levels (Whiting, 2007) (also see Su and Zhao 
2006 and Carsten and Feng 2004 for elaboration on this point). From Table 3.2, 
column D and F, we could count that the size of EBR exploded between 1980 and 
1992. In 1988, the size of EBR was almost the same to the size of budgeted revenue 
and in 1992 the size of EBR was 110.99 percent of budgeted revenue. In 1993, a 
definitional change was made to extra-budgetary funds, where SOE earnings were 
taken out from these accounts. This marked the attempt to separate the operation of 
SOEs from the governments and such attempt had been facilitated by the 1994 
Tax-Sharing-Reform (discussed in next section). Thus there was a sharp drop in the 
size of EBR in 1993. As most of the EBR and OBR were extracted from the same tax 
bases as budgeted revenue, local governments therefore may have essentially diverted 
a considerable portion of funds from budgetary revenue to EBR or even OBR and 
effectively reduced the amount of remittance to the centre. Most scholars (such as 
Wong, 2005) criticize the use of EBR and OBR, as they obscure budgetary practice 
and contribute to horizontal fiscal inequality (because EBR and OBR are more 
abundant in rich areas and these funds are not subject to sharing with the central 
government). 
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Comparing to the pre-reform system, the fiscal regimes since the 1980s had been 
moving toward self-financing at the local levels. During the fiscal contracting period 
(1988-1993), the central government’s capacity to exert massive interregional fiscal 
redistribution (the practice in the Mao-era) was significantly constrained, as a result of 
general budgetary decline and the decline of central government’s share of total 
budgeted revenue. Some scholars such as Wong (1991, 1992) express concern that the 
sharp reduction in fiscal redistribution in the context of expenditure decentralization 
would create fiscal challenges for governments in poor local areas. Wong (1991) and 
Tsai (2004) further argue that the fiscal contracting system offered local government 
the incentive to set up trade barriers (local protectionism) and make duplicated and 
inefficient investments.  However, some other scholars (e.g. Oi, 1992; Qian and 
Weingast 1997; Qian 1998) give much credit to the fiscal contracting system, 
highlighting its positive incentive effect for local governments to foster economic 
development.  
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Table 3.3: Major expenditure responsibilities between central and local governments 
Main expenditure responsibilities of the central government   
1. Defence   
2. Foreign affairs   
3. Operation of the central government   
4.Operational expenses for cultural, educational, scientific and public health undertakings at the 
central level   
5. Key capital construction   
6.Technical renovation and new product development in centrally owned enterprises   
7.Agriculture  
8.Subsidies  
9.Macro-economic control and regional coordination of economic development   
10.Social security   
11.Debt  
Main expenditure responsibilities of subnational governments   
1.Operation of local governments   
2.Operational expenses on cultural, educational, scientific and public health undertakings at the 
local level   
3.Local capital construction   
4.Fund for technical renovation and new product development in locally owned enterprises   
5.Agriculture  
6.Urban maintenance and construction   
7.Social security   
8.Subsidies  
Source: adapted from Zhang and Martinez (2003) 
 
3.3 The Fiscal System after the 1994 Tax-Sharing Reform   
In 1994, a Tax-sharing-system (TSS) was introduced to replace the fiscal contracting 
approach and on 1 January 1995 the TSS was written into the Budgetary Law. The 
stated objective of this reform was to increase the two ratios (budgeted 
revenue-to-GDP ratio and the central government’s share of total budgeted revenue) 
so that the government, especially the central government could have more leverage 
in macroeconomic management and fiscal redistribution. The effects of this reform   73
were more profound than raising the two ratios. The TSS transformed the ways in 
which fiscal revenue were generated, collected and clarified, broadened the tax bases 
and brought China’s fiscal practice more in line with that of market economies.       
 
Under the TSS, fiscal revenue no longer comes from SOE profit remittance but from 
taxation; and taxes are divided into central taxes, local taxes and shared taxes. Table 
3.4 lists the assignment of taxes between the central and local governments. The tax 
structure has been simplified and the tax rates have become more uniform. 
Value-Added Tax (VAT) replaces multi-rated product taxes and is levied at a uniform 
rate of 17 percent. The coverage of VAT has been broadened to all manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail enterprises (Ma, 1997). This single most buoyant tax is shared 
between the central and local governments at 75:25. But in order to gain a quick 
support from relative wealthy provinces for the 1994 reform, the central government 
promised to return a fraction of shared VAT and exercise taxes (consumption tax) to 
source provinces and guaranteed that each province would receive at least the 
amounts they retained in 1993. To stimulate the growth of these tax bases, 30 percent 
of the growth in tax revenues would also be returned to the province of the origin. Tax 
rebate is calculated as:   
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An excise tax (consumption tax) on goods was established in the reform and assigned 
exclusively to the central government. Thus consumption on all goods (domestic and 
imported) would be taxed. The reform also extended business tax (5 percent tax rate, 
local tax) to service sector and reduced the tax rate for enterprise income tax (EIT) to 
a uniform 33 percent in 1994 from some 55 percent in the 1980s. In 2002, the central 
government increased its share of security stamp tax to 97 percent and converted 
personal income taxes (PIT) and enterprise income taxes (EIT), two fast growing 
taxes, to shared taxes from pure local taxes. The share rate of PIT and EIT between 
the central and local governments was 50:50 in 2002 and has become 60:40 since 
2003. Therefore the revenue has been further recentralized since 2002. The 
value-added tax, consumption taxes, business tax and enterprise income tax together 
accounted for around 86 percent of the budgeted revenue in 1995 and around 80 
percent in 2006 (calculated from Statistics Yearbook of China 2007).   
 
To some extent, the officially stated objective—raising the two ratios, has been 
achieved. Immediately after the reform in 1994, the central government’s share of 
budgetary revenue jumped to 55 percent (comparing to the averaged 31.6 percent 
between 1980 and 1993) and remained at around 50 percent thereafter. The budgeted 
revenue-to-GDP ratio also climbed to 18.4 percent in 2006 after dropping to its lowest 
point 10.3 percent in 1995 (Table 3.2). The increase in the central government’s share 
of budgeted revenue was attributable to central government’s dominant share in major 
taxes. But the central government’s disposable revenue may not have substantially 
increased, because of the built-in tax rebates.  Several factors could jointly explain   75
the boost of revenue-to-GDP ratio. The new tax structure has become capable of 
capturing the growth of non-state sectors and the state has also taken measures to 
reduce the revenue losses (Zhang, 1999). In addition, the Fiscal Management Reform 
launched in the late 1990s has re-categorized some of the EBR and OBR to budgeted 
revenue. The government pledged to gradually transform OBR to EBR and to put 
EBR under the stricter supervision of corresponding Department of Finance. For 
instance, the self-raised funds by township governments (formally a big item in OBR) 
were consolidated to EBR by 1999. After a series of changes, the relative importance 
of EBR to budgeted revenue has plunged to less than 20 percent, though in absolute 
term the size of EBR has still been growing (see Table 3.2).   
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Table 3.4: Central Taxes, Local Taxes and Shared Taxes since 1994 
I. Taxes exclusively assigned to the Central Government   
1.Excise taxes   
2.Taxes collected from the Ministry of Railroads and from the headquarters of banks and 
insurance companies   
3.Income taxes, sales taxes and royalties from offshore oil activities of foreign companies and 
joint ventures   
4.Energy and transportation fund contribution   
5.Seventy percent of the three sales taxes collected from enterprises owned by the Ministry of 
Industry, the Ministry of Power, SINOPEC (petrochemicals), and the China nonferrous metals   
companies.  
6.All customs duty, VAT and excise taxes on imports 
7.Enterprise income tax collected from banks and other financial institutions.   
II. Taxes shared between the central and local governments   
1.Value-added tax (75 percent central, 25 percent provincial) 
2.Natural resource taxes (coal, gas, oil, and other minerals if the enterprises are fully Chinese   
owned.)  
3.Construction tax on the cost of construction of buildings that are outside the plan and financed 
from retained earnings   
4.Salt tax 
5.Industrial and commercial tax, and income tax levied on foreign and joint venture enterprises. 
6.Security and exchange tax (50 percent central, 50 percent provincial) – added in late 1990s   
7.Income tax of all enterprises – added in 2002 
8.Personal income taxes – added in 2002.   
III. Taxes exclusively assigned to local governments   
1.Business (gross receipts) tax falling on sectors not covered by VAT (transportation and   
communications, construction, finance and insurance, post and telecommunications, culture and   
sports, entertainment, hotels and restaurants, and other) 
2.Rural market (stall rental) trading tax 
3.The urban maintenance and construction tax (a surcharge on the tax liability of enterprises for   
business tax, consumption tax, and VAT)   
4.The urban land use tax   
5.Vehicle and vessel utilization tax 
6.Thirty percent of the product and VAT revenues collected from enterprises owned by the 
Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Power, SINOPEC, and the China nonferrous metals companies   
7.Value-added tax on land 
8.Education surtax   
9.Entertainment and slaughter taxes   
10.Property tax 
11.Surtax on collective enterprises   
12.Resources tax   
13.Fixed asset investment tax (discontinued in 1999) 
14.Fines for delinquent taxes.   
Source: Wong (2000), World Bank (2000b)     77
The tax-sharing reform also altered the tax administration: a National Tax Bureau was 
established (under the supervision of the central government) to collect central 
government revenue and the shared revenues. Local Tax Bureau (under the 
supervision of provincial governments) would only be responsible for collecting local 
taxes. A clarified and transparent tax sharing system helped to eliminate revenue 
uncertainty induced by frequent central-local negotiations. The separation of national 
and local tax offices ruled out the opportunities for local governments to hide or divert 
revenues that would otherwise belong to the central government. Wong and Bird 
(2005) argued that the link between enterprises and local governments has been 
diluted as local governments only get 25 percent of the VAT. This reduces local 
governments’ incentive to over-invest in industries with high tax rates and mitigates 
the economic distortions. These positive changes mark China’s transition from an 
ownership state to a tax state.   
 
However, the reform is recognized as incomplete by a number of scholars such as Ma 
(1997), Zhang (1999), Bahl (1999), Zhang and Martinez (2003), Dable-Norris (2005), 
Wong and Bird (2005), Shah and Shen (2006) and Shen et al (2006). First, after the 
1994 reform, there has only been recentralization of budgeted revenue, while the 
expenditure responsibilities were still extensively decentralized and remained vaguely 
defined (see Table 3.3). Wong (2005) compares the revenue-expenditure division 
between the central and local governments among OECD countries and a number of 
developing countries and finds that China is almost the most decentralized country in   78
terms of expenditure assignment. Thus there have been large vertical fiscal 
imbalances: since 1994, all provinces have become dependent on the central-local 
fiscal transfers to finance their expenditure. From Table 3.5, one could easily calculate 
that the average per capita provincial fiscal revenue covers only around 55 percent of 
the average per capita fiscal expenditure. This implies that around 45 percent of the 
local expenditure has to be financed by the transfer. While vertical fiscal imbalance 
itself is not a problem, a high level of imbalance may create perverse incentives for 
local governments and with such a high level of imbalance, the role of central-local 
fiscal transfers becomes extremely important in determining fiscal efficiency and 
fiscal equity. A vaguely defined expenditure assignment may increase the chances for 
governments to shift expenditure responsibilities downwards.   
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
242 305 379 421 491 548 609 734 805 921 1097 1378
1256 1552 1977 2282 2607 2859 3084 3776 4363 5179 6350 7972
90 90 100 121 146 180 208 232 274 300 366 434
14 17 20 19 18 16 15 16 16 17 17 18
0.92 0.97 1.0 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.07 1.12 1.17 1.17 1.2 1.18
Pronvincial Average 445 538 632 698 814 947 1080 1383 1620 1792 2082 2538
1414 1837 2348 2806 3218 3632 3866 4387 5307 6361 7936 9259
157 226 278 308 349 411 478 532 655 741 906 1165
Ratio (higest/lowest) 9 8 8 9 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 8
Coefficient of variation 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.73
Table 3.5 Per Capita Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure of Various Provinces (Yuan) and their inequality
1994-2005
Per Capita fiscal revenue
Per Capita fiscal expenditure
Ratio (higest/lowest)
Coefficient of variation
Source: year 2005: author's calculation from China Statisitcal Yearbook  2005-2006; all other years: based
on UNDP (2005)
Highest
Lowest
Pronvincial Average
Highest
Lowest
 
Secondly, although the tax bases were broadened in 1994, local governments still 
have no authority to set up the tax bases or alter the tax rates (lack of formal tax 
autonomy). The conventional local taxes such as user charges and property taxes in   79
developed market economics were not introduced in the 1994 reform. On the contrary, 
there are numerous local arbitrary and illogical charges in China that tend to create 
urban price distortions (Bird, 2004). Hong (2003) lists a large number of fees imposed 
by Shanghai government on real estate development and concludes that the only 
motivation for these fees was revenue generation. Some of these charges are part of 
the budgeted revenues, but most of them remain in extra-budgetary or off-budget 
revenues. In any case, these arbitrary charges are not economically efficient. Bird 
(2004) further argues that it is important for local governments (in particular the more 
affluent ones) to be able to raise adequate revenue from their own tax bases, in order 
to promote fiscal accountability.   
 
The third deficiency lies in the intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. Shah and Shen 
(2006) point out that the residence based enterprises income taxes (current practice) 
may deprive poor provinces of significant revenues because company headquarters 
usually locates in rich provinces. A residence based tax charges the company on the 
basis of the company’s registered place, normally its headquarters. The conventional 
practice of enterprise income taxes in industrial nation is source based, where the 
taxes would attribute to various locations in which the firms operate. Many authors 
such as Wong (2000) and Tsui (2005) argue that the tax rebates (derivation-based tax 
sharing) contributed to widening horizontal fiscal disparities (Table 3.5 depicts the 
extent of fiscal inequality at the provincial level). Table 3.6 shows that the magnitude 
of tax rebates in central-provincial transfers decreased over the years, yet they still   80
occupied around 40 percent of total transfers in 2004. While in 1995, the Minstry of 
Finance introduced an equalization grant (called transitory period grant up to 2002, 
see Table 3.6), its size is still too small to have a sizeable equalizing impact. In 2004 it 
occupies 7.3 percent of total central-regional transfers, comparing to 0.8 percent in 
1995 the year of introduction. Dable-Norris (2005), Shah and Shen (2006) and Shen 
et al criticize that the design of current equalization grant is problematic as it is too 
complex and lack of explicit equalization standards. The ad hoc earmarked grants in 
sum constitute the second largest transfer (after tax rebates). These grants form the 
most secret part of central-provincial transfers and even experts cannot fully tell their 
allocation basis. According to Shah and Shen (2006), both equalization transfer and 
those special purpose transfers have some equalizing effect and the impact from 
special purpose transfers is higher. But other authors such as Wong (2000) argue that 
some special purpose transfers require matching funds from local governments, which 
could exacerbate fiscal inadequacy problems in poor areas. Wong (2000) further 
argues that the grants for increasing wages of civil servants (to compensate local 
governments for centrally mandated wage increase) may create perverse incentives 
for bureaucratic expansion, because the wage levels of civil servants in poor areas are 
too generous comparing to costs of living in those areas. The grants for rural tax 
reforms were introduced to compensate more agricultural-based local areas for the 
abolishment of some agricultural taxes. It is argued that the amount of transfers only 
covered part of the revenue loss, thus those more agricultural-based areas tend to 
suffer further (Whiting, 2007).     81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6 Transfers from the Central Government to Subnational Governments by type   
Units=100 millions RMB Yuan   
Year   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
 Total   2389  2533  2672  2801  3285  3992  4748  5893  7348  8656  10177 
1.Revenue  sharing  plus   1799 1867  1949  2012  2083  2121  2207   2431  3328  4196  4335 
  tax  rebates   75.3%  72.9%  72.9%  71.8%  63.4%  53.1%    46.5% 41.3% 45.3% 48.5%  42.6% 
2.Prior-1994 Grandfathered    114  115  111  112  113  114    120  contained in tax rebates   
subsidies   4.8%  4.6%  4.2%  4.0%  3.5%  2.9%  2.5%   
3.Equalization  grants   21  35  50  61   75   85  138  279  380  745 
 0.8%  1.3%  1.8%  1.8%  1.9%    1.8%  2.3%  3.8%  4.4%  7.3% 
4.Grants for minority regions        26 35 39 55  76 
       0.5%  0.6%  0.5%  0.6%  0.7% 
5.Grants for increasing wages of civil servants     108   217    631   817    901  993 
      2.7%    4.6% 10.7% 11.1% 10.4%  9.8% 
6.Grants  for  rural  tax  reform                   80  245  305  307 
                  1.4%  3.3%  3.5%  3.0% 
7.Other  earmarked  transfers   476    499 578  627  1029  1574   2093  2355  2434  2577  3223 
  19.9%    21.3%  21.6%  22.4%  31.3%  39.4% 44.1% 40.0% 33.1% 29.8%  31.7% 
Source: calculated from various sources including: Zhang and Martinez (2003), Su and Zhao (2006), 
  China Statistical Yearbook 2005; Note that items do not add up to 100 percent   
  3.4 The First Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism (FGT) Perspective on the 
Problem of Unmet Fiscal Needs at the Local Levels   
Wong’s studies (1991, 1992) of China’s fiscal contracting system in the late 1980s 
raise the issue of fiscal inadequacy in poorer areas of China, as all local governments 
had become self-financing while at the same time they had been given greater 
expenditure duties and the central government’ s capacity to implement fiscal 
redistribution was significantly weakened. While the 1994 reform helped boost the 
central government’s fiscal capacity, the fiscal support to poorer areas have not been 
strengthened; at least in a decade’s time, the size of equalization transfers had still 
been very small, comparing to other central-local transfers. Fiscal inadequacy 
describes a situation where a government unit has insufficient revenue to meet its 
expenditure needs. Unmet fiscal/expenditure needs may only be measured against 
certain benchmarks (such as minimum per capita spending on certain services or 
minimum service standards) or criteria (such as whether there are social exclusions or 
restrictions on access).   
 
Since the 1990s, studies of the education and health sector at the local levels provide 
concrete evidence that much of the education and health needs in many poor areas 
have not been properly met. The early study by West and Wong (1995) compares 
indicators of education attainment and health outcomes between Shandong (an 
affluent coastal province) and Guizhou (a poor inland province) in the context of 
fiscal contracting system. It demonstrates that up to 1993, the levels of education   83
provision in counties and cities of Guizhou lagged far behind Shandong and fell far 
short of national goals set by the central government (in 1986, the 9-year Compulsory 
Education Law was passed and provinces set the target dates for achieving this goal). 
For instance, in 1990 the rural illiteracy rate for Shandong was 26 percent (equal the 
national average), while for Guizhou it was 41 percent; the primary and middle school 
drop-out rates were also much higher in Guizhou than in Shandong; in addition, the 
dilapidated and dangerous school buildings were concentrated in Guizhou while they 
had been eliminated in Shandong (ibid). In terms of health outcomes, there are also 
striking differences between the two provinces. For example, in 1990 the infant 
mortality rate in Shandong was 14.2 (male) and 18 (female) per 1000 births, lower 
than the national average: 34.4 (male) and 36.3 (female), while in Guizhou, the infant 
mortality rate was 60.7 (male) and 65.6 (female) per 1000 births (ibid). West and 
Wong (1995) argue that the much lower education and health outcomes were to a 
large extent the result of fiscal inadequacy of Guizhou (where the education and 
health services were under-provided and the quality of provisions were compromised). 
Part et al (1996) also provide similar evidence from Shaanxi province (a lower-middle 
income province) showing that under the fiscal contracting system, poorer local 
governments' ability to provide basic social services had been compromised.   
 
In more recent years (under the Tax-Sharing system), studies of education service has 
been extended to cover almost all provinces with the availability of new statistics data. 
For instance, Wang et al (1998, cited by Rong and Shi, 2001) classify all the   84
provincial units to four types according to their levels of economic development in 
1996 and find that there are substantial gaps between the most developed areas (type 1 
region) and the least developed areas (type 4 region) in educational attainments. 
According to Wang et al, in 1996 the illiteracy rates for type 1 region and type 4 
region were 8.2 percent and 20 percent respectively; around 68 percent of the 
population in type 1 region completes 9-year education or higher, while only around 
36.5 percent of the population in type 4 region complete 9-year education or higher 
(ibid). Rong and Shi (2001) also argue that under-investment in education in poor 
areas could explain much of the low educational attainments in these areas. It is 
reported (see O’Brien and Li 1999; Tsui and Wang 2004) that some poor local 
authorities were forced to make unlawful extractions from local households and 
enterprises in order to finance the services. According to UNDP (2005), the goal of 
9-year compulsory education may have yet to be achieved in many poor areas of 
China.   
 
Adopting the first generation theory (FGT) of fiscal federalism as the analytical 
framework, a number of scholars such as Wong (1997, 2000,2005), Bahl (1999), Shen 
et al (2006) see the coexistence of unmet fiscal needs (in terms of education and 
health) in poor local areas and persistent high levels of horizontal fiscal inequality as a 
severe intergovernmental fiscal coordination failure arising from China’s piecemeal 
decentralization reforms. It is recognized that in the late 1980s, central government 
spun-off expenditure responsibilities to lower levels of government and greatly   85
reduced its fiscal support for poorer local governments as a result of revenue starving 
(discussed in the previous sections). Thus the expenditure needs in poor areas were far 
from being met, because of inadequate fiscal resources. These authors argue that 
while the 1994 reform recentralized tax responsibilities, there was no commensurate 
centralization of expenditure responsibilities, therefore (similar to other developing 
and transition nations) the subnational governments in China have become dependent 
on central-local fiscal transfers to close the fiscal gaps. Stronger fiscal capacity of the 
central government may imply its ability to support the poor areas via higher level of 
transfer payment, yet a properly designed transfer system that could promote fiscal 
equity (reduce net fiscal benefit differentials) and ensure the provision of a national 
minimum level of services in poor areas is still not in place. Perverse practices such as 
the tax rebates and other non-transparent grants may have also compromised the 
equalization objective. Wong and Bird (2005) further highlight that the aim of fiscal 
equalization via central-local fiscal transfers may have been compromised by sizable 
transfers that went to social security subsides. The persistent high levels of horizontal 
fiscal inequality after 1994 (see Table 3.5 for provincial fiscal inequality; see Tsui 
2005 and Yep 2008 for county-level fiscal inequality) were often cited as an evidence 
of failure in intergovernmental fiscal relations. In sum, authors of the FGT camp 
expect China’s current intergovernmental fiscal system to be further rationalized to be 
in line with the intergovernmental fiscal relations prescribed by the first generation 
theory of fiscal federalism, so that the fiscal resources could be effectively channelled 
to poor areas to cover the fiscal needs.     86
3.5 The Political Economy Perspectives   
In more recent years, Tsui and Wang (2004) and Liu et al (2006) use political 
economy approach to analyse the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels 
(some of the authors in the FGT camp such as Wong and Bird 2005 also consider 
political factors, but political factors are not their core concerns). Central to this line 
of analysis is the perception of China’s central-local relations, where a “top-down” 
view and a “bottom-up” view could be identified. Tsui and Wang take up a strict 
“top-down” vision, while Liu et al combine both views in their analyses.   
 
The rift between “top-down” and “bottom-up” visions lies in the extent of local 
government autonomy in China. At one end of the spectrum, there is a paradigm 
called market preserving federalism (Montinola et al, 1995; Qian and Weingast 1997) 
contending that China is a de facto federalist state. This strand of literature sees the 
high marginal revenue retention rates at the provincial level under the fiscal 
contracting system and the proliferation of local off-budget resources as the evidence 
of local government autonomy. They further attribute China’s economic growth to 
local autonomy and inter-jurisdictional factor mobility (acting as the disciplining 
force to constrain local predatory behaviour). Another “bottom-up” vision is supplied 
by Li (1997, 2006), in which she considers central-local relations as non-zero sum 
game. From Li’s position, local governments are partners of the central government in 
policy formation and implementation and local autonomy is most evident in local 
policy initiatives. However, Hsu (2004) argues that while there maybe some policy   87
areas whereas central-local relations are non-zero sum game, there are also areas 
where central-local relations are necessarily zero-sum (conflicting).   
 
At the other end of the spectrum, scholars (such as Huang 1995, 2002; Solinger 1996; 
Wedeman 1999; Edin 2003; Whiting 2001 and Tsui and Wang 2004) envision a 
top-down and still somewhat monolithic Chinese state system despite decades’ 
decentralization process. They quarrel that the existence of cadre management system 
is itself a powerful counter-force to local autonomy. The cadre management system 
(see Whiting 2001 for insightful discussions on the evolution of this system) was 
devised in the mid 1980s and matured in the mid 1990s, with a purpose to evaluate, 
promote and dismiss leading cadres. Each level of government only assesses the 
performance of cadre one level below (e.g. the centre appoints provincial leaders and 
let provincial governments supervise municipal cadres) and there are quantitative 
targets and qualitative targets set by higher levels of the government to assess the 
performance of their subordinate governments. Thus the cadre management system is 
essentially a vertical administrative monitoring mechanism. For these authors, this 
elaborated system serve to bring local preferences in line with central preferences and 
but such a mechanism may suffer from principal-agency problem (due to deficiency 
in monitoring). Unlike the conventional principal-agency problems in the SGT fiscal 
federalism literature where the principal is the voters at large and the agency is the 
elected government officials, the China-specific literature treat the principal as the 
central government while the agency as local governments. Wedeman (1999) argues   88
that the principal-agency problem in China could be magnified many times because 
there are so many layers of governments, for example, a provincial government is 
both the agent of the centre and the principal of its municipal governments. The 
implication from Wedeman's study is that the implementation of central government 
policies at the lower levels of government might not be effective due to difficulty in 
monitoring. But his research has little to say about the problem of unmet fiscal needs 
at the local levels. Tsui and Wang (2004), on the other hand, emphasize multi-task 
principal-agency problem (a concept developed by Holstrom el al 1991 and 
Dewatripont, 2000): when there are multiple tasks, the agent would have incentives to 
exert efforts on tasks that are easily measurable and tasks with high priorities at the 
expense of tasks that are less measurable. Thus, in contrast to the market-preserving 
federalism theory, Tsui and Wang interpret China’s economic growth story as the 
result of successful local implementations of the central government’s primary 
preference—economic growth. Interestingly, Chen et al (2005) studies the linkage 
between political turnover and economic performance in China and finds that the 
central government tends to promote the provincial leaders with good economic 
performance and terminates those with bad economic performance. This result to 
some degree supports the top-down vision.   
 
Both Tsui and Wang (2004) and Liu et al (2006) recognize that there is no popular 
election in China and nor will there be popular elections in the near future, because 
top-down administrative monitoring is a necessity for the Communist Party to stay in   89
power (elections at the village level should be viewed as efficiency-enhancing device 
rather than formal democracy, see Edin 2003; because while the village governor is 
elected, the village secretary, the boss of village governor, is directly appointed by 
township governments). Therefore, local residents have limited influences over local 
leaderships. According to the strict top-down view adopted by Tsui and Wang, the 
problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels could only be solved by higher 
amount of central-local fiscal transfers (this view is no different from authors in the 
FGT camp) and a corresponding change in target priorities of the cadre management 
system (to change the incentive structure, a standard solution of the principal-agency 
problem). This is because current cadre management framework puts too much 
weight on economic construction, which spurs local capital investment and may make 
local governments downplay the provision of social services, which have long-term 
developmental impacts (this is similar to the situation in the 1980s indentified by 
Wong 1991, 1992: during the 1980s, revenue-starved local governments were eager to 
over-invest in revenue-generating projects and under-provide basic social services). 
The point is that when more resources are spent on capital investments, fewer 
resources are available for financing services such as education and health.    Tsui and 
Wang argue that provision of social services such as education and health care should 
be prioritized via the assignment of a higher weight in the vertical cadre management 
system.  
 
The anatomy by Liu et al (2006) is very different. First, they make a distinction   90
between areas with high autonomy—those developed coastal areas with more 
abundant local fiscal resources (both formal and informal) and higher factor mobility 
and areas with low autonomy—those inland poorer areas that are more 
transfer-dependent from the above and with lower factor mobility. Secondly, they 
borrow the concept of “Leviathan” government from the pubic choice literature and 
contend that in poorer areas, local governments are far more predatory in extracting 
resources from the economy (because they face less constraint from the market than 
the governments in rich areas do). Thirdly, they argue that the cadre management 
system--the “yardstick” is problematic, as it places too many unrealistic policy 
burdens (such as birth control and grain procurement) on lower level governments, 
especially government units in less developed areas. It is noted that Liu et al do not 
give a very clear definition of the term “unrealistic policy burdens”; therefore one is 
not clear what other burdens are unrealistic, apart from birth control and grain 
procurement. Li (2006) also states that the obsolescence and/or ambiguity of central 
policies often leave too much room for local governments to interpret. The overall 
effect is that the “predatory” governments in poorer areas then make use of these 
policies to add more and more personnel and expand the expenditure, consuming 
large amount of fiscal resources which could otherwise be used for public services 
provision. Liu et al further argue that governments in more affluent areas have higher 
autonomy and their behaviours are also more disciplined by the market force, hence 
these rich local governments tend not to implement the unrealistic or obsolescent 
central policies and they are much less predatory and less expansive. These authors   91
also observe that governments in rich areas are more responsive to businesses and 
more eager to promote local economic development than their counterparts in poorer 
areas. Therefore, for Liu et al, the key option to solve the problem is not increasing 
fiscal transfers from the above, but removing those unrealistic top-down policy 
burdens in the first place to mitigate costly government expansion so as to free up 
vital fiscal resources for services provision. In comparison with the study by Tsui and 
Wang (2004), Liu et al use much stronger assumption of government behaviour 
(predatory) and selectively apply the arguments from market-preserving federalism 
theory, a perspective strongly rejected by Tsui and Wang (2004). One recent empirical 
study of China’s provincial differences in effective tax rates on foreign direct 
investments (FDI) by Zheng (2006) demonstrate that less developed provinces tend to 
have lower effective tax rates on foreign enterprises than those developed provinces 
or those provinces with stronger fiscal autonomy. This is because the comparative 
economic advantage of more developed areas enables them to tax more on mobile 
companies. This result casts doubt on Liu’s argument that poorer local governments 
are necessarily more predatory than governments in developed areas. However, Liu’s 
argument that government staff expansion contributes to fiscal inadequacy and 
subsequently unmet fiscal needs in poor local areas may still be valid. What Zheng's 
research has really challenged is the market-preserving federalism theory. In the 
recent conference on central-local fiscal relations in China, some participants reveal 
that staff wage expenses occupy near 70 percent of China’s budgetary expenditure, 
which is substantially higher than the levels in other countries (Whiting, 2007). What   92
maybe questionable is Liu's reasoning of government staff expansion. We argue in the 
next section that there may be other possible reasons (such as market transition, 
income growth and urbanization) underlying government staff expansion. We also 
argue that the study of Tsui and Wang (2004) neglect social security spending 
(induced by market transition), which may be a factor that bid away fiscal resources 
for education and health. 
 
3.6 Reflecting on Existing Debates and Proposing a Nuanced Perspective to 
Extend the Understanding of the Research Problem 
The two strands of research contribute enormously to the understanding of fiscal 
inadequacy and unmet fiscal needs problem at the local levels. It is justified that 
jurisdictions with low fiscal capacity require additional fiscal transfers in order to 
provide a minimum level of services that are of national concern. This is the case even 
if the two “governance” problems identified by political economy perspectives are 
solved. However, existing studies while extensively analysing the unmet fiscal needs 
in education and health sectors in poor areas of China, tend to under-estimate or even 
neglect (the political economy approaches) one of the very important fiscal needs 
induced by market transition—the expenditure need of the widespread introduction of 
social security since the mid-late 1990s. The insights from the regulation theory 
demonstrate the importance of social security in a market economy (briefly reviewed 
in section 3.7). In the 2006 conference on central-local fiscal relations in China (see 
Whiting, 2007), social security issues have totally been bypassed. Social security   93
typically has two main components: social insurance and tax-financed social benefits. 
Social insurance is financed by contributions from employer and employee and 
benefits are paid when risks (unemployment, old age, health risks etc) occur. Tax 
financed social benefits are normally for social assistant purpose, which aims to cover 
the basic needs of the poorest section of the population (van Ginneken, 2003). In 
many American literatures, social security is often referred to as state organized old 
age pension. In the Chinese context, social security refers to state-mandated social 
insurances, means-tested social benefits and subsidized employment services such as 
re-employment training services. Although social security is a conventional central 
government responsibility (from fiscal federalism perspective and in practice), in 
China it has largely been devolved to the subnational governments during the fiscal 
reforms. Since the mid-late 1990s, there have been two additional noteworthy changes. 
First, the social security responsibility previously assumed by the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) has been transferred to the local governments, as part of the SOE 
restructuring process (employees now also need to assume part of the responsibility 
via mandatory social insurance contributions). Secondly, social security schemes have 
since then been gradually extended to the non-state sectors, where we witness a 
continuous expansion of wage-labour. While a few authors such as Wong and Bird 
(2005), Wong (2005) raise the concern that decentralized provision of social security 
would be a serious problem for local public finance and they find that sizeable amount 
of the central-local transfers were used to subsidize local social security sector, to our 
knowledge, there is no systematic enquiry on the magnitude of fiscal needs in social   94
security sector at the local levels. Studies of social security reforms such as Guan 
(2000), Saunders and Shang (2001), Duckett (2003, 2004), Duckett and Hussain 
(2008) clearly illustrate the evolution of the social security system in China. Yet they 
provide little quantitative evidence (no quantitative evidence at the local levels) for 
one to properly assess the fiscal impacts. In other words, these studies have not 
analysed the social security issues from the public finance perspective. When the 
social security needs at the local levels are overlooked or under-estimated, one is 
inclined to conclude that unmet fiscal needs only occur in poor local areas (a 
frequently observed problem arising from fiscal decentralization). Given the 
decentralization of social security function (which is excess comparing to 
conventional decentralization approach), the widespread introduction of social 
security since the mid-late 1990s and local diversity in the pace and scale of market 
transformation, it is possible that relatively affluent regions have also suffered from 
fiscal inadequacy and struggled (or not been able) to meet the emerging social 
security responsibilities.   
 
This dissertation seeks to investigate the impact of market transition on local social 
security spending and verify whether there have been unmet fiscal needs in social 
security sector in relative affluent local areas during the post Tax-Sharing reform era 
(1994-2008). By explicitly considering the social security sector our nuanced 
perception of the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels is depicted in 
Figure 3.8, which could be compared with the prevailing view depicted in Figure 3.7.   95
Specifically, we argue that excess fiscal decentralization in China may have led to 
fiscal inadequacy (so that unmet fiscal needs occur) even in relatively affluent 
regions.  
Figure 3.7 The Prevailing View of Unmet Fiscal Needs at the Local Levels 
 
Figure 3.8 Our Nuanced View of Unmet Fiscal Needs at the Local Levels 
 
This research also recognises that, while the two political economy approaches are 
relevant to the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels, especially in poorer 
areas, they have neglected other important variables such as market transition, income 
growth and urbanization. Liu el al (2006) argue that local government over-staffing 
problem would be much more serious in poor areas than in rich areas, as factor 
mobility in developed areas constraints the expansionary tendency of local 
bureaucracy. This is an inconclusive issue as they did not provide evidence 
confirming that the relative number of government staff in affluent areas is smaller. 
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More importantly, even if government staff expansion is the case, the underlying 
reasons for this phenomenon may go beyond the unrealistic central policy mandates 
such as birth control and grain procurement. An alternative explanation might be that 
market transition, urbanization and income growth have created demand for various 
forms of public services and investments that require additional administrative 
capacity (more staff). Tusi and Wang (2004) point out that spending on capital 
investment may siphon away the resources required for financing the standard public 
services such as education and health. An alternative explanation may be that the 
pressure to cover social security issue bid away resources that would be otherwise 
available for education and health. The secondary intention of this research, therefore, 
is to statistically test these two alternative hypotheses derived from the political 
economy perspectives (the statistical data for government staff number are normally 
available in the statistics yearbooks of each province but many provinces do not 
publish this information, therefore it is not feasible to directly test the hypothesis 
related to government staff expansion; a compromised method is then used, where the 
relative size of staffing level is approximated by the relative size of 
government--budgetary expenditure-to-GDP ratio). 
 
Finally, this research intends to test to what extent the variation of central-provincial 
transfers could be explained by the variation of relative sizes of the local SOE sector. 
This test is used to ascertain an untested proposition from Wong and Bird (2005), 
where they argue that the aim of fiscal equalization via central-local fiscal transfers   97
may have been compromised by sizable transfers that went to social security subsides 
in the SOE sector. Before offering the detailed hypotheses, we would like to draw 
insights from regulation theory to further discuss the reasons behind the social 
security expansion (to non-state sectors) and give a brief account of China’s recent 
social security reforms. 
 
3.7 The Insights from Regulation Theory on the Development of Social Security   
The modern public finance theory and theories of fiscal federalism analyse facets of 
allocation, stabilization and redistribution functions of the public sector in the context 
of welfare state. Capitalist-democratic welfare state is the contextual background for 
the analysis. As we briefly reviewed in Chapter 2, the economic rationale for public 
provision of various forms of social insurances is partly grounded in market failure 
and merit goods consideration, for instance, the failure of annuity market, the 
information asymmetry and adverse selection problems and the uncertainties faced by 
individuals over their future. These normative justifications do not tell us on what 
conditions did these redistributive services emerge and how they evolved into current 
sophisticated forms. Authors from the regulation school do not take the capitalist 
welfare state as granted, but see the development of welfare state as a social and 
historical process.   
 
The origin of social security was the social aids organized by Church at the local 
levels a few hundred years ago. Later, social insurances such as work injury insurance   98
and unemployment insurance were offered to cover those who work in arduous 
sectors such as mining and railways (Andre, 2002). To certain extent, it was union 
pressure and increase in strikes that forced the governments in western industrial 
countries to set up social security for workers during late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century. The social security system was finally extended to the general 
population during the post-war periods in western industrialized countries. Between 
the 1940s and the early 1970s, one has witnessed strong economic growth combined 
with growth in public expenditure on social security in these countries. To date, for 
most OECD countries, the largest public spending is on redistribution—the social 
security sector. For instance, in 2005, most of the OECD countries spent between 25 
to 35 percent of their total general government expenditure on social security benefits 
(OECD statistics database, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx, accessed 8
th June 2008) 
The figures do not include health insurance payments, which are included in health 
spending. The combination of spending on health and expenditure on social security 
benefits is the aggregated social expenditure. In 2005, most of OECD countries spent 
between 40 to 60 percent of their total government expenditure on aggregated social 
expenditure (ibid). 
 
According to scholars in the regulation school, the development of capitalist economy 
fundamentally transforms the society into employers-those who have the means of 
production and whose aims are to accumulate money, and the employees-who do not 
have the means of production and whose survival depends on selling his/her labour   99
power as commodities. Aglietta’s (1997) analysis of American capitalism over the 
long term (1870-1970) demonstrates that while the capitalist continuously transforms 
the labour force for productivity gains, it has to deal with the demands from organized 
wage-earners for improved living conditions. The increases in real wages and 
transformations in the life of workers are evidence of the “institutional compromises” 
in capitalism development. Similarly, the modern welfare state that covers social 
security and universal education was gradually institutionalized by the same social 
movement, at the time when wage-earners become the dominant social form (Andre, 
Chapter 12, 2002). These occur all the more logically when democratic regimes 
prevail with a political arena capable of imposing new obligations on private 
accumulation (Boyer, 2002). 
 
Aglietta's work (1997, p231-238) clearly illustrates that social security is 
indispensible for the well-functioning of a market economy. This is because 
socialisation of risks (such as unemployment and sick) helps to stabilize private 
consumption of commodities when social security benefits "accrue to the 
wage-earners in forms independent of current maintenance cycle of labour-power" 
(ibid). Social security facilitates capital accumulation as the responsibility/cost of 
wage-earners' welfare is shifted to the society/state from individual firms (rather than 
providing guaranteed welfare benefits for the wage-earners, which could go beyond 
the capacity of the firms especially when the economy is stagnant or the firms become 
less competitive, the firms only make social insurance contributions for their   100
wage-labour). What could be carefully inferred is that when a market economy is 
established and the wage-based society is expanding, there is inevitable demand by 
wage-earners for welfare protection, and to a large extent the provision of such 
protection would be ultimately borne by the state. A democratic environment helps to 
facilitate such process.   
 
3.8 China’s Social Security System at a Glance 
China’s social security system is not built from scratch. The system was established in 
1949 when the People’s Republic of China was founded. Comparing to the 
conventional model, the Chinese social security system in pre-reform era (1949-1979) 
was comprehensive in terms of programs offered and but was very restricted in the 
sense that it was only designed for employees in the state (public) sector, which 
comprises state-owned enterprises (SOEs), public service units, government 
administrative departments and official social organizations. The major components 
of the pre-reform social security system are summarized in Table 3.9. There were 
several distinctive features. First, the benefits were provided by individual’s 
respective work unit and there was no social pooling. Since all work units are 
budgeting units of the central government, the benefits were essentially paid from the 
central budgeted expenditure. Secondly, the objective was to guarantee everyone with 
urban hukou a job, so there was no unemployment insurance scheme; the state 
provided cash benefits to the urban “Three Nos” (no working ability, no family and no   101
income). Thirdly, the system was strongly urban-biased. Rural residents, the majority 
of the population (around 90 percent in 1950 and 82 percent in 1978, calculated from 
China Statistics Yearbook 2000), were expected to rely on their family, kin and local 
community to cope with the risks (White, 1998). Several authors such as Duckett 
(2003) and Saunders and Shang (2001) point out that at such low level of economic 
development, the welfare provisions in urban areas were very generous. The high 
level of provision would become unaffordable if same benefits were extended to rural 
workers (Saunders and Shang, 2001). To prevent a flood of rural workers into urban 
labour market, the government used the household registration system (hukou) to 
restrict rural-urban migration. That is even if a peasant migrated to urban area, 
without an urban hukou, he/she would still be excluded from the urban social welfare 
system. 
Components  Urban Sector Rural Sector
1. Pension, medical and work injury
insurance were provided by state
sector employees' respective work
units
1.Under rural collective economy,
medical care was provided by local
community (cooperative health system)
2. No contribution from employees 2. No pension insurance
3. Social pooling was  limited and
acted as the last resort
3. Pulbic ownership of land and equal
distribution of the right to farm work
1. Full employment policy, therefore
there was no unemployment
insurance
1.Full employment policy, no
unemployment insurance
2. Cash benefits for those who with no
ability to work, no family and no
income ("Three Nos")
2. Cash benefits for those who with no
family support  (also based on local
collective economy, not the governemnt)
1. The work units provided free
housing for the staff
Table 3.9 China's Social Security System before the market reform
Source: summarized from Guan (2000) p116 and Saunders and Shang (2001)
Social
Benefits
Social
Insurance
Other
Benefits 2. The prices of food and other subsistence materials were kept at low level  as a
result of government subsidies  102
The system started to become problematic when market reform initiated in 1978. The 
fast expansion of collective-sector (up to late 1990s) and private sector (which 
paralleled the expansion of industrial and service sectors) created a competitive force, 
driving inefficient SOEs (which provided generous pension and health benefits to 
their employees) to the brink of bankruptcy. Full-employment policy (in the urban 
area) was no longer the agenda and in 1986 an unemployment insurance scheme for 
urban SOE workers was first introduced.  But the major development of 
unemployment insurance came only after 1997, when SOEs started to be restructured 
across the country (Duckett and Hussain, 2008). Under the new unemployment 
insurance, employers and employees in the SOEs are then required to make 
contribution to the plan and the scheme has since then being extended to other urban 
residents. State-mandated contribution-based pension, health, work injury and 
maternity insurances have also started to be introduced to SOEs during the mid-1990s 
and then to urban non-state sectors (employees in township-village enterprises and 
peasant labour working in urban enterprises are eligible to participate in pension 
insurance) in the late 1990s. These social insurances are pooled either at 
prefecture-level or the provincial level (pooling within the same SOE industry was an 
early practice, but has largely been abolished since the mid-1990s). During the course 
of SOE restructuring, social security responsibility previously assumed by the SOEs 
has been transferred to the local governments, which act as the last resort by providing 
subsidies to the social insurance schemes if there are deficits (Duckett, 2003). The 
governments also offer subsidized re-employment or training services for the laid-off   103
workers and then the job-seekers at large, but employees now also need to assume 
part of the responsibility via mandatory contributions to social insurances.  In 1998, 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security was created to regulate the social security 
system (Saunders and Shang, 2001). In 2008, Ministry of Personnel was merged with 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the new ministry became Ministry of 
Human Resource and Social Security. In the rural sector, the collapse of rural 
collective economy (when the household responsibility system was introduced in the 
1980s) denotes that the welfare supports from rural communities has significantly 
been weakened. It was not until 2003 did the government begin to introduce a new 
rural cooperative medical insurance to its rural residences and start to subsidize rural 
pension insurance. No unemployment, work injury or maternity insurances exist in 
rural areas. In terms of social assistance, the government has started to operate a 
mean-tested social relief system targeting poor households (both urban and rural) 
living below officially designated poverty lines since the mid-late 1990s. In sum, 
there is still considerable divide between social security in urban areas and rural areas. 
The only two obvious changes are that non-farm workers (without urban hukou) are 
now allowed to participate in urban enterprise pension insurances and the 
governments have started to assume a limited part of the rural social security 
programs. 
 
Some authors such as Duckett (2003) argue the fact that social security was not 
widely introduced at the very beginning of China's market transition (but introduced   104
in the mid-late 1990s) may be explained by several factors. First, there has no formal 
democratic mechanism for consultation. Secondly, the SOE restructuring did not start 
at the beginning of market transition but was initiated in the mid-late 1990s. Thirdly, 
while there is an All-China Federation of Trade Unions, it could not effectively 
channel the demand for social security by wage-earners, as it is an official 
organization. In recent years the Chinese governments, especially the central 
government have paid significant attention to labour-capital relations and social 
security: the expansion of social security system was the third of the nine key 
objectives in the national campaign for building-up a Harmonious Society in 2006 
(Renmin Ribao, web edition, published on 15th October 2006, accessed 19th October 
2006 http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/70195/index.html); in June 2007, the new 
Labour Contract Law was approved by the NPC (effective from Jan 2008), under 
which the employers become obliged to pay social security contributions to their 
formal workers (the official website of People's Republic of China, published on 29th 
June 2007, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-06/29/content_669394.htm, accessed 2nd 
July 2007).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   105
3.9 The Testable Hypotheses   
We develop four testable hypotheses: 
H1: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), even certain relatively affluent locality has 
not been able to fully meet the emerging social security needs, resulting in 
under-provision of social security (Relatively affluent locality refers to jurisdiction 
that has both per capital GDP and per capita fiscal revenue above the median of the 
population). 
Notes to H1: This is the core hypothesis of this thesis. In the literature (such as Bird 
and Tarasov, 2004) , rich and poor areas are often measured by per capita GDP (a 
simplified measure). Using actual per capita fiscal revenue as the measurement may 
not be appropriate since the actual revenue could reflect fiscal capacity as well as tax 
effort of a given jurisdiction. In the Chinese case, the tax bases and tax rates are 
uniform and set at the central level; therefore, it is possible for localities with similar 
levels of per capita GDP to have quite different levels of per capita fiscal revenue and 
such differences may derive from the differences in economic structure and tax efforts. 
Hence, we define the relative affluent areas with both GDP and fiscal revenue 
measures. 
 
H2: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), there have been negative correlations 
between the share of consolidated provincial budgetary spending on social security 
and health sector, and between the share of consolidated provincial budgetary 
spending on social security and education sector.   106
Notes to H2: This is the alternative hypothesis (the pressure to cover social security 
issue bid away resources that would be otherwise available for education and health) 
to Tsui and Wang's (2004) proposition. 
 
H3: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), holding other factors constant, larger sizes of 
provincial governments (expressed as higher levels of consolidated budgetary 
expenditure-to-GDP ratios across provinces) could be in part explained by higher 
degrees of market transition and higher levels of urbanization and income. 
Notes to H3: Whereas the absolute value of per capita fiscal expenditure in a given 
locality may be largely explained by the level of its per capita fiscal revenue, 
budgetary expenditure as share of local GDP reflects the relative size of the 
government. This hypothesis indirectly tests the alternative explanation of 
government staff expansion. An explicit assumption made is that higher relative size 
of government (government expansion) is associated with higher staffing level 
(government staff expansion). We are aware that this correlation is not perfect and 
may not even be very strong, as the cost of employing personnel only constitutes part 
of the government expenses. Thus this test could only serve as a preliminary step to 
explore the underlying dynamics of government expansion. Formal testing 
government staff expansion hypothesis would have to be left to future research, when 
all the relevant data become available. The only available proxy for market transition 
is the gross industrial output value of non-state-owned and non-state-controlled 
enterprise as share of total provincial gross industrial output value. Higher ratio may   107
stand for higher degree of market transition (this might not be necessarily the case, for 
instance, assuming that two areas have the same ratio, one area could still have higher 
degree of market transition than the other area if it has achieved more effective 
enterprise management in the SOE and state-controlled enterprise sectors).   
 
H4: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), holding other factors constant, higher 
amount of per capita central-provincial fiscal transfers could be in part explained by 
lower level of market transition. 
Notes to H4: Once again, the proxy for market transition is the gross industrial output 
value of non-state-owned and non-state-controlled enterprise as share of total gross 
industrial output value. Lower level of market transition is associated with higher 
share of gross industrial output value generated by SOE and state-controlled 
enterprises. This hypothesis help tests the claim made by Wong and Bird (2005), 
where they argue that sizable central-provincial transfers went to the social security 
(in particular in the SOE sector). We are conscious that in this hypothesis, the market 
transition variable could not be used to distinguish the transfer that was used to cover 
the SOE social security issue from the transfer that was used to finance specific SOE 
projects. What is actually tested is that if the transfers were not biased toward the SOE 
sector, one could expect this hypothesis to be falsified. 
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Chapter 4 Research Methodology   
This research is conducted by using a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Specifically, we use correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis to 
test Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 (at the provincial level) and employ a case study of Fujian 
province to address Hypothesis 1(the cross-sectional provincial analysis also tests 
Hypothesis 1). The selection of these research methods is not arbitrary, but based on 
careful consideration of the natures of our hypotheses as well as the pros and cons of 
other possible research methods. In the following sections, we briefly review the 
debates between qualitative method and quantitative method, clarify the reasons why 
the alternative research techniques are not chosen, lay out our approach and discuss 
the validity, reliability and research ethics issues in our research.   
 
4.1 Quantitative Versus Qualitative Research 
The qualitative-quantitative debate has been one of the hottest methodological issues 
in social science research for quite a long period of time. The debate as to whether 
quantitative method or qualitative method is more appropriate has taken place at both 
the philosophical and operational levels. At the philosophical level, this divide is 
rooted in epistemological and ontological assumptions, in terms of whether there is an 
objective reality in nature or multiple realities. The positivist paradigm sees the world 
as largely deterministic and the objectivity is a characteristic that resides in the 
individual scientist and it believes science as the way to uncover the truth (Trochim,   109
2006); therefore, under this paradigm, deductive reasoning and quantitative measure 
is commonly used to postulate, test and revise theories to better predict the reality. 
Positivist paradigm predominates in science and believes in empiricism. In contrast, 
the interpretivist paradigm or the naturalist paradigm view reality as subjective and 
socially constructed (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992) and the knowledge is context and 
time dependent (Cousins, 2002). These paradigms suggest that, as reality is not purely 
objective (value-free), there are multiple value-bound realities. Under these 
philosophical and ontological assumptions, the qualitative researcher believes that the 
best way to understand any phenomena is to immerse or participate in it. According to 
Trochim (2006), many qualitative researchers see “quantification as limited in nature, 
looking only at one small portion of the reality that cannot be split or unitized without 
losing the importance of the whole phenomenon”. Inductive reasoning is more 
common in qualitative research. It is clear that it is the fundamental philosophical 
dichotomy between positivism and interpretivism that make some scholars view 
quantitative and qualitative methods as irreconcilable.   
 
Such divide is significantly diminished in the post-positivist paradigms (one of which 
is critical realism). The post-positivist paradigms reject the positivist idea that any 
individual can see the world perfectly as it really is and believe the best way to 
approach objectivity is to use multiple fallible sources to get a better idea of what is 
happening in reality (Trochim, 2006). In other words, the post-positivism sees any 
single scientific measure is imperfect or biased, thus the true objectivity could never   110
be uncovered—it could only be approached/perceived using multiple measures and 
observations (which is called triangulation). The imperfection or bias of any measure 
or observation is essentially the result that there are gaps between reality and people’s 
perceptions of reality. In comparison, positivism concerns a single objective reality; 
interpretivism concerns multiple realities; while post-positivism concerns multiple 
perceptions about a single, mind-independent reality (Healy and Perry, 2000). Under 
the post-positivist paradigms, the quantitative and qualitative approaches are not 
necessarily rival (ibid). 
  
Despite the dualist debate between the underlying philosophical assumptions of 
qualitative and quantitative researches, scholars recognize that actual research may 
not exactly fit those ideal paradigms. Thus quantitative and qualitative approaches 
may be integrated to generate a better understanding of the multifaceted questions, as 
suggested by a number of scholars such as Patton (1990), Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
and Trochim (2006). Quantitative approach yields precise and powerful results that 
could be generalized. But statistical research may be unable to take full account of the 
many interaction effects that take place in social settings, because it ignores effects 
that may be important, but that are not statistically significant (Cronbach 1975, p. 
124). Qualitative approach, on the hand, could be used to pursue a deeper 
understanding of specific phenomenon or “actor” in the complex and dynamic social 
world. The disadvantage with the qualitative method is that it has limited ability to 
mine out observed factors and limited ability to generalize the findings. Therefore in   111
most qualitative studies, the researchers consider transferability—extrapolating one 
situation to other similar situations. Because of their differing features, quantitative 
approach may be better at answering confirmatory questions and explaining the 
relationships between measured variables and qualitative approach may be excelled in 
tackling exploratory questions. In this regard, qualitative approach could be 
supplementary to quantitative analysis (or vice versa). When moving away from the 
philosophical to operational consideration, the selection of research methods may 
largely depend on the nature of questions one seeks to answer. Of course, we are 
aware that, as reminded by Hathaway (1995), the decisions about the adoption of 
research methods could also be based on other factors such as the proposed audience 
of findings, time and availability of resources   
  
4.2 The “Mixed Methods” Approach   
Our decision to adopt the “mixed methods” approach (combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods) is based on the nature of the hypotheses. We form the hypotheses 
via the critical review of the relevant literature and logical reasoning. In other words, 
the specific hypotheses are deduced rather than induced. Hypothesis 2, 3, and 4 are 
questions that concern variations/differences, which are better answered via the 
statistical analysis of numerical data. Hypothesis 1 is a question that requires some 
exploratory observations and interpretation in the public policy sphere (for instance, 
we would like to find out the policy decisions on social security provision and to   112
explore the reasons of under-provision of social security).   
 
Our hypotheses focus on the subnational levels of government in China. Before the 
hypotheses are formally tested, we provide a descriptive analysis of the aggregated 
national statistical data.  The analysis at this level would not directly confirm or 
reject the hypotheses and it only serves to capture the country’s overall economic and 
fiscal trend in the context of market transformation. The study at this layer serves as 
an essential prelude for further analysis at the provincial level and the Fujian case 
study.    
 
Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 are tested using consolidated provincial statistical data. A 
census is used, where we take all 31 provincial units into the analysis. In such case, no 
sampling strategy is needed. The primary reason we test these three hypotheses at the 
provincial level rather than at prefecture-level is that the statistical data at this level 
are more accessible. All the statistical data used are secondary data from China 
Statistics Yearbooks, Industrial Statistics Yearbooks of China, China Labour Statistics 
Yearbooks or statistics yearbooks of various provinces. The statistics yearbooks of the 
provinces are easier to collect than the statistics yearbooks of prefecture-level cities as 
there are only 31 provincial units and some provinces also publish the data over the 
internet; even using sampling methods, collecting a representative sample for the 333 
prefecture-level municipalities is extremely difficult. These three hypotheses cannot 
be tested at the county-level because many of the required indicators are not provided   113
in county-level statistics (there are 2862 county-level government units, which could 
make the collection of data even more difficult). Descriptive statistics, correlation 
analysis and cross-sectional multiple regression techniques are used in addressing 
these three hypotheses. We refrain from using panel regression (cross-sectional and 
time-series) because many of the statistical indicators have been modified and become 
incomparable with previous year's data (for instance, the definition of urban 
non-agricultural population was changed in 2002/2003) and for some key indicators, 
we have only been able to collect the data of more recent years (the issue of validity 
and data reliability is discussed later). Model specifications are provided in the 
subsequent chapters along with the research findings. We use a Fujian province case 
study to verify Hypothesis 1(The cross-sectional provincial analysis also address 
Hypothesis 1, but the case study tackle the hypothesis in more depth).   
 
There are four major types of qualitative research designs, namely, case study, 
ethnography, phenomenology and grounded theory. Ethnography is normally used in 
studying culture and behaviour, phenomenology is the typical method in philosophy, 
grounded theory is the inductive method (originated from sociology) that builds 
theories from the analysis of data and case study is used to shed light on a 
phenomenon and has wider application among researchers than grounded theory (for 
more detail description of these qualitative methods, see Leedy, 1997). This research 
does not concern culture and behaviour or philosophy and the hypotheses are deduced 
from the literature, therefore case study is more appropriate for testing Hypothesis 1.   114
As pointed out by many scholars such as Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991), case 
study is an ideal method when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed. Detailed 
contextual analysis is one of the advantages of case study. According to Yin (1993), 
case study could be used to describe, explore, explain or evaluate phenomenon or 
programs. There could be single-case or multiple-case applications. Like some of the 
other qualitative methods, case study has been criticized as the research results from 
case study may not be generalized to other situations and may be biased. Nevertheless, 
if carefully designed, bias could be minimized or even eliminated. In addition, case 
study researchers normally focus on transferability rather than generalization. The 
Fujian province case study is a single case study and the selection of Fujian province 
is based on two criteria. We seek to verify fiscal inadequacy and unmet social security 
needs in one of the more affluent areas (preferably in the coastal region). Moreover, 
we must have the access to relevant information—published statistics and some 
unpublished government reports. Fujian, a coastal province in southeast China is the 
only province out of the nine that meets these criterions. Fujian has managed to 
develop its economy at a faster-than-average rate over the reform era. Its GDP per 
capita and per capita fiscal revenue have consistently ranked around 7
th to 10
th out of 
31 provinces since 1994 (author’s calculation from China Statistics Yearbooks). Three 
of the nine prefecture-level municipalities in Fujian are very affluent cities. In the 
Fujian case study, we not only use the whole province as a subject for analysis, but 
also investigate the situation in its second richest prefecture-level municipality 
Quanzhou to enrich the understanding of the research problem. The case study is both   115
explanatory and exploratory. We interview several government officials in Fujian's 
Finance Department and Bureau of Statistics as well as Quanzhou’s Finance Bureau, 
Statistics Bureau and State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission. The main purpose of the interviews is to gain access to relevant official 
reports and memos. We also conduct a careful research of relevant published 
secondary data to corroborate the quantitative analysis.   
 
The data-gathering fieldwork has taken places in several stages. In December 2006, a 
pilot/preliminary fieldwork was conducted to enhance the understanding of the 
research questions. Between December 2007 and August 2008, we collected all the 
quantitative data and interviewed 9 government officials in Fujian province (15 
face-to-face interviews). The final fieldwork took place between April and May 2009, 
where a few more reports were collected. Appendix 1 provides the list of interviews. 
   
4.3 Validity, Reliability and Research Ethics 
Validity and reliability are the key considerations of any research project. Validity is 
normally defined as the best available approximation to the truth of a given 
proposition, inference, or conclusion (Trochim, 2006). Reliability is often referred to 
as the consistency of measure and test in quantitative studies or the consistency of the 
researcher’s interpretation of participant meanings in qualitative studies (McMillan 
and Schumacher, 1993). There are three broad types of validity: construct validity,   116
internal validity and external validity. Construct validity concerns the degree to which 
the operationalisation reflects the concept or the construct. In other words, it is an 
assessment of how well a researcher translates the theories into actual measures 
(Trochim, 2006). Internal validity is an estimate of causal inferences. External validity 
refers to the extent to which the result of the study could be generalized to other cases.   
 
There are some potential threats to validity and reliability. In our research, how do we 
minimize the threats in order to enhance validity and reliability? In terms of 
Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 (tested using quantitative approaches), the potential threats to 
construct validity may come from the fact that we have to use some proxies to 
represent the concept. In some cases, the indicators/proxies themselves equal the 
concept (e.g. budgetary revenue). In other cases, the indicators we used may only 
approximate the concept. For instance, we use the industrial output of non-SOE and 
non-state-controlled enterprises as share of total industrial output to proxy market 
transition.  We therefore ignore the tertiary sector and implicitly assume that the 
effect of the industrial sector is representative. Such compromise is the typical result 
of using secondary data in quantitative studies. We are unable to completely eliminate 
such kinds of threat and we seek to reduce the negative impacts by searching for 
alternative indicators or alternative evidence as much as possible (triangulation) and 
by comparing the indicators used in other similar quantitative studies. The internal 
validity check is performed via the statistical analysis of the numerical data, where 
different means and methods are employed to make sure that the result is robust. In   117
terms of external validity, the result of Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 may not be a concern 
because we study the whole population (the 31 provinces) and the results need not to 
be further generalized.   
 
In terms of the quantitative analysis, reliability refers to consistency of measure in the 
indicators employed. Since all the economic and statistical data in our analysis are 
secondary data and are collected and assembled by the Statistics Bureaus and the 
Finance Departments at various levels of government, the question of reliability in 
measure/observation becomes a question of whether China's statistical data are 
reliable. In retrospect, there have been many criticisms on China’s official statistical 
data, in particular on the reported GDP figures. For a comprehensive review, see 
Rawski (2001). It has been reported that, the governments, especially local 
governments tended to overestimate the GDP figures in order to impress higher levels 
of government and the investors. The former premier Zhu Rongji in 2000 openly 
admitted that the exaggeration of Chinese economic data was rampant (Baumohl, 
2004). Under-supply of qualified staff in the statistic departments may further obscure 
the problem (ibid). Nevertheless, the National Bureau of Statistics has devoted strong 
efforts to upgrade data quality by training staff in local statistics departments and 
sending its own staff to help data-collection in local areas since 2003. It has become 
much more difficult for local governments to “cook the books”. Several rounds of 
national economic surveys have also been served to correct bias and errors in previous 
statistic reports. There is another problem in Chinese statistics, that is, many of the   118
indicators, such as unemployment rates, are not in line with international conventional 
standards; because those indicators are the legacy of the economic system in the 
pre-reform era. Therefore, we are very cautious in using and interpreting the statistical 
data in China. First, we use more up-to-date statistics, given the fact that data are 
often revised. For instance, we look at the 2004 data from both 2005 and 2006 
yearbooks, in cases that the 2004 data have been revised. Secondly, we use multiple 
sources of evidence to corroborate the figures. For example, we collect social security 
statistics from Department of Statistics as well as from Department of Finance to 
check whether there are discrepancies. Thirdly, we examine the time-series data to 
dictate whether there are definition changes for the indicators. Finally, when there are 
contradictions between the Chinese definitions and international conventions of 
certain data, we make specifications. 
  
In the qualitative part of the research (the Fujian case study to address Hypothesis 1), 
we also make efforts to reduce the threats to validity and reliability. Construct validity 
and reliability are difficult to maintain in case studies, because to some degree there is 
subjectivity in measures and observations by the researchers. We are aware that 
construct validity and reliability are different, although both are related to 
measures/observations. Construct validity refers to how well we measure what the 
theories want us to measure, while reliability refers to how consistent we 
interpret/measure participant meaning. Yin (1993) proposes the use of multiple 
evidence to reduce the threats to construct validity and reliability in case studies. In   119
our studies, subjectivity in measures and interpretation of participant meaning is 
minimized as we collect supporting government reports to corroborate the interview 
notes. In terms of internal validity in qualitative studies, the typical threat is the social 
interaction threats, where participants respond to the investigators purposefully (or 
even lying to the researches) because of the influences from the researches, which 
results in the causal-conclusion generated from the studies invalid. To reduce such 
kind of threat, we limit the questions that ask for personal opinions from the 
government officials and request for relevant government reports or other sources of 
information. The drawback of such “rigid” design, however, is that we reduce the 
chances to capture anecdotal evidence that might be interesting. Unlike quantitative 
research that uses probability sampling (i.e. random selection of samples to represent 
the population) to facilitate the generation of the result from the statistical analysis, 
qualitative researches do not normally aim to generalize the result. Therefore, the 
criteria for external validity in case study is more with translatability—to what degree 
the understanding in one case could be extended to other cases? In our studies, we aim 
to improve the translatability by providing the clear socioeconomic background of 
Fujian province as well as a detailed description of the case itself. Thus the typicality 
of the Fujian case could be grasped by other researches. Our transparent and 
pre-specified research methodology may also facilitate comparisons by other 
researches.  
 
This research does not investigate controversial or politically sensitive topics, but we   120
still comply with the ethical principles. Permissions are obtained before entering the 
field, before conducting any interview and before borrowing any government report 
and document. Oral or written consent is obtained before photocopying the documents. 
Anonymity is ensured when conducting interviews, as requested by the interviewees. 
With regard to a small number of unpublished government internal reports yet are 
important to our studies, we read them on-site, take notes (if permitted) and use the 
evidence to corroborate the interview notes.   
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Chapter 5 The Impact of Market Transition on Public Finance—an 
Analysis at the National Level   
This chapter examines the changes in the fiscal spheres, especially the structural 
changes in China’s consolidated budgetary spending at the national level in the 1990s 
(in particular in the post 1994 era). The purpose is to assess one of the very important 
fiscal needs arising from market transition: the expenditure need of the widespread 
introduction of social security since the mid-late 1990s. The discussion in this chapter 
does not directly address the hypotheses, yet it serves as a necessary prelude and helps 
to improve the understanding of the analysis at the sub-national levels.   
 
5.1 The Expansion of Wage-Labour and the SOE Restructuring   
Since the late 1970s, there has been continuous expansion of wage-labour outside the 
state sector in China. Table 5.1 reports the number of non-farm employed persons by 
urban and rural areas between 1990 and 2006 (constrained by space, the figures prior 
to 1990 are not reported). The total number of non-farm employed persons increased 
from around 279.1 millions in 1990 to around 477.69 millions in 2006. This means 
that assuming no elimination of jobs, on average, around 12.41 million new non-farm 
jobs were created each year during the 16-year period. The rural non-agricultural 
sectors (township and village enterprises, private enterprises and self-employed 
individuals) expanded faster than the urban sectors: a 79 percent increase in job 
positions was realized between 1990 and 2006, which was higher than the 66.1   122
percent growth in the urban sectors. The discrepancy may be a result of the relative 
success of rural industrialization, which generated much more jobs; and the 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the urban sectors, which slowed 
down the new job creation. A survey of the urban sectors in Table 5.1 reveals that 
three out of the ten sub-sectors experienced decline in job positions, which to some 
extent counteracted the job creations in the other seven sub-sectors, especially the 
non-state sectors. We could see that in 1990, the state-owned units (covering both 
SOEs and the government agencies, institutions and organizations) and the urban 
collective-owned units (covering collective enterprises and a few public services units) 
together accounted for around 81.5 percent of the total urban job posts. In 2006 this 
number dropped to merely 25.4 percent, though the SOE sector is still the single 
largest urban sector in terms of the number of employees. Some of the job loss was 
nominal: for instance, when a collective enterprise is privatized, its employees would 
no longer be recorded as collective enterprise employees but entered as private 
enterprise employees. But a large part of the job losses in the SOE sector were real, 
because prior to the market reform, most of the state-owned firms did not recruit 
employees according to viable economic rules, which often led to redundancy and 
inefficiency. SOE restructuring was therefore accompanied by laying-off the 
redundant  workers.   
 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Number of Employed Person 27910 28806 30348 32804 33537 35427 37289 37953 38745 39912 40043 40842 41952 43226 44431 46091 47769
Urban Employed Persons                 17041 17465 17861 18262 18653 19040 19922 20781 21616 22412 23151 23940 24780 25639 26476 27331 28310
  State-owned Units                       10346 10664 10889 10920 11214 11261 11244 11044 9058 8572 8102 7640 7163 6876 6710 6488 6430
  Urban Collective-owned Units            3549 3628 3621 3393 3285 3147 3016 2883 1963 1712 1499 1291 1122 1000 897 810 764
  Cooperative Units                     136 144 155 153 161 173 192 188 178
  Joint Ownership Units                       96 49 56 66 52 53 49 43 48 46 42 45 45 44 44 45 45
  Limited Liability Corporations          484 603 687 841 1083 1261 1436 1750 1920
  Share-holding Corporations Ltd.         164 292 317 363 468 410 420 457 483 538 592 625 699 741
  Private Enterprises                     57 68 98 186 332 485 620 750 973 1053 1268 1527 1999 2545 2994 3458 3954
  Units Funded fr HK,Macao,Taiwan 4 69 83 155 211 272 265 281 294 306 310 326 367 409 470 557 611
  Foreign Funded Units                    62 96 138 133 195 241 275 300 293 306 332 345 391 454 563 688 796
  Self-employed Individuals               614 692 740 930 1225 1560 1709 1919 2259 2414 2136 2131 2269 2377 2521 2778 3012
Rural Employed Persons                  10869 11341 12487 14542 14884 16387 17367 17172 17129 17500 16892 16902 17172 17587 17955 18760 19459
  Township and Village Enterprises        9265 9609 10625 12345 12017 12862 13508 13050 12537 12704 12820 13086 13288 13573 13866 14272 14680
  Private Enterprises                     113 116 134 187 316 471 551 600 737 969 1139 1187 1411 1754 2024 2366 2632
  Self-employed Individuals               1491 1616 1728 2010 2551 3054 3308 3522 3855 3827 2934 2629 2474 2260 2066 2123 2147
Table 5.1 the Number of Non-Farm Employed Persons by Urban and Rural Areas in China (10000 persons)
Source: Compiled from China Statistics Yearbook 2007 by the author
Note: Rural Employed Persons do not include peasonts that work on the farmland
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Employed Persons in SOE and
State-Controlled Enterprises
5978 5732 5333 5030 4693 4583 4288 4290
Fully employed staff and
workers in SOE and State-
controlled enterprises
5827 5564 5141 4821 4461 4335 4036 4026
Fully employed staff and
workers in SOE
7502 7643 7642 7545 7544 7404 7131 5220 4733 4265 3809 3382 3067 2841 2570 2456
Urban registered unemployed
persons
352 364 420 476 520 553 577 571 575 595 681 770 800 827 839 847
SOE Laid-off workers at year-end 595 653 657 515 410 260 153 61
Table 5.2  Basic statistics of SOE employment and urban unemployment (10000 persons)
Source: adapted from China Statistics Yearbook 2007 and China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2004-2007  
Figure 5.3 The number of SOE workers and  urban registered unemployees
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 Table 5.2 brings us closer to the effects of SOE restructuring. The SOE reforms were 
piloted in a few jurisdictions during the early 1990s and the formal national campaign 
started from 1997 and finished between 2004 and 2006 in most areas. From 1998, 
many of the state-owned enterprises have been converted to state-controlled 
enterprises and only a small number of state-owned enterprises have been completely 
privatized (Interview 2). Table 5.2 shows that the number of SOE laid-off workers 
peaked in 2000 (6.57 millions) then diminished to 0.61 millions in 2005. The 
cumulative number of laid-off workers may be well above 25 millions. The SOE 
laid-off workers would be compensated with basic living stipends for two years, then 
transferred to urban unemployment benefits for up to another two years (if he/she still 
could not find a job) then transferred to urban minimum livelihood assistance scheme 
(Saunders and Shang, 2001; reconfirmed in Interview 2). The compensation standard 
is highest for the basic living stipends, then urban unemployment benefits, then the 
means tested urban minimum livelihood assistance (ibid). The laid-off workers would 
also be entitled to free employment training or reemployment services (subsidized or 
provided by the governments) (ibid). Figure 5.3 depicts that while the number of fully 
employed staff and workers in SOE dropped since 1994, the official controlled 
number of urban registered unemployed persons rose during the same period. These 
figures are underestimated as they do not include the number of unemployed rural 
migrant workers.   
 
The heavier expenses for SOE restructuring may come from subsidies to social   126
security accounts. Social security reforms went hand in hand with the SOE 
restructuring. The purpose was to transfer the welfare provision responsibility from 
individual enterprises (including SOE and other non-state-owned enterprises) to the 
society at large to pool the risks. Many of the state-owned firms were unable to make 
the required social insurance contributions for their employees and the laid-off 
workers. Thus the governments also had to take up such responsibilities (Interview 2). 
Pension insurance has been the primary concern among the five social insurances 
(there are pension insurance, unemployment insurance, medical insurance, work 
injury insurance and maternity insurance). The government pledged “Two Ensure” in 
the late 1990s: to ensure a fully and on time delivery of basic pensions for retired 
people of enterprise and to ensure a basic standard of living for SOE laid-off 
employees (Finance Yearbook of China 2005, p380). The demand for contributory 
social insurances and non-contributory social benefits could have also been increased 
with the continuous growth of wage-labour. Many of the requirements may have yet 
to be met, as illustrated below. 
 
The number of urban employees participated in pension insurance, unemployment 
insurance, medical insurance and work injury insurance has augmented largely since 
the establishment of these services (see Table 5.4 and Table 5.5). However even if we 
take the widest covered pension insurance as an example, the number of urban 
participants is only 141.3 millions, around 49.9 percent of the number of employed 
persons in urban units in 2006 (calculated from Table 5.1 and Table 5.5). When the   127
township-village enterprise sector is taken into account (employees in this sector are 
also eligible to participate in urban enterprise pension insurance), the participation 
rate becomes much lower (around 32.9 percent). The participation rates of urban 
unemployment insurances, medical insurances and work injury insurances must be 
lower than the participation rate of pension insurances, as the numbers of participants 
by the end of 2006 were smaller than the number of pension participants. There are 
two separated pension insurances for urban workers, one for those who work in 
enterprise and another one for employees in government agencies, organisations and 
institutions (launched in the late 1990s) (Interview 2). One could observe from Table 
5.5 that from 1999, the figure under “participating employees” started to become 
larger than “enterprise employees only”. Before 1999, the pension for government 
staff was paid directly from the budget and the employees did not need to make any 
contribution. The reform launched in 1999 aimed to gradually introduce a 
contribution-based pension scheme to the public sector. But so far only a very small 
number of government employees is transferred to this scheme and the majority of the 
government employees still enjoys the privilege of state paid pension (Interview 2). At 
this level of analysis, we are unable to detect any potential under-provision of social 
benefits/assistances, because the relevant data is not available (this issue is tackled in 
the Fujian case study).    What has become clear is that since the mid 1990s, the social 
security sector has grown to a sizable budgetary item (analyzed in the next section).   
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Year 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
4350 10269 4406 6845 Work Injury Insurance 1822 3103 3781
2863 6926 9044 11580 Medical Insurance 375 791 1509
7928 10408
Table 5.4: The Number of Person Participated in the three Urban Social Insurances ( unit:
10000 persons)
Source: adapted from China Statistics Yearbook 2007
Unemployment Insurance 7968 8333 10182 10584 11187
 
 
of which
Enterpise
Employees
of which Enterprise
Retirees
1990 6166 5201 5201 965 965
1991 6740 5654 5654 1087 1087
1992 9456 7775 7775 1682 1682
1993 9848 8008 8008 1839 1839
1994 10574 8494 8494 2079 2079
1995 10979 8738 8738 2241 2241
1996 11117 8758 8758 2358 2358
1997 11204 8671 8671 2533 2533
1998 11203 8476 8476 2727 2727
1999 12485 9502 8859 2984 2948
2000 13617 10447 9470 3170 3017
2001 14183 10802 9733 3381 3171
2002 14737 11129 9929 3608 3349
2003 15507 11647 10325 3860 3557
2004 16353 12250 10904 4103 3775
2005 17488 13120 11711 4368 4005
2006 18766 14131 12618 4635 4239
Year
Participating Employees Participating Retirees
Total
Participants
Table 5.5: the Number of People Participated in Basic Pension Insurance (10000
persons)
Source: adapted from China Statistics Yearbook 2007  
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5.2 The Emerging Social Security Sector 
Since 1990, the GDP, government budgetary revenue and expenditure have achieved 
remarkable growth in both nominal term (11.3 times) and real price (4.74 times, see 
Table 5.6). The size of budgetary expenditure has been slightly larger than the revenue, 
with an average annual deficit around 4.5 percent of the budgeted revenue.    Another 
noteworthy trend is the share of budgetary revenue and the share of budgetary 
expenditure as proportion of GDP.  Both ratios declined until 1995 and they started 
to climb up again from 1996. This was cited as one of the successes of 1994 
Tax-Sharing-Reform. As already specified by some scholars (such as Zhang, 1999), 
the growth in budgetary revenue after the reform has also been contributed by 
reclassifying some of the extra-budgetary revenue to budgetary revenue (Described in 
Table 5.7, the size of extra-budgetary revenue in 2005 was only around 15 percent of 
the budgetary revenue). It may be reasonable to state that the governments spent more 
as they became more affluent, however, another explanation could be that higher 
amount of spending was driven by the growing needs.   
 
There is one important issue that needs to be clarified. The general government 
budgetary revenue and expenditure of China does not include the contributions to and 
payments from state-mandated contribution-based social insurance funds. In other 
words, social insurance funds are kept off-budget. In contrast, the international 
practice is to include the social insurance contributions in general government 
budgetary revenue and treat payments from state-mandated social insurance funds as   130
part of general government expenditure. Thus the level of budgeted social security 
spending in OECD countries is not directly comparable to the level of budgeted social 
security spending in China. It is obvious that, if the international standard is adopted, 
China's level of social security spending would have been much higher. In those 
literature on China's public finance issues, scholars have always used the official 
figures without making adjustment. This may be because the social insurance funds 
are earmarked for social insurance payments only and the governments could only 
make subsidies to those funds (they could not withdraw the funds for other budgetary 
spending needs). In this regard, the level of social insurance funds does not imply the 
fiscal capacity of the government. It is rather difficult if one would like to make such 
adjustment to China's budgetary figures. Since the budgetary spending on social 
security includes the subsidies made by the government to social insurance funds and 
the exact amount of subsidies to social insurance funds is not reported/available, 
simply adding up the social insurance payments to budgeted expenditure may count 
the amount of subsidies twice (overstating the total expenditure). Likewise, the total 
social security spending (budgeted spending on social security plus payments from 
social insurance funds) may be overstated. Therefore, we are not able to make such 
adjustment. Nevertheless, the budgetary data on social security (and the trend) alone 
are already illustrative. 
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1990 18668 2937 3084 16 17 18668 2937 3084
1991 21781 3149 3387 14 16 20381 2947 3169
1992 26923 3483 3742 13 14 23284 3012 3236
1993 35334 4349 4642 12 13 26535 3266 3486
1994 48198 5218 5793 11 12 30006 3249 3606
1995 60794 6242 6824 10 11 33284 3418 3736
1996 71177 7408 7938 10 11 36616 3811 4083
1997 78973 8651 9234 11 12 40020 4384 4679
1998 84402 9876 10798 12 13 43155 5050 5521
1999 89677 11444 13188 13 15 46443 5927 6830
2000 99215 13395 15887 14 16 50359 6799 8064
2001 109655 16386 18903 15 17 54539 8150 9401
2002 120333 18904 22053 16 18 59492 9346 10903
2003 135823 21715 24650 16 18 65456 10465 11879
2004 159878 26396 28487 17 18 72057 11897 12839
2005 183868 31649 33930 17 18 79575 13697 14684
2006 210871 38760 40423 18 19 88398 16248 16945
Source: author's calculation from China Statistics Yearbook 2007
Budgeted
Expd
Nominal Price      Constant 1990 price
Table 5.6 China's GDP, budgeted revenue & expenditure (1990-2006) at nominal price
and constant 1990 price; unit: 100 million Yuan
Year
Expd as %
of GDP
GDP
Budgeted
Revenue
GDP
Budgeted
Revenue
Budgeted
Expd
Revn as%
of GDP
 
 
1990 2709 40 60 92 2707 38 62 88
1991 3243 43 57 103 3092 41 59 91
1992 3855 44 56 111 3650 44 56 98
1993 1433 17 83 33 1314 15 85 28
1994 1863 15 85 36 1710 13 87 30
1995 2407 13 87 39 2331 15 85 34
1996 3893 24 76 53 3838 27 73 48
1997 2826 5 95 33 2686 5 95 29
1998 3082 5 95 31 2918 5 95 27
1999 3385 7 93 30 3139 5 95 24
2000 3826 7 94 29 3529 6 94 22
2001 4300 8 92 26 3850 7 93 20
2002 4479 10 90 24 3831 7 93 17
2003 4567 8 92 21 4156 8 92 17
2004 4699 8 93 18 4352 9 91 15
2005 5544 7 93 18 5242 9 91 15
Source: author's calculation from China Statistics Yearbook 2007
EBR as
% of
Budgetary
Revenue
Total
EBE
(100 M
Yuan)
Central
Gov
share (%)
Local
Govs
share
(%)
Year
Total
EBR
(100 M
Yuan)
Central
Gov
share (%)
Local
Govs
share
(%)
Table 5.7: Basic statistics of Extra-budgetary Revenues (EBR) and Extra-budgetary Expenditures (EBE);
unit: 100 million yuan
EBE as
% of
Budgetary
Spending 
Table 5.8(100 M RMB, 1990 price) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP 18668 20381 23284 26535 30006 33284 36616 40020 43155 46443 50359 54539 59492 65456 72057 79575 88398
Real Total Budgetary Revenue 2937 2947 3012 3266 3249 3418 3811 4384 5050 5927 6799 8150 9346 10465 11897 13697 16248
Real Total Budgetary Expenditure 3084 3169 3236 3486 3606 3736 4083 4679 5521 6830 8064 9401 10903 11879 12839 14684 16945
  Construction & Urban Maintenance 547 524 481 445 398 567 616 686 904 1307 1301 1531 1877 2020 1986 2295 2485
  Enterprises Innovation Funds 201 217 241 367 309 326 326 390 392 469 520 554 539 584 618 712 798
  Rural Production Expenses 222 228 233 243 249 236 262 284 320 351 389 457 545 547 763 776 906
  Social Security 55 63 57 57 59 63 94 166 305 620 770 988 1303 1280 1404 1601 1828
  National Defence 290 309 327 320 343 349 370 412 478 557 613 717 844 919 992 1071 1249
  Government Administration 303 322 367 402 454 478 535 576 678 790 907 1093 1473 1657 1830 2093 2364
  Price Subsidies 381 350 278 225 196 200 234 280 364 361 529 369 319 297 359 432 582
  Culture,Edu, Health, Science 617 662 686 719 796 803 877 965 1102 1247 1389 1672 1967 2171 2318 2642 3113
  Others 467 494 567 709 802 715 768 920 979 1127 1645 2021 2035 2404 2569 3063 3621
Source:author's calculation from China Statistics Yearbooks 2001-2007 (using implicit GDP deflator)
 
Table 5.9 the Indices of: 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP 100 109 125 142 161 178 196 214 231 249 270 292 319 351 386 426 474
Real Total Budgetary Revenue 100 100 103 111 111 116 130 149 172 202 231 277 318 356 405 466 553
Real Total Budgetary Expenditure 100 103 105 113 117 121 132 152 179 221 261 305 354 385 416 476 550
  Construction & Urban Maintenance 100 96 88 81 73 104 113 125 165 239 238 280 343 369 363 419 454
  Enterprises Innovation Funds 100 108 120 183 154 162 162 194 195 233 259 275 268 291 308 354 397
  Rural Production Expenses 100 103 105 110 112 106 118 128 144 158 176 206 246 247 344 350 409
  Social Security 100 114 104 103 108 115 171 302 553 1127 1399 1796 2368 2325 2552 2908 3322
  National Defence 100 106 113 110 118 120 128 142 165 192 211 247 291 317 342 369 430
  Government Administration 100 106 121 133 150 158 177 190 224 261 299 361 486 547 604 690 780
  Price Subsidies 100 92 73 59 51 52 61 73 96 95 139 97 84 78 94 113 153
  Culture,Edu, Health, Science 100 107 111 117 129 130 142 156 178 202 225 271 319 352 376 428 504
  Others 100 106 121 152 172 153 165 197 210 241 352 433 436 515 550 656 775
Source:author's calculation from China Statistics Yearbooks 2001-2007 (using implicit GDP deflator)  We now turn to analyse the budgetary expenditure composition to highlight the 
impact of market transition on social security. Table 5.8 records major expenditure 
items since 1990 and the figures are deflated to 1990 price using implicit GDP 
deflator from China Statistics Yearbooks (2001-2007). Table 5.9 compiles the indices 
of all Table 4 items over the same period in order to capture the rate of change of each 
item. Here are the simplified explanations for some of the expenditure items, which 
summarized from the explanatory notes of China Statistics Yearbook (2005). 
Construction & Urban Maintenance refers to all capital construction expenditure (not 
only cover urban infrastructure but other capital outlays such as school buildings) and 
urban maintenance expenses. Enterprise Innovation Funds refer to subsidies to both 
public and private enterprises for the purposes of production upgrading or promotion 
of science and so on. Rural Production Expenses refer to all operating expenses in 
rural sectors (which exclude capital spending). Social Security covers three sub-items, 
namely, “pensions and relief funds for social welfare”, “social security subsidiary 
expenses” and “expenditure for retired persons in administrative departments”. All the 
subsidies on social insurance funds and on SOE restructuring are contained in “social 
security subsidiary expenses”, while the social benefit payments are included in 
“pensions and relief funds for social welfare”. Government Administration covers the 
operating expenses of government agencies and organizations, but excludes the 
operating expenses of government institutions (public services units). Culture, 
Education, Health and Science refer to the operating expenditure of these four sectors. 
"Others" cover a wide range of other public service department expenses (e.g. the   134
expenses of Industry, Commerce and Transportation Departments).   
 
From Table 5.8 and Table 5.9, one could notice that the most fast-expanding item is 
Social Security, which grew from 5.5 billions in 1990 to 182.8 billions (constant 1990 
price) in 2006, an over 33 times increase. The other two sectors that beat the 
benchmark growth rate (the growth rate of total budgetary expenditure) are 
Government Administration and Others, which expanded more than 7 times between 
1990 and 2006 (the benchmark growth rate is 5.5 times). But the pace of such 
expansion is still dwarfed by the Social Security sector. The Price Subsidies 
experienced the slowest growth, it rose to 58.2 billions in 2006 from 38.2 billions in 
1990, only a 1.5 times differences. The growth rates of all the other items are just 
slightly below the benchmark growth rate. A closer examination of Social Security 
sector shows that its growth trajectory was not steadily: the turning point was in 1996 
in which there was a sharp rise. The growth path of social security spending cannot be 
simply explained by the increase in government revenue and its trend is much more 
associated with the trend of SOE restructuring (see Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). In 
around ten year’s time, the Social Security sector has become one of the sizable 
expenditure item (see Table 5.10) consuming around 11 percent of the budgeted 
expenditure. Note that the budgetary spending figure of social security we presented 
here is an underestimated one, because it does not include the medical care subsidy 
for the government administrative institutions (which is a social security item, as 
classified by the Finance Yearbook of China 2005). A careful comparison between   135
Finance Yearbook of China (2005) and China Statistics Yearbook (2005) reveals that, 
medical care subsidy for the government administrative institutions is hidden under 
the “operating expenses for public health” in China Statistics Yearbook. There has 
been a definition change since 2005 and the statistical information of this item has 
become unavailable from Finance Yearbook of China. Between 1998 and 2004, the 
medical care subsidy for the administrative institutions averaged 1.3 percent of the 
annual budgetary spending (Finance Yearbook of China 2005, p379). If this ratio were 
unchanged, then the budgeted social security spending would consume more than 12 
percent of the consolidated budgeted expenditure in 2006. 
 
We notice from China Statistics Yearbook 2008 that there was a thorough change in 
the categorisation of China’s budgetary expenditure items, making the expenditure 
data of the year 2007 incomparable with previous years’ data. Therefore, the 2007 
statistical information is not reported here. There is an interesting evidence, which 
may suggest the that concern of social security funding pressure by the government 
has increased. In 19
th June 2009, the State Department of China decreed that in future 
all the state-owned and state-controlled enterprises listed in China’s domestic stock 
markets must transfer stock equal to 10 percent of the shares offered to National 
Social Security Fund after their initial public offerings (FT Chinese Edition, 22
nd June 
2009, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001027132, accessed 23
rd June 2009). Before, 
only those state-controlled enterprise listed in stock exchange of Hong Kong were 
required to make the transfer. The National Social Security Fund is a reserve fund   136
established by the central government in 2000 in order to prepare for future social 
security obligations (National Council For Social Security Fund, 
http://www.ssf.gov.cn/jj/qgsbjj/200812/t20081208_1019.html, accessed 23
rd June 
2009). The source of finance of this fund largely comes from the subsidies made by 
Ministry of Finance as well as the SOE stock transfers (ibid). In contrast, social 
security funds managed by provincial or municipal governments are mainly financed 
from the contributions made by employers and employees (the government made 
limited subsidies) and current contributions finance current benefits (Interview 3). 
Therefore, social security funds managed at the local levels have much smaller 
balance available for investment and the balance is required to be invested in 
government bonds or deposited in commercial banks (Interview 2) 
 
Table:5.10 the distribution of budgetary items in selected years
1990 1996 2001 2006
Construction & Urban Maintenance 17.8% 15.1% 16.3% 14.7%
Enterprises Innovation Funds 6.5% 8.0% 5.9% 4.7%
Rural Production Expenses 7.2% 6.4% 4.9% 5.3%
Social Security 1.8% 2.3% 10.5% 10.8%
National Defence 9.4% 9.1% 7.6% 7.4%
Government Administration 9.8% 13.1% 11.6% 14.0%
Price Subsidies 12.3% 5.7% 3.9% 3.4%
Culture,Edu, Health, Science 20.0% 21.5% 17.8% 18.4%
Others 15.1% 18.8% 21.5% 21.4%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: calculated from China Statistics Yearbook 2005-2007
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Distribution of Expenditure Items 2006
Unit: 100 M Yuan  and %
Expenditure for Capital Construction 4390 1484 2907 34% 66%
Enterprise Innovation Funds  1903 486 1417 26% 74%
Urban Maintenance and Construction Expenditure 1699 0 1699 0% 100%
Rural Production Expenses 2161 194 1967 9% 91%
Social Security 4362 356 4006 8% 92%
National Defence 2979 2947 32 99% 1%
Government Administration 5639 655 4984 12% 88%
Price Subsidies 1388 550 837 40% 60%
Expenses for Culture, Edu, Science and Health 7426 719 6707 10% 90%
Operating Expenses in Other Departments 2043 247 1796 12% 88%
Other Expenditure 6433 2353 4080 37% 63%
Total Budgetary Expenditure  40423 9991 30431 25% 75%
Table 5.11: Expenditure Responsibility between the Central and Local Government
Source: author's calculation from China Statistical Yearbook 2007
Total Central  Local Central Local
 
 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter confirms our earlier speculation that market 
transition has generated growing fiscal needs for the governments in the area of social 
security. Some of the needs have been met, resulting in significantly increased 
budgetary expenditure on social security. But the aggregate coverage ratios of social 
insurances are still low, which signal that a large part of the needs may have yet to be 
dealt with. The fact that the central government requests the SOEs to transfer part of 
the stock to the National Social Security Fund may suggest that the concern of social 
security funding pressure by the government has increased. Since most of the social 
security responsibilities have been decentralized to local governments (Table 5.11 
shows that local governments covered around 92 percent of the consolidated social   138
security expenditure in 2006), the analysis at the sub-national levels provide better 
insights of the problem of fiscal inadequacy and unmet social security needs. 
Although the expenditure of government administration has increased in a faster pace 
than the general budgetary expenditure, it may not necessarily suggest that there has 
been government expansion. Because this expenditure item only covers the operating 
expenses of government agencies and organization (jiguan danwei) and a large 
portion of public sector expenditure is on government institutions (pubic services 
units). The evidence presented in this chapter does not address any of the four 
hypotheses. The testing results of the four hypotheses are discussed in the next two 
chapters. 
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Chapter 6 The Impact of Market Transition on Local Public 
Finance—Cross-Sectional Analyses at the Provincial Level 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, we highlight the major changes in the fiscal spheres at the national level 
during the 1990s. The result indicates that market transition has already had an 
increasing impact on public finance, evidenced in the growing level of spending on 
social security between 1990 and 2006. It also reveals that there has been considerable 
unmet social security needs. In this chapter, the provincial cross-sectional analyses 
tackle Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4; some evidences presented in this chapter also address 
Hypothesis 1.   
 
In section 6.3, we analyse the changing patterns of social security spending across the 
provinces as well as the coverage status of several social insurance schemes to 
evaluate the fiscal impact from market transition and identify unmet social security 
needs in different provinces. A mini case study on Shanghai’s social security fund is 
also reported to further illustrate the magnitude of social security needs and fiscal 
inadequacy problem at subnational levels. Hypothesis 1 is supported. In section 6.4, 
we use simple correlation analysis to test Hypothesis 2 and the result to some extent 
confirms this hypothesis.  In section 6.5, we use multiple regression to analyse 
Hypothesis 3 and the result rejects this hypothesis. In section 6.6, we use correlation 
and multiple regression to test Hypothesis 4 and the end result only partially confirms   140
this hypothesis.   
 
6.2 Identifying the Relatively Affluent Areas 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 present a few key indicators of China’s provinces in 1995 and 
2004. The consolidated provincial budgetary revenue in 1994 (in which the 
Tax-Sharing reform took place) contains the tax rebates, but from 1995 onward the 
consolidated budgetary revenue figures does not include the tax rebates. Therefore the 
1994 figures are not comparable with post 1994 fiscal data. That is why 1995 is used 
as the benchmark year instead of 1994. As the unpublished social security data 
collected are in the year of 2004 (these data were collected in 2009 fieldwork and they 
had been the only available cross-provincial data by that time), for consistence, we 
have to select 2004 as the year for analysis. Nevertheless, the consolidated provincial 
expenditure data on social security from 1998 to 2006 are presented here to facilitate 
the comparison. The year 1998 is the earliest year where the social security data for 
all the provinces become available (from China Statistics Yearbooks), while 2006 is 
the latest year in which these statistics are still reported (as already discussed in 
Chapter 5, most of the official fiscal expenditure data since 2007 are not comparable 
with previous years’ data as a result of categorization change). Unless specified 
otherwise, the Chinese budgetary data reported in this dissertation are consolidated 
budgetary data (i.e. the consolidated provincial expenditure contains the expenditure 
of lower level governments as well as the expenditure of the provincial level   141
government alone). This is a rule used in China's official statistics data. Another 
important issue is that the budgetary expenditure of sub-national governments in 
China are after-fiscal transfer expenditure.     
 
From Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, a few striking features could be summarized. First, the 
31 provinces differ considerably in terms of population, GDP per capita, per capita 
budgeted revenue and expenditure. The size of population in a few western provincial 
government units such as Tibet, Qinghai, and Ningxia is only a fraction of the average 
or median provincial population. There is a very high concentration of resources: the 
top 2 wealthiest provincial units Shanghai and Beijing have much higher levels of 
fiscal capacity (per capita income and fiscal revenue) than the others. Secondly, the 
budgetary expenditure figures (after central-provincial transfers) are larger and more 
equalized than the budgeted revenue figures (as the coefficient of variation (CV) of 
the expenditure is lower than the CV of revenue, reported in Table 6.1 and 6.2). For a 
few provincial units such as Tibet and Qinghai, their expenditure ranking are much 
higher than the revenue ranking, while in some relatively affluent provinces such as 
Shandong, the expenditure ranks much lower than its revenue. Since the expenditure 
figures are shown as after-transfer figures, which do not necessarily represent fiscal 
capacity, we weight the rankings of per capita GDP and per capita budgeted revenue 
to reflect the relative fiscal capacity of a province. At the same level of per capita 
GDP, the discrepancy in per capita revenue between localities may mirror the 
differences in economic structure and tax efforts (the tax bases and tax rates are set by   142
the central government). Thus weighting the GDP and revenue ranking may produce a 
better approximation of fiscal capacity than the revenue ranking alone. Two weighted 
ranks (for 1995 and 2004) are presented in Table 6.3 (if weighting lead to same values 
between two or more provinces, the one with higher GDP ranking would be ranked 
higher) and the provinces are rearranged to fit a conventional classification, which 
divides China into eastern, central and western regions. There maybe several ways to 
categorize the provinces to different regions. The categorization in this research 
follows the one defined by the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjzs/t20030812_402369584.htm accessed on 11
th April 
2008). 
 
We are aware that such ranking makes an assumption that those provinces ranked 
above the median value are recognized as relatively rich areas and those below the 
median value are counted as relatively poor areas. To adhere to the more strict 
definition (both per capital GDP and per capita fiscal revenue must be above the 
median value) of relatively affluent areas proposed in Chapter 3, we find out that only 
the top 13 provinces in terms of 2004 ranking could be recognized as relatively 
affluent areas. The 14
th province Hebei has per capita fiscal revenue ranked in the 18
th 
place and the 15
th province Jinin has per capita revenue ranked in the 17
th place. 
However, if the mean value (population weighted mean, see Table 6.2, 2004 figures) 
is used instead, there would only be 9 provinces having per capita GDP above the 
average figure, 8 provinces having per capita fiscal revenue above the average figure.   143
The population weighted mean is used to mitigate the effects from a few western 
provincial units that have extremely small number of population. In this case, only 7 
provinces (the top 7 provinces of the 2004 weighted ranking, see Table 6.3) could be 
reckoned as relatively well-off areas and the remaining 24 provinces are all relatively 
poor localities. Such skewness reflects that there is concentration of resources in a few 
provincial units such as Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjian. The 7
th richest province is 
Fujian, where our case study is conducted. Using mean value rather than median 
value to classify the provinces may be too strict. Nevertheless, to be more objective, 
we bear these two types of division method in mind in the following analysis.   
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1995 Population GDP Fiscal  Fiscal 
Rank Revenue Rank Expenditure Rank
Beijing 1251 12052 2 921 2 1234 3
Tianjin 942 9894 3 657 3 991 4
Hebei 6437 4427 13 186 17 297 22
Shanxi 3077 3497 17 235 13 367 17
InnerMongolia 2284 3752 15 191 16 447 15
Liaoning 4092 6826 7 451 5 669 6
Jinin 2592 4387 14 244 12 466 13
Heilongjiang 3701 5381 10 274 8 472 12
Shanghai 1415 17664 1 1552 1 1837 1
Jiangshu 7066 7296 6 244 11 359 18
Zhejiang 4319 8237 5 270 9 417 16
Anhui 6013 3011 24 139 26 226 30
Fujian 3237 6472 8 363 7 530 11
Jiangxi 4063 2879 26 158 23 272 26
Shandong 8705 5690 9 206 15 317 20
Henan 9100 3284 22 137 28 228 29
Hubei 5772 3655 16 173 21 281 24
Hunan 6392 3336 20 169 22 272 25
Guangdong 6868 8639 4 557 4 765 5
Guangxi 4543 3296 21 175 20 309 21
Hainan 724 5017 11 394 6 585 9
Chongqing n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Sichuan 11325 2157 29 148 24 245 27
Guizhou 3508 1814 30 111 29 243 28
Yunnan 3990 3063 23 246 10 589 8
Tibet 240 2338 27 90 30 1453 2
Shaanxi 3514 2951 25 146 25 292 23
Gansu 2438 2288 28 139 27 334 19
Qinghai 481 3489 18 179 18 599 7
Ningxia 513 3415 19 175 19 448 14
Xinjiang 1661 4906 12 230 14 580 10
Mean 4009 5170 305 538
Median 3608 3703 198 432
STDEV 2795 3410 296 382
CV 0.70 0.66 0.97 0.71
Population Weighted Mean 4700 248 401
Table 6.1 Provincial population, GDP, budgeted revenue and  expenditure
(in per capita) and their ranks in 1995  (10000 persons,10000 Yuan)
Source:  calculated from China Statistics Yearbook 1996 & 2005  
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2004 Population GDP Fiscal  Fiscal 
Rank Revenue Rank Expenditure Rank
Beijing 1493 40591 2 4987 2 6017 2
Tianjin 1024 30381 3 2404 3 3662 4
Hebei 6809 12451 11 599 18 1154 23
Shanxi 3335 10709 15 769 12 1556 15
InnerMongolia 2384 12756 10 825 10 2366 6
Liaoning 4217 15822 9 1256 7 2209 9
Jinin 2709 11525 13 614 17 1874 12
Heilongjiang 3817 12446 12 758 13 1827 13
Shanghai 1742 46342 1 6350 1 7936 1
Jiangshu 7433 20185 6 1319 6 1765 14
Zhejiang 4720 24679 4 1708 5 2252 7
Anhui 6461 7366 26 425 28 931 30
Fujian 3511 16415 7 950 8 1472 18
Jiangxi 4284 8069 24 480 24 1060 27
Shandong 9180 16364 8 902 9 1296 21
Henan 9717 8803 19 441 27 906 31
Hubei 6016 9364 17 516 21 1074 24
Hunan 6698 8423 23 479 25 1074 25
Guangdong 8304 22718 5 1708 4 2231 8
Guangxi 4889 7023 28 486 23 1038 28
Hainan 818 9767 16 697 14 1555 16
Chongqing 3122 8625 21 643 15 1268 22
Sichuan 8725 7312 27 442 26 1026 29
Guizhou 3904 4298 31 382 30 1072 26
Yunnan 4415 6981 29 597 19 1503 17
Tibet 274 8042 25 366 31 4884 3
Shaanxi 3705 8571 22 580 20 1394 19
Gansu 2619 6447 30 398 29 1363 20
Qinghai 539 8647 20 501 22 2548 5
Ningxia 588 9135 18 637 16 2092 11
Xinjiang 1963 11254 14 793 11 2145 10
Mean 4175 13920 1097 2082
Median 3817 9767 637 1555
STDEV 2695 9852 1316 1572
CV 0.65 0.71 1.20 0.75
12950 904 1591 Population Weighted Mean
Table 6.2 Provincial population, GDP, budgeted revenue and expenditure
(in per capita) and their ranks in 2004  (10000 persons,10000 Yuan)
Source:  calculated from China Statistics Yearbook 2005
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GDP  Revn Weighted GDP  Revn Weighted
 Beijing          2 2 2 2 2 2
 Fujian           8 7 7 7 8 7
 Guangdong        4 4 4 5 4 5
 Guangxi          21 20 21 28 23 26
 Hainan           11 6 9 16 14 16
 Hebei            13 17 14 11 18 14
 Jiangshu         6 11 8 6 6 6
 Liaoning         7 5 5 9 7 8
 Shandong         9 15 11 8 9 9
 Shanghai         1 1 1 1 1 1
 Tianjin          3 3 3 3 3 3
 Zhejiang         5 9 6 4 5 4
 Anhui            24 26 25 26 28 28
 Heilongjiang     10 8 10 12 13 11
 Henan            22 28 24 19 27 22
 Hubei            16 21 19 17 21 19
 Hunan            20 22 22 23 25 23
 InnerMongolia    15 16 16 10 10 10
 Jiangxi          26 23 23 24 24 24
 Jinin            14 12 13 13 17 15
 Shanxi           17 13 15 15 12 13
 Chongqing        n/a n/a n/a 21 15 18
 Gansu            28 27 28 30 29 30
 Guizhou          30 29 30 31 30 31
 Ningxia          19 19 20 18 16 17
 Qinghai          18 18 18 20 22 20
 Shaanxi          25 25 26 22 20 21
 Sichuan          29 24 27 27 26 27
 Tibet            27 30 29 25 31 29
 Xinjiang         12 14 12 14 11 12
 Yunnan           23 10 17 29 19 25
Table 6.3 the ranking and weighted orders of per capita GDP and per
capita fiscal revenue  by region and by year (1995 and 2004)
source: calculated from Table 6.1 and Table 6.2
Western
Central
1995 Ranking
Eastern
2004 Ranking
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6.3 Analysis of the Changes and Differences in Social Security Spending and 
Social Insurance Coverage 
The analysis at the national level demonstrates that there has been substantial increase 
in the proportion of budgeted expenditure on social security and there is still a large 
proportion of population not covered with social insurances. Now the central question 
is to what extent such increase has taken place in relatively affluent areas and whether 
and to what extent there have been unmet social security needs in relatively affluent 
areas. We attempt to answer this question by examining the development of social 
security sector across different provincial units.   
 
In China Statistics Yearbooks, three budgetary expenditure items are counted as social 
security spending, namely, “pensions and relief funds for social welfare”, “social 
security subsidiary expenses” and “expenditure for retired persons in administrative 
departments”. As reported in Chapter 5, “medical care subsidy for the administrative 
institutions”, a social security expenditure item, is included in operating expenditure 
for public health.  Therefore, total budgetary spending on social security is still 
underestimated when we add these three items altogether. Nevertheless, our primary 
intention is to understand the portion of social security spending that is directly 
related to market transition. Expenditure for retired persons in administrative 
departments and the related health expenses subsidy have invariably been the 
budgeted social security expenditure items since 1949 and are not directly tied to 
market transition, though market transition may indirectly impact the level of these   148
spending (e.g. higher cost of health care may require more subsidies). In contrast, 
“social security subsidiary expenses” has been a completely new fiscal expenditure 
emerged in the 1990s when the government started to shoulder the responsibility of 
public enterprise workers’ welfare. It contains the subsidies on social security funds 
and urban employment services as well as the living stipends for SOE laid-offs. 
“Pensions and relief funds for social welfare” have four major 
subcategories—pension for disable and bereaved families, expenditure on retirees 
from military services, social welfare and relief funds and expense on disaster relief. 
At least two of the four sub-categories are directly related to market transformation. 
The data of these four sub-categories are only reported in finance yearbooks of each 
province and we have only been able to collect the finance yearbooks of Fujian 
province. Therefore, the “Pensions and relief funds for social welfare” could not be 
further decomposed for analysis on a cross-sectional basis. 
 
In Table 6.4, “pensions and relief funds for social welfare” and “social security 
subsidiary expenses” are aggregated and shown as share of total provincial budgetary 
spending for the period between 1998 and 2006 (the figures of the odd years are not 
reported in this table to save space). It is easy to observe from this table that in all 
areas, the aggregated social security spending has increased faster than the total 
budgetary expenditure between 1998 and 2006 (or between 1998 and 2004), indicated 
by the increasing ratios. This trend is not very different from what we observe at the 
national level and it means that to some degree, the expenditure structure in all   149
provinces has been adjusted to accommodate the emerging social security needs. It 
could also be observed that different provinces have invested different proportions of 
their total budgetary expenditure to tackle the needs. Take the years 2004 and 2006 as 
examples, among the 13 relatively affluent provinces (2004 ranking), 9 provinces 
allocated equal or less than 10 percent (the median value) of the budgeted expenditure 
in the aggregated social security item. However, two relatively rich provinces 
Heilongjiang and Liaoning spent much higher levels of the budgeted expenditure on 
this aggregated item than the others. In 2004, Heilongjiang spent 16.8 percent and 
Liaoning spent 17.8 percent of the budgeted expenditure on this item. In 2006, the 
spending ratios for these two regions were 18.1 and 17.8 respectively. Even if we 
apply another measure that only reckons the top 7 provinces as relatively rich 
provinces, we would still find Tianjin bearing higher than the average burdens. This in 
part suggests that even some affluent areas have been plagued with onerous fiscal 
burdens. However, we are aware that the level of social security spending alone does 
not tell us the important issues such as whether and to what extent there have been 
social exclusions or unmet social security needs.   
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1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Eastern
 Beijing          0.030 0.035 0.044 0.055 0.058 1.96 22
 Fujian           0.030 0.040 0.041 0.044 0.046 1.57 77
 Guangdong        0.022 0.031 0.041 0.042 0.040 1.78 45
 Guangxi          0.027 0.045 0.068 0.063 0.069 2.59 21 26
 Hainan           0.025 0.073 0.114 0.118 0.113 4.59 91 6
 Hebei            0.041 0.080 0.091 0.089 0.100 2.46 14 14
 Jiangshu         0.034 0.043 0.052 0.058 0.066 1.96 86
 Liaoning         0.055 0.170 0.206 0.178 0.178 3.27 58
 Shandong         0.036 0.052 0.059 0.063 0.064 1.75 11 9
 Shanghai         0.018 0.023 0.032 0.050 0.071 3.96 11
 Tianjin          0.039 0.108 0.108 0.106 0.115 2.98 33
 Zhejiang         0.032 0.032 0.039 0.046 0.050 1.58 64
Central
 Anhui            0.037 0.084 0.132 0.114 0.104 2.79 25 28
 Heilongjiang     0.064 0.142 0.133 0.168 0.181 2.83 10 11
 Henan            0.031 0.084 0.098 0.101 0.092 2.99 24 22
 Hubei            0.070 0.101 0.109 0.135 0.145 2.08 19 19
 Hunan            0.044 0.102 0.120 0.139 0.136 3.13 22 23
 InnerMongolia   0.053 0.076 0.075 0.095 0.074 1.41 16 10
 Jiangxi          0.063 0.093 0.123 0.117 0.110 1.77 23 24
 Jinin            0.077 0.093 0.138 0.195 0.155 2.01 13 15
 Shanxi           0.048 0.104 0.130 0.140 0.101 2.12 15 13
Western
 Chongqing        0.062 0.138 0.147 0.119 0.125 2.01 n/a 18
 Gansu            0.032 0.090 0.090 0.137 0.111 3.50 28 30
 Guizhou          0.042 0.075 0.089 0.080 0.076 1.82 30 31
 Ningxia          0.035 0.103 0.182 0.069 0.085 2.40 20 17
 Qinghai          0.060 0.141 0.103 0.118 0.112 1.87 18 20
 Shaanxi          0.039 0.113 0.128 0.126 0.116 2.97 26 21
 Sichuan          0.052 0.084 0.109 0.106 0.105 2.02 27 27
 Tibet            0.033 0.033 0.036 0.046 0.044 1.35 29 29
 Xinjiang         0.030 0.058 0.085 0.072 0.076 2.53 12 12
 Yunnan           0.035 0.060 0.071 0.079 0.066 1.92 17 25
Mean 0.042 0.081 0.097 0.099 0.096 2.39
Median 0.037 0.084 0.098 0.101 0.100 2.08
Table 6.4 The Combination of "Pensions and Relief Fund" and "Social Security Subsidiary
Expenses" as Share of Total Provincial Budgeted Expenditure
Source: author's calculation from China Statistics Yearbook 1999-2007
06/98
ratio
Weighted
Rank 95
Weighted
Rank 04
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Eastern
 Beijing          0.362 n/a 0.008 0.002 0.480 0.59 2
 Fujian           0.209 0.229 0.024 0.003 0.280 0.5 7
 Guangdong        0.463 0.510 0.016 0.003 0.170 0.62 5
 Guangxi          0.273 0.326 0.161 0.019 0.340 0.69 26
 Hainan           0.444 n/a 0.383 0.067 0.470 0.58 16
 Hebei            0.266 0.308 0.177 0.032 0.360 0.66 14
 Jiangshu         0.367 0.402 0.039 0.008 0.310 0.78 6
 Liaoning         0.487 0.544 0.285 0.084 0.450 0.73 8
 Shandong         0.275 0.304 0.047 0.009 0.240 0.85 9
 Shanghai         0.588 n/a 0.046 0.009 0.520 0.53 1
 Tianjin          0.473 n/a 0.211 0.057 0.530 0.69 3
 Zhejiang         0.331 0.355 0.017 0.003 0.200 0.8 4
Central
 Anhui            0.310 0.355 0.229 0.037 0.350 0.77 28
 Heilongjiang     0.557 0.650 0.274 0.060 0.410 0.78 11
 Henan            0.278 0.324 0.202 0.034 0.320 0.85 22
 Hubei            0.383 n/a 0.228 0.047 0.350 0.78 19
 Hunan            0.239 n/a 0.249 0.039 0.420 0.71 23
 InnerMongolia  0.362 0.437 0.259 0.031 0.370 0.8 10
 Jiangxi          0.314 0.368 0.265 0.035 0.380 0.63 24
 Jinin            0.492 0.587 0.218 0.052 0.390 0.91 15
 Shanxi           0.342 0.403 0.194 0.037 0.330 0.75 13
Western
 Chongqing        0.357 0.411 0.298 0.049 0.520 0.56 18
 Gansu            0.301 0.365 0.214 0.032 0.390 0.81 30
 Guizhou          0.223 n/a 0.249 0.026 0.430 0.69 31
 Ningxia          0.314 0.370 0.165 0.027 0.330 0.66 17
 Qinghai          0.411 n/a 0.363 0.052 0.390 0.67 20
 Shaanxi          0.309 0.364 0.259 0.044 0.380 0.87 21
 Sichuan          0.296 n/a 0.203 0.036 0.460 0.6 27
 Tibet            0.145 n/a 0.417 0.016 0.680 0.7 29
 Xinjiang         0.449 0.557 0.294 0.061 0.420 0.64 12
 Yunnan           0.235 0.281 0.261 0.028 0.460 0.65 25
Retiree
as % of
Active
Note: 1.Coverage A= The number of participating employees dividied by the sum of urban
employees and employees in township enterprises 2. Coverage B takes the number of staff
working in government agencies and institutions out of the denominator used in the calculation
of Coverage A  3.Retiree/Active Ratio=participating reitiree number divided by the number of
participants that are currently working  4.Replacement Ratio=average amount of pension
divided by the average wage
Weighted
Rank 04
Source: calculated from unpublished social security statistics compiled by Ministry of Finance
of China and statistics yearbooks of various provicnes (2005)
Table 6.5  Major Indicators of the Basic Enterprise Pension Insurance (2004)
Replace-
ment
Ratio
Indicators/
Regions
Subsidy
as % of
Insurance
Income
Coverage
Ratio A
Coverage
Ratio B
Subsidy as %
of Budgeted
Expenditure
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We learn from field interviews (Interview 2) that prior to 2004, most of the social 
security subsidies went to the SOE sector. The governments paid social insurance 
contributions for non-performing SOEs and some distressed collective-owned 
enterprises, if these enterprises were unable to make enough contributions for their 
employees. Subsidies to the social insurances were also needed when there were 
funding shortfall. The governments also subsidized training and reemployment 
services and living stipends for the laid-offs from SOEs and collective-owned 
enterprises (ibid). Though the coverage of Basic Enterprise Pension Insurance, Urban 
Health/Medical Insurance, Urban Unemployment Insurances, Urban Work Injury 
Insurance and Urban Maternity Insurance have all expanded since the late 1990s, the 
governments made little subsidy for participants of these programs who are from the 
non-state sectors. In many areas, collecting social insurance contributions from 
non-state sector participants have become an important means to cover the shortfall in 
local pension funds (Interview 3). After 2004, there has been two important changes. 
Although the SOE restructuring process in most of the eastern provinces has 
completed and generated no more laid-offs by 2005, the governments still subsidized 
the reemployment and training services, which have become general public services 
for urban residences (including the rural migrants) who are unemployed or who would 
like to upgrade their skills (ibid). Another change is that the governments have started 
to increase the subsidies on rural health care--the New Cooperative Rural Health 
Insurance scheme. These changes are observed from the Fujian case study where 
relevant data have been gathered. In this chapter, we focus on provincial statistics on a   153
cross-sectional basis. The statistics of the 2004 Basic Enterprise Pension Insurance, 
Urban Health Insurance and Urban Unemployment Insurance for all the provinces 
have been collected and are analysed as follows.   
 
For the Basic Enterprise Pension Insurance, six key indicators are presented in Table 
6.5. The target population for this pension insurance is the urban workers that work 
outside government agencies, organizations and institutions plus the enterprise 
employees in rural areas (the workers of township and village enterprises). Since the 
data of total number of retired persons is not reported in any official statistics, only 
the coverage ratio of employees is presented. For several provinces, the number of 
workers in government agencies, organizations and institutions is not available (these 
data are normally contained in statistics yearbooks of each province, but some 
provinces do not publish these data in their provincial statistics yearbooks) . Therefore, 
two types of coverage ratio are provided. Coverage ratio A divides the number of the 
pension insurance participants by the number of urban employed persons and 
employed persons in township-village enterprise. Coverage ratio B is the more 
accurate measure, which divides the participant number by the target population—the 
number of urban employed persons plus township enterprise employed persons minus 
the number of employees in government agencies, organizations and institutions. 
Shown in Table 6.5, the coverage ratio B could be 2% to 10% higher than coverage 
ratio A (a larger discrepancy between the two coverage ratios suggest that, a higher 
proportion of employees works for the government).  But by any measure, none of   154
the provinces have achieved 100 percent coverage and most of provinces have the 
coverage ratios lower than 60 percent. A close examination between Table 6.4 and 
Table 6.5 finds that the coverage rates across provinces bear no direct relationship 
with the relative fiscal strength of the provinces.   
 
Reported in Table 6.5, fiscal subsidy as share of pension income is a measure that may 
indicate the relative level of participating employees from non-performing SOEs or 
collective-owned enterprises. It may also reveal the age structure of the pension 
insurance participants (higher ratio may be the result of too many retired persons 
relative to pension insurance contributors). It is not possible to identify which effect is 
dominant, however. Among the top seven richest provinces (Beijing, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangshu and Shanghai) that have very low 
subsidizing rates, Guangdong and Shanghai have much higher coverage ratios than 
the other five areas. In fact, Guangdong and Shanghai are the two “forerunners” that 
first allow the employed persons from township-village enterprises to participate in 
the pension insurance (Interview 3).    But the governments did not make any subsidy 
to township-village enterprises. Subsidy as share of budgetary expenditure shows to 
what extent the operation of pension insurance has become a fiscal burden to local 
governments. Interestingly, among the top five spenders (they are Liaoning, Tianjin, 
Heilongjiang, Hainan and Xinjiang), Lianning, Tianjin and Xinjiang are relatively rich 
provinces. In the other end of the spectrum, Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangshu and 
Zhejiang are the bottom five spenders and these five candidates are also relatively   155
affluent provinces. This contrast shows that the level of subsidy to pension insurance 
has been very different, even among the rich areas. This is by large the result that 
provinces have differing levels of non-performing SOEs and collective-owned 
enterprises. In most areas, subsidy to the Basic Enterprise Pension Insurance is the 
single largest sub-item in "Social Security Subsidiary Expenses".   
 
Retiree—active worker ratio measures the number of pensioners relative to the 
number of pension contributors. A high retiree-active ratio indicates a higher risk that 
the pension fund may be unable to meet the withdrawing demand from retired persons. 
The pension insurance scheme in all provinces has been further reformed in more 
recent years. One of the major change is the introduction of personal accounts. Now 
the pension fund has a social pooling portion and personal accounts. The individuals 
make contributions toward their own personal accounts while their employers make 
contribution to the social pooling portion (Interview 3). When retired, the individuals 
would first withdraw pensions from their own personal accounts and if their own 
accounts run out of funding (e.g. when they live longer than the life expectancy), the 
social pooling portion would be used to subsidize the individual accounts. With regard 
to retiree-to-active ratios (reported in Table 6.5), the pension funds of Fujian, 
Guangdong, Shandong and Zhejiang, four rich provinces are in better 
conditions—they have a larger section of young workforce. In contrast, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Chongqing and Tibet have much higher retiree-to-active ratios, which means 
their pension funds have higher withdrawing pressure. Shanghai and Tianjin are the   156
most affluent provincial units in China, while Chongqing and Tibet belongs to the 
relative poor group.   
 
Replacement ratio, reported in the next to last column of Table 6.6 is computed as the 
average pension payment divided by pension contributors’ average wage (there are 
various methods for the calculation of replacement ratio; the one reported in Table 6.6 
is the official figure adopted from the social security statistics). A very generous 
pension payment (high replacement ratio) may suggest that the pension fund have 
higher risks of falling into deficit when, for example, the return on pension fund 
investment unexpectedly drops or the number of pensioners increase faster than the 
number of contributors. A very low replacement ratio may imply that the quality of 
living of the retired persons maybe compromised, as a retired person only gets a small 
fraction of his/her income before retirement. The variation in replacement ratio across 
jurisdictions could not be explained by differences in local fiscal strength or weakness. 
Several factors may jointly affect the replacement ratio. For instance, the average 
pension payment is strongly affected by pension standards of individual SOEs, since 
the pensioners at the moment are dominated by SOE retirees (one must make at least 
15 year's contribution before he/she could start withdrawing the pension, Interview 3). 
Secondly, the average wage of the pension insurance contributors maybe affected by 
the relative number of participants from non-SOEs and the discrepancy in average 
wage between SOE workers and non-SOE workers. Thirdly, the central government 
has in recent years raised the basic pension standards several times (Interview 3) .   157
Without other information, it is not possible to further specify the factors that 
determine the variations of replacement ratio.   
 
To our surprise, in more recent years, the increase of social security subsides in some 
areas has also been the consequence of population aging (more accurately, the aging 
problem of the pension insurance participants). According to a recent news (released 
on 23
rd Feb 2009, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-02-23/003317266065.shtml, 
accessed on 25
th Feb 2009), Shanghai paid between 17billion and 18 billion yuan out 
of its municipal budgeted expenditure (not including the budgetary expenditure of its 
subordinated counties and urban districts) in 2008 to cover the deficit of the social 
insurance funds, in particular the Basic Enterprise Pension Insurance Fund and the 
Urban Health Insurance Fund. This was because the number of withdrawers (most 
were pensioners) had significantly grown. Even after the huge amount of subsidies, 
there were still 6 to 7 billions outstanding liabilities that could not be balanced in 
2008 and the government of Shanghai had to defer the payment for the remaining 
liabilities to 2009. Around 7 billions out of the 17 or 18 billions were used to 
subsidize the enterprise pension insurance fund, which was about 5.6 times of the 
amount of subsidy to pension fund in 2004 (author's calculation). Note that 7 billions 
were only the amount paid out from the unconsolidated municipal budgetary 
expenditure (not the consolidated budget that takes lower level government budget 
into account). The figure for the consolidated budgetary expenditure is likely to be 
bigger than 7 billions. Shanghai has the highest proportion of old age population in its   158
total population. By the end of 2007, the proportion of population aged 65 and above 
in Shanghai was around 14.3 percent, while the national average was about 9.2 
percent (the median value among the 31 provincial units was about 8.9 percent) 
(author's calculation from China Statistics Yearbook 2008). Also see Table 6.5, in 
2004, the retiree-active ratio of the pension insurance of Shanghai was the third 
highest among the 31 provincial units (it is not clear whether the ratio has changed 
since then). One could observe that (from Table 6.5) in 2004 the replacement-ratio of 
the pension insurance of Shanghai was the second lowest. If the replacement-ratio 
were higher (higher pension payment relative to contribution), the deficit problem 
would have become bigger for Shanghai. According to the news, both the mayor (Han 
zheng) and the party secretary (Yu Zhengsheng) of Shanghai expressed deep worries 
about the status of Shanghai's social security funds and Shanghai’s fiscal inadequacy 
issue. They acknowledged that Shanghai has invariably been China's richest 
provincial unit, but the spending requirements for Shanghai have also been very hefty. 
But it is still a surprise to many that Shanghai's budget could not cover its social 
security deficit.   
 
Apart from the aging issue, mismanagement may also contribute to the funding 
shortfall or the risk of funding shortfall. It is widely reported by the press in 2006 that 
between 2002 and 2004, the former director of Shanghai's Department of Labour and 
Social Security, Zhu Junyi, breached the regulation by defalcating around 3.45 billion 
(Chinese Yuan) from Shanghai's social insurance funds to invest in a risky private   159
corporation as a result of corruption (Xinhua News, released on 20
th August 2006, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-08/20/content_4983597.htm accessed on 10
th 
November 2006; in Chinese ). It was not until the early 2007 did the authority claw 
back the diverted amount of money and the associated interest payments (Xinhua 
News, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-01/29/content_5666491.htm, released 
on 29th Jan 2007, accessed 4th Feb 2007; in Chinese). According to the regulation, 
social insurance funds managed by the subnational governments are only allowed to 
invest in government bonds and deposit with commercial banks, which generate very 
low but virtually riskless return (Interview 4). Subnational social insurance funds are 
normally managed by one or more subsidiary public service units of local Bureau of 
Labour and Social Security. In Shanghai, one of the corresponding public service unit 
is called Shanghai Enterprise Annuity Development Centre and this is where Zhu 
junyi diverted the funds from. In terms of the amount of fund managed (more than 10 
billion CNY managed in 2004), it is the largest social security fund managing unit 
among the 31 provinces (Interview 5). Overseeing such a huge amount of money, the 
unit has a weak management structure: many of the staff are part-time employees who 
are also the public servant (gong wu yuan) of Shanghai's Bureau of Labour and Social 
Security (Renmin Ribao, released on 26th September 2006, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/67607/4858539.html, accessed on 10
th November 
2006; in Chinese). Therefore, it has been difficult for the government to perform the 
role of supervision over the Enterprise Annuity Development Centre. The government 
of Shanghai has since 2006 started to consider options to improve the supervision of   160
the social insurance funds (such as converting the Enterprise Annuity Development 
Centre to an independent trust fund with its own corporate governance structure) 
(ibid).   
 
The Shanghai's scandal is not the only case of social security fund mismanagement. 
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily newspaper) reveals that between 1986 and 1997, more 
than 10 billions of social insurance funds in China were unlawfully diverted for other 
use; between 1998 and 2005, the government clawed back 16 billions diverted fund 
but there was still 1 billion fund yet to be clawed back by 2005 (released on 11th 
August, 2006, http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1045/4694460.html, accessed on 10
th 
November 2006; in Chinese). By 2005, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
(renamed to Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security) had been informed 96 
cases of defalcation of social insurance funds (ibid). We learn from the interviews 
(Interview 5 & 6) with government officials of Fujian's Finance Department that 
diversion of social insurance funds to invest in risky assets happened in numerous 
areas, corruption was one of the reasons and another obvious reason was that some of 
the governments wanted to earn higher returns for the funds to meet the growing 
withdrawing needs and therefore took very high risks. Highly decentralized 
management of social insurance funds contribute to the difficulty of monitoring by 
higher levels of government. Since many social insurances are pooling at the 
municipal levels (some province pools the pension and unemployment funds at the 
provincial level), a province would typically have dozens of social insurance funds. In   161
2007, the National Audit Office of China issued new regulations to subject the 
operation of social security funds to much stricter supervision (Interview 5&6). It is 
unclear whether this measure would be adequate to prevent any mismanagement of 
social security funds in future. 
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Eastern
 Beijing          n/a 0 155759 8982756 2
 Fujian           0.532 1716 70261 5166787 7
 Guangdong        0.798 409 280033 18529500 5
 Guangxi          0.515 15 59953 5074721 26
 Hainan           n/a 25 16704 1272006 16
 Hebei            0.816 828 101171 7855591 14
 Jiangshu         0.765 4226 266612 13120404 6
 Liaoning         0.697 87163 240844 9313979 8
 Shandong         0.639 1460 206790 11893716 9
 Shanghai         n/a 0 295126 13825254 1
 Tianjin          n/a 0 64582 3750212 3
 Zhejiang         0.475 6948 159501 10629355 4
Central
 Anhui            0.693 10030 80372 6015280 28
 Heilongjiang     0.762 50 82996 6975516 11
 Henan            0.840 781 102350 8799580 22
 Hubei            n/a 863 77543 6462888 19
 Hunan            n/a 74 68745 7195435 23
 InnerMongolia    0.644 808 37826 5641117 10
 Jiangxi          0.481 413 37024 4540598 24
 Jinin            0.689 335 56449 5077758 15
 Shanxi           0.731 79 42415 5190569 13
Western
 Chongqing        0.604 5 36393 3957233 18
 Gansu            0.661 106 31137 3569366 30
 Guizhou          n/a 40 36371 4184181 31
 Ningxia          0.407 10 8728 1230177 17
 Qinghai          n/a 70 10199 1373363 20
 Shaanxi          0.775 468 76155 5163052 21
 Sichuan          n/a 635 92367 8952534 27
 Tibet            n/a 0 4619 1338335 29
 Xinjiang         0.552 1 69682 4210446 12
 Yunnan           0.454 0 52600 6636354 25
Source: calculated from unpublished social security statistics compiled by Ministry of
Finance of China and statistics yearbooks of various provinces 2005
Note: Coverage Ratio= the number of participating employees (excluding employees of
government agencies, organizations and institutions)  dividied by the number of urban
employees that work outside government agencies, organizations and institutions
Weighted
Rank04
Table 6.6  Key Indicators of Urban Unemployment Insurance (2004) unit : 10000 Yuan
Indicators/ Regions Total Income
Coverage
Ratio
Fiscal
Subsidy
Total Fiscal
Expenditure
 
 
The Urban Unemployment Insurance (Table 6.6) is supposed to cover urban economic 
active population (above 16 and able and willing to work),who are subject to the risk 
of unemployment. Those who work in government agencies and organizations are not 
subject to the risk of unemployment. To date, the rural migrant workers are still not   163
eligible to participate in this insurance. Fieldwork interviews show that a small but 
growing number of employees in the public service units are required to join the 
unemployment insurance scheme, as there has been reform that aimed to convert 
some public service units to public enterprises (Interview 3). However, in calculating 
the unemployment insurance coverage ratio, we ignore this group of employees 
because it is not possible to identify the number of public service unit workers that are 
subject to unemployment risks. It is also not possible to count the exact number of 
migrant workers. Since the number of migrant workers are likely to be larger than the 
number of participants from public services unties, the overall effect is that, the 
estimated coverage ratios are likely to be biased downwards. Table 6.6 shows that the 
variation of the 2004 coverage ratio across provinces are different from the variation 
of provincial GDP or fiscal revenue. The not-so-accurate coverage rates of Urban 
Unemployment Insurance were higher than the coverage rates of pension insurance. 
This is because employees in township-village enterprises were not allowed to 
participate in this scheme. What is quite clear is that none of the area has achieved 
100 percent coverage. It is surprising that the fiscal subsidy on unemployment 
insurance varies so hugely between regions. Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Tibet and 
Yunan did not subsidize the insurance at all, while Liaoning and Anhui spent 871.63 
millions and 100.3 millions respectively in 2004. Comparing the amount of subsidy 
with the provincial budgeted expenditure, we find that only the subsidies made by 
Liaoning (a rich province) and Anhui (a poor province) were sizeable.   
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Eastern
 Beijing          0.427 0 891937 8982756 2
 Fujian           0.347 375 339672 5166787 7
 Guangdong        0.510 665 1175526 18529500 5
 Guangxi          0.341 0 216535 5074721 26
 Hainan           0.211 42 48979 1272006 16
 Hebei            0.333 3109 355074 7855591 14
 Jiangshu         0.459 488 944043 13120404 6
 Liaoning         0.402 635 537173 9313979 8
 Shandong         0.330 940 621722 11893716 9
 Shanghai         0.498 0 1342929 13825254 1
 Tianjin          0.443 23789 250348 3750212 3
 Zhejiang         0.577 6903 675963 10629355 4
Central
 Anhui            0.261 339 223822 6015280 28
 Heilongjiang     0.234 224 346652 6975516 11
 Henan            0.319 1909 332443 8799580 22
 Hubei            0.216 551 343653 6462888 19
 Hunan            0.384 3154 342424 7195435 23
 InnerMongolia    0.247 3403 151678 5641117 10
 Jiangxi          0.193 3980 124295 4540598 24
 Jinin            0.216 701 148304 5077758 15
 Shanxi           0.228 17 181600 5190569 13
Western
 Chongqing        0.290 0 156063 3957233 18
 Gansu            0.235 27 108013 3569366 30
 Guizhou          0.203 10 89114 4184181 31
 Ningxia          0.288 0 43312 1230177 17
 Qinghai          0.298 357 66389 1373363 20
 Shaanxi          0.351 9298 217089 5163052 21
 Sichuan          0.322 328 474898 8952534 27
 Tibet            0.140 0 12534 1338335 29
 Xinjiang         0.296 1085 318135 4210446 12
 Yunnan           0.327 130 325085 6636354 25
Source: calculated from unpublished social security statistics compiled by Ministry of
Finance of China and statistics yearbooks of various provinces 2005
Note: Coverage Ratio= the number of participants  dividied by urban population
Weighted
Rank04
Table 6.7  Key Indicators of Urban Health Insurance (2004) unit : 10000 Yuan
Indicators/ Regions Total Income
Coverage
Ratio
Fiscal
Subsidy
Total Fiscal
Expenditure
 
 
For Urban Health Insurance (Table 6.7), the target population is the urban residences, 
including those migrant workers who stay in the city for over one year. The 
contribution-based urban heath insurance system was established in 1998. The system   165
was initially designed for the workers in the public sector and urban enterprises. In 
more recent years, the ordinary resident, migrant workers and university students 
from other areas have become eligible to participate. Like the pension insurance, this 
insurance is financed by participant’s contributions and contains both social pooling 
portion and personal accounts. The government made subsidies when those distressed 
SOEs were unable to make contributions for their employees or when the insurance 
fund ran into deficit (Interview 5 in Fujian confirms that the governments of Fujian 
also made limited subsidy for the residents). One could see from Table 6.7 that the 
coverage ratio of this insurance scheme in 2004 was quite low across provinces. 
Similar to the unemployment insurance, there is significant difference in the amount 
of fiscal subsidy made to this insurance fund between localities. But this time, Tianjin 
(rich province) and Shaanxi (poor province) replaced Liaoning and Anhui, as the top 
two spenders. The subsidies in all other regions are not sizable. Comparing to pension 
insurance subsides, the sizes of subsides on Urban Health Insurance Fund and Urban 
Unemployment Insurance are very small (except in the four provincial units we 
specified).  
 
It is not possible to analyse the social assistance issues (such as the expenditure and 
unmet needs) across the provincial governments, as there are inadequate data. These 
issues are dealt with in the Fujian province case study. However, the cross-sectional 
analysis presented so far is supportive to Hypothesis 1 (In the post TSS period 
(1994-2008), even certain relatively affluent locality has not been able to fully meet   166
the emerging social security needs, resulting in under-provision of social security). 
Three key points could be summarized from the above findings. First, all provincial 
units have increased their levels of budgetary spending on social security since 1998 
and the levels of spending in a few relatively affluent areas were much higher than the 
benchmark. Since a large part of the social security spending was devoted to the SOE 
sector, this  may suggest that the distribution of non-performing SOEs across the 
geographical areas has been highly imbalanced but was not highly related to the fiscal 
capacity of the provinces. Secondly, even after several years of expansion of social 
insurance coverage, there have still been a considerable proportion of population not 
covered by the social insurances. In other words, there has been severe social 
exclusions. This is the case even for relatively affluent provinces. But it is not clear 
whether those who not covered by social insurances are only from the non-state 
sectors (the case study of Fujian shows that the answer is not). Thirdly, the mini-case 
from Shanghai demonstrates that social security could be a hefty fiscal burden for the 
government, even for the richest area (aging is also an issue not to be overlooked). 
Finally, the evidences of mismanagement of social insurance funds in Shanghai and in 
other areas suggest that decentralized management of social insurance funds may be 
problematic, as supervision of those funds could be a challenging task for the 
governments. Mismanagement of social insurance funds generates the risks that may 
lead to shortfall in social insurance funds and create unexpected fiscal pressure for the 
government.  
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6.4 Has Budgetary Spending on Social Security Crowded-Out Budgetary 
Spending on Education and Health? 
In Chapter 5 and section 6.3 of this chapter, the evidence presented suggests that the 
proportion of social security spending (no matter in the national or subnational levels) 
has significantly increased since the 1990s. This section seeks to answer the question 
as to whether the increased budgetary spending on social security has crowded-out the 
spending on education and health sectors. Specifically, it tests Hypothesis 2: in the 
post TSS period (1994-2008), there have been negative correlations between the share 
of consolidated provincial budgetary spending on social security and health sector, 
and between the share of consolidated provincial budgetary spending on social 
security and education sector.   
 
We run the correlation analysis using provincial-level data for 2004 and 1998 (the 
data for all the 31 provinces are available). As already highlighted in last section, 
between 1998 and 2004, the share of consolidated provincial budgetary spending on 
social security in almost all provinces rose greatly. Thus it would be useful to compare 
the testing results of these two years to see whether the increasing share of spending 
has led to different level of correlation coefficients. All data are entered in natural 
logarithm form to reduce the effect of outliers. Social2_04 stands for the aggregation 
of “pension and relief funds” and “social security subsidiary expenses” as share of 
total consolidated provincial budgetary spending for the year 2004. Edu_04 stands for   
the operating expenses of education as share of total consolidated provincial   168
budgetary spending for the year 2004. Health_04 stands for the operating expenses of 
health as share of total consolidated provincial budgetary spending for the year 2004. 
"LN" is natural logarithm. The result shows that for 2004 (see Table 6.8), there are 
negative correlations between the percentage of budgeted spending on social security 
and the percentage of budgeted spending on education (the correlation coefficient is 
-0.249, but only significant at the 0.1 level), and between the proportion of budgeted 
expenditure on social security spending and the proportion of budgeted expenditure 
on health (the correlation coefficient is -0.511, significant at the 0.01 level). However, 
the correlation coefficient (-0.249) between social security sector and education sector 
is very weak (negligible) and only significant at the margin, though it is significant. 
The trade-off effect between social security and health spending is stronger and the 
correlation coefficient of -0.511 is considered to be moderate. To further analyse the 
relationship between the level of spending between social security and health, we 
regress the share of spending on health (the dependent variable) against the share of 
spending on social security (the independent variable) for 2004. The result (Table 6.10 
a,b and c) shows that the beta coefficient of LNSocial_04 is -0.22 and significant. 
Since both variables are entered in natural log form, this result could be interpreted as 
across the provinces, 1 percent increase in the share of budgeted spending on social 
security is associated with around -0.22 percent decrease in the share of budgeted 
spending on health.   
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Table 6.8 Correlations between the share of consolidated
provincial budgetary spending on social security (two
sub-items aggregated), health and education (2004 data)
1 -.249 -.511**
.089 .002
31 31 31
-.249 1 .369*
.089 .021
31 31 31
-.511** .369* 1
.002 .021
31 31 31
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
LNSocial2_
04
LNEdu_04
LNHealth_04
LNSocial2_
04 LNEdu_04
LNHealth_
04
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). *. 
 
 
Table 6.9 Correlations between the share of consolidated
provincial budgetary spending on social security (two
sub-items aggregated), health and education (1998 data)
1 -.163 -.181
.190 .165
31 31 31
-.163 1 .448**
.190 .006
31 31 31
-.181 .448** 1
.165 .006
31 31 31
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
LNSocial2_
98
LNEdu_98
LNHealth_98
LNSocial2_
98 LNEdu_98
LNHealth_
98
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). **. 
 
Table 6.10a Model Summary
.511a .261 .235 .16727
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error
of the
Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), LNSocial2_04 a. 
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Table 6.10b ANOVA b
.286 1 .286 10.223 .003a
.811 29 .028
1.097 30
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LNSocial2_04 a. 
Dependent Variable: LNHealth_04 b. 
 
Table 6.10c Coefficients a
-3.749 .168 -22.271 .000
-.220 .069 -.511 -3.197 .003
(Constant)
LNSocial2_04
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LNHealth_04 a. 
 
 
Comparing the results in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9, one could easily see that both the 
negative correlation coefficients in 1998 were smaller and insignificant than the 
negative correlation coefficients in 2004 . This suggests that the trade-off effect 
became more obvious in more recent year when the social security sector grew to a 
relatively large spending sector. One may be interested in whether such trade-off 
effects have been stronger in poor areas than in rich areas. However, the total 
observation is only 31; dividing 31 observations to sub-groups would not be viable for 
statistical testing. Such gap would require additional research in future, when 
prefecture-level data are collected.   
 
The above statistical outcomes partially confirm Hypothesis 2. As strictly speaking, 
only the negative correlation between the share of budgeted spending on health and 
the share of budgeted spending on social security for 2004 is to be reckoned. This 
result suggests that to some extent, the growth in social security spending may have 
crowded-out the budgeted spending on health at the local levels. One may question   171
that this effect has only been nominal, since the reduction of the share of operating 
expenses for health may have been compensated by the increase of subsidies on 
health insurance. Reported in Table 6.7, the subsidies for health insurance fund across 
provinces were much lower (even the top spender Tianjin only spent 0.63 percent of 
its budgeted expenditure on health insurance subsidy in 2004) comparing to the 
subsidies for pension insurance fund. This suggests that the growth of subsidies on 
health could only explain a small part of the increase in aggregated social security 
spending. Thus the trade-off effect between spending on health and spending on social 
security could be real. Of course, the fact that health insurance has been introduced as 
a protection might itself be a reason that governments reduced the share of operating 
expenses for health, when they were forced to free up resources to accommodate the 
growth of social security expenses.   
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6.5 What Explains Bigger Provincial Governments?     
This section tests Hypothesis 3: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), holding other 
factors constant, larger sizes of provincial governments (higher levels of consolidated 
budgetary expenditure-GDP ratios across provinces) could be in part explained by 
higher degrees of market transition and higher levels of urbanisation and income. The 
proxy for market transition is the gross industrial output value of non-state-owned and 
non-state-controlled enterprise as share of total provincial gross industrial output 
value. A cross-sectional multiple regression model is employed to test this hypothesis.   
The model is specified as:   
 
FisGDP = a + β1*Market +β2Urban+β3GDP+ βc*C + u 
 
The dependent variable FisGDP stands for consolidated provincial fiscal expenditure 
as share of provincial GDP. "Market" stands for market transition. There may be other 
possible proxies for market transition such as using the industrial value-added to 
replace the gross industrial output value or use the number of employed persons in 
non-state-owned and non-state-control enterprise employment numbers as percentage 
of employed persons in all enterprises. However, the value-added figures are not 
available and the total number of employed persons in enterprise is only available in a 
few provinces.   
 
In the above model, "Urban" stands for urbanisation rate. The true urbanisation rate 
(the percentage of population residing in urban areas) is only available for a few   173
provinces (from their statistics yearbooks). Thus we must comprise by using the 
proxy--the share of non-agricultural population in total population. This is a serious 
underestimated figure (in particular for area with a large number of migrant workers) 
and might not be a good measurement of urbanisation. The definition for 
non-agricultural population has changed several times since the 1990s. But the 
definitional change has always been nation-wide. Thus although the figures have been 
inconsistent over time, they are still comparable across provinces for any given year. 
"GDP" stands for per capita gross regional produce of a province.   
 
Variables Description
GDP Per capita regional GDP, Chinese Yuan; data available from 1995 to 2006
Density
Population density (persons per square km); the cost of public services provision is
normally higher in lower density areas; data available from 1995 to 2006
Trade
Total volume of foreign export and import as  percentage of GDP, a proxy for
openness; data available from 1995 to 2006
Urban
Urbanization rate, the true urbanziation rate (percentage of population residing in
urban areas) is only available in a few provinces in the year 2000 and 2006; we
use the share of non-agricultural population in total population as a proxy for
urbanization (this may be probematic  because non-agricultural population is based
on household regristration, not the true level of urban population); data available
from 1995 to 2005
Age65
The proportion of population aged 65 and above, a not-so-perfect proxy for
spending needs in health and pension; data available from 2001 to 2006
Wage
The average wage of state sector employees (Yuan), an imperfect proxy for the
cost of government employees because state sector covers SOE employees whose
wage payments are not from the budgets; another problem is that the number of
employees in the government sector is unknown, so even if the average wage is
higher, the total cost could stilll be low if fewer persons are working for the
government. data available from 2001 to 2006
Market
The gross industrial output value of non-state-owned and non-state-controlled
enterprises as share of total provincial gross industrial output value. Data available
in 2003 and 2005 (the 2005 China Industrial Statistics Yearbook does not provide
information regarding the total gross industrial output value for 2004 for unkonwn
reasons)
Dummy
Dummy variable for provincial units that are autonomous regions, which are Inner
Mongolia, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Tibet and Guangxi.
Source: compiled from China Statistics Yearbooks 1996-2007, China Industrial Statistics
Yearbooks 2004-2006, China Population Statistics Yearbooks 1996-2006 and statistics
yearbooks of various provinces 2003-2005
Table 6.11: List of Independent Variables
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There are seven control variables for the model (listed in Table 6.11). In the above 
model, “C” stands for control variables. We are not only interested in whether 
“Market”, "Urban" and "GDP" have any explanatory power on the variation of  
“FisGDP”, but are also interested in whether such power are robust or not in the 
presence of other possible factors. This is the reason of employing control variables. 
U stands for the error term. All variables in the model (except the dummy variable) 
are transformed using the natural logarithm. This helps to reduce the effect of outliers 
and improve the stability of the model. The dummy variable cannot be 
log-transformed, as log0 is undefined. We use 2004 data to test the model, so the 
result could be readily compared with what we have analysed in the previous sections 
(in fact, no matter 2003 data or 2005 data are used, the testing results are very similar 
and would lead to same conclusions). The number of observation is all the 31 
provinces. For the variable "Market", the average of 2003 and 2005 figures is used, as 
2004 data are not available.   
 
Table 6.12 describes the dependent and independent variables before log 
transformation. When considering the dependent variable, Tibet is an outlier. The 
budgeted expenditure-to-GDP ratio (FisGDP) of Tibet is 60.7 percent, much higher 
than the peer. In terms of population density, a number of western provincial units 
have much lower density than other provinces. In terms of openness (Trade), several 
eastern provincial units have much higher ratios than the western and central 
provinces. In terms of urbanization (using the share of non-agricultural population as   175
proxy), Beijing and Shanghai have much higher values than other areas and the 
average urbanization value is only 34.1 percent, while the true national urbanization 
rate in 2004 was already 41.7 percent (as reported by China Statistic Yearbook 2005). 
This confirms that the measure of urbanization underestimates the true level of 
urbanization. When comparing the per capita GDP with the average wage of state 
sector employees, one could discover that Tibet has extremely high wage level 
relative to its per capita GDP. In terms of the level of market transition, a few coastal 
provinces such as Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong and Fujian have much higher levels 
of market transition: most of the gross industrial output in these provinces have been 
generated by the non-state enterprises. After log-transformation, the effect of the 
outliers has been greatly reduced. Depicted in Table 6.13, the value of most variables 
ranges within three standard deviations of the mean value. The outlier effect of 
Density_04 is still strong, this is due much to the sharp contrast between the 
population density of Shanghai and that of Tibet. 
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FisGDP GDP Density Trade Urban Age65 Wage Market
2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2003_05
Eastern
Beijing          0.148 40591 910 1.248 0.735 0.111 29674 0.476
Fujian           0.09 16415 283 0.66 0.309 0.085 15603 0.792
Guangdong       0.098 22718 462 1.514 0.487 0.079 22116 0.82
Guangxi          0.148 7023 206 0.1 0.185 0.084 13579 0.481
Hainan           0.159 9767 231 0.341 0.378 0.075 12652 0.428
Hebei            0.093 12451 361 0.128 0.266 0.08 12925 0.611
Jiangshu         0.087 20185 696 0.911 0.42 0.107 18202 0.828
Liaoling         0.14 15822 285 0.413 0.479 0.095 14921 0.443
Shandong         0.079 16364 585 0.323 0.322 0.092 14332 0.711
Shanghai         0.171 46342 2114 1.586 0.812 0.154 30085 0.593
Tianjin          0.121 30381 859 1.081 0.597 0.108 21754 0.626
Zhejiang         0.091 24679 448 0.585 0.267 0.098 23506 0.861
Central
Anhui            0.126 7366 461 0.121 0.208 0.085 12928 0.46
Heilongjiang     0.147 12446 84 0.114 0.481 0.068 12557 0.22
Henan            0.103 8803 587 0.062 0.213 0.081 12114 0.554
Hubei            0.115 9364 324 0.096 0.344 0.082 11855 0.456
Hunan            0.128 8423 316 0.077 0.214 0.088 13928 0.512
InnerMongolia 0.185 12756 21 0.098 0.382 0.075 13324 0.443
Jiangxi          0.131 8069 257 0.082 0.281 0.08 11860 0.421
Jinin            0.163 11525 142 0.174 0.452 0.075 12431 0.287
Shanxi           0.145 10709 213 0.121 0.297 0.071 12943 0.456
Western
Chongqing        0.147 8625 379 0.115 0.25 0.114 14357 0.474
Gansu            0.211 6447 65 0.084 0.227 0.066 13623 0.221
Guizhou          0.249 4298 222 0.072 0.158 0.075 12431 0.317
Ningxia          0.229 9135 113 0.135 0.352 0.057 14620 0.423
Qinghai          0.295 8647 8 0.099 0.295 0.059 17229 0.2
Shaanxi          0.163 8571 180 0.092 0.249 0.077 13024 0.286
Sichuan          0.14 7312 180 0.086 0.223 0.088 14063 0.561
Tibet            0.607 8042 2 0.073 0.16 0.064 30873 0.275
Xinjiang         0.191 11254 12 0.204 0.367 0.063 14484 0.179
Yunnan           0.215 6981 115 0.097 0.164 0.077 14581 0.31
Minimum 0.079 4298 2 0.062 0.158 0.057 11855 0.179
Maximum 0.607 46342 2114 1.586 0.812 0.154 30873 0.861
Mean 0.165 13919.7 358.7 0.351 0.341 0.084 16212 0.475
Std. Deviation 0.096 9852 402.6 0.446 0.159 0.02 5517.2 0.19
Source: see Table 6.11
Table 6.12 Dependent and Independent Variables (original form)
 
 
The test begins with a correlation analysis, which serves to discover the relationship 
between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables and to check 
whether there are high correlations between any two independent variables. An 
insignificant and low correlation between the dependent variable and an independent   177
variable means that this independent variable has little explanatory power and would 
normally be excluded from subsequent regression analysis. A very high and 
significant correlation between two independent variables may suggest the two 
independent variables are better not to be entered in the regression model at the same 
time. If they are entered at the same time, multicollinearity problem may arise. 
Multicollinearity problem describes a situation where the set of independent variables, 
as a group well explains the variation in the dependent variable (the model is 
statistically significant and the R square is high) , but none of the individual 
independent variables are significantly different than zero. Multicollinearity problem 
could also arise even when the correlations between any two independent variables 
are low, this is because linear combination of the variable may also lead to high 
correlations. We use the multicollinearity diagnostics in SPSS 16 to identify 
multicollinearity problem and to drop the variables that contribute to this problem.     
 
Table 6.13 Descriptive Statistics
31 -2.54 -.50 -1.9020 .41640
31 -1.9720 -.1970 -.732387 .4697224
31 8.37 10.74 9.3702 .55391
31 .00 1.00 .1613 .37388
31 .82 7.66 5.2387 1.46098
31 -2.78 .46 -1.6440 1.02879
31 -1.84 -.21 -1.1673 .42518
31 -2.87 -1.87 -2.4967 .21239
31 9.42 10.43 9.7197 .31498
31
FisGDP_04
SOE_03_05
GDP_04
Dummy
Density_04
Trade_04
Urban_04
Age65_04
Wage_04
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.
Deviation
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Table 6.14 Correlations between FisGDP_04 and independent variables
1.000 -.728 -.404 .489 -.759 -.413 -.279 -.478 .060
-.728 1.000 .514 -.266 .716 .553 .203 .634 .368
-.404 .514 1.000 -.177 .466 .905 .837 .638 .724
.489 -.266 -.177 1.000 -.599 -.227 -.146 -.408 .013
-.759 .716 .466 -.599 1.000 .510 .352 .758 .119
-.413 .553 .905 -.227 .510 1.000 .761 .605 .696
-.279 .203 .837 -.146 .352 .761 1.000 .418 .386
-.478 .634 .638 -.408 .758 .605 .418 1.000 .474
.060 .368 .724 .013 .119 .696 .386 .474 1.00
. .000 .012 .003 .000 .010 .064 .003 .373
.000 . .002 .074 .000 .001 .136 .000 .021
.012 .002 . .170 .004 .000 .000 .000 .000
.003 .074 .170 . .000 .109 .217 .011 .473
.000 .000 .004 .000 . .002 .026 .000 .262
.010 .001 .000 .109 .002 . .000 .000 .000
.064 .136 .000 .217 .026 .000 . .010 .016
.003 .000 .000 .011 .000 .000 .010 . .004
.373 .021 .000 .473 .262 .000 .016 .004 .
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
FisGDP_04
Market_03_05
GDP_04
Dummy
Density_04
Trade_04
Urban_04
Age65_04
Wage_04
FisGDP_04
Market_03_05
GDP_04
Dummy
Density_04
Trade_04
Urban_04
Age65_04
Wage_04
FisGDP_04
Market_03_05
GDP_04
Dummy
Density_04
Trade_04
Urban_04
Age65_04
Wage_04
Pearson
Correlation
Sig.
(1-tailed)
N
Fis
GDP_04
Market
_03_05
GDP_
04 Dummy
Density
_04
Trade
_04
Urban
_04
Age65
_04
Wage
_04
 
 
The correlation matrix above (Table 6.14) shows that there are significant correlations 
between FisGDP_04, the dependent variable and six out of the eight independent 
variables. Five correlations are significant at the 0.01 level, one at 0.05 level 
(GDP_04). The correlation coefficient (r equals -0.279) between FisGDP_04 and 
Urban_04 is only significant at the 0.1 level. It is surprising that apart from Dummy, 
Density and Wage, all the other independent variables have unexpected correlations 
between the dependent variable. The correlations above show that bigger government 
is associated with lower degree of market transformation (lack of market transition), 
lower level of urbanization (not very significant), lower level of income, lower level   179
of international trade and lower proportion of aged population. One would normally 
expect these correlations to be positive, in other words, one would expect government 
with higher degree of market transition, urbanization, income, international trade and 
higher proportion of aged population to be associated with higher expenditure-to-GDP 
ratios for higher investment needs in infrastructure, public services, administrative 
capacity and redistribution. Given the contrary result, Hypothesis 3 may have to be 
rejected. Multiple regression analysis is employed to further ascertain this result. 
Wage_04 has very low correlation with the dependent variable (the Pearsonian r is 
only 0.06) and the correlation is insignificant at all, therefore it would be excluded 
from further regression analysis. It is noticed that there are high correlations 
in-between several independent variables, which could lead to multicollinearity 
problem in the multiple regression. The correlations between GDP_04 and Trade_04, 
between GDP_04 and Urban_04, between Trade_04 and Urban_04, and between 
Density_04 and Age65_04 are very high and significant (the r are: 0.905, 0.837, 0.761 
and 0.758 respectively). Indeed, a locality has higher income is highly likely to be 
more actively engaged in foreign trade and more urbanized. It is also interesting that 
the higher the population density is, the more likely an area has higher proportion of 
population aged 65 or above. Multicollinearity problems could be mitigated or 
avoided when these variables are entered at the different times. Before performing 
each regression analysis, the residuals are analysed (using histogram and scatter plot) 
to ensure that the model assumptions for dependent variables are satisfied.   180
Independent
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant
***-2.488
(-21.633)
***-2.221
(-10.256)
0.944
(0.787)
-1.657    (-
1.875)
***-1.711
(-3.838)
0.342
(0.338)
Market_03_05
***-0.708
(-5.718)
**-0.378
(-2.264)
**-0.445
(-2.569)
***-0.427
(-2.792)
Urban_04
-0.273
(-1.564)
GDP_04
**-0.304
(-2.378)
0.019
(0.186)
Density_04
***-0.14
(-2.958)
**-0.104
(-1.759)
***-0.196
(-3.686)
Dummy
0.181
(1.092)
Trade_04
0.026
(0.455)
Age65_04
*0.629
(1.909)
Ajusted R
Square
0.514 0.046 0.134 0.607 0.612 0.653
Partial R
2 for
Market_03_05
0.514 N/A N/A 0.16 0.202 0.224
Partial R
2 for
GDP_04
N/A N/A 0.134 0.001 N/A N/A
Multicollinearity No No No GDP_04 Trade_04 Age65_04
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31
b. * significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at 0.01 level
Table 6.15: Multiple Regression Estimates Dependent Variable: FisGDP_04
Note:
a. t-statistics in parentheses
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Independent
Variables
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Constant
***-1.48
(-4.243)
*-2.187
(-1.933)
-0.361     (-
0.401)
-2.541
(-1.099)
Market_03_05
**-0.369
(-2.352)
***-0.688
(-4.687)
GDP_04
-0.03      (-
0.268)
-0.048     (-
0.464)
-0.126
(-0.785)
Density_04
***-0.139
(-3.02)
***-0.208
(-5.254)
Age65_04
-0.728
(-0.371)
Ajusted R
Square
0.62 0.498 0.549 0.191
Partial R
2 for
Market 03 05
0.165 0.44 N/A N/A
Partial R
2 for
GDP_04
N/A 0.003 0.008 0.022
Multicollinearity No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 31 31 31 31
b. ** significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at 0.01 level
Table 6.15 (continued): Multiple Regression Estimates
Note:
a. t-statistics in parentheses
Dependent Variable: FisGDP_04
 
 
The regression results (using SPSS 16) are presented in Table 6.15. Model 1, 2 and 3 
are simple regressions that regress FisGDP (dependent variable) against Market, 
Urban and GDP respectively. The outcomes show that urbanisation (measured as the 
share of non-agricultural population in total population of a province) could not 
explain the variation of the size of the government (Model 2, the t statistics for 
Urban_04 is insignificant), while both market transition and per capita income could 
explain part of the variation of the size of the government. Market alone could explain 
around 51.4 percent of the variation of FisGDP (Model 1), whilst GDP alone could 
explain only about 13.4 percent of the variation of FisGDP (Model 3). The beta 
coefficient of Market is negative and significant at the 0.01 level, since both the   182
dependent and independent variable are in log form, this could be interpreted as 1 
percent increase in market transition could result in around 0.708 percent decrease in 
the size of government, when other variables are not controlled for. The beta 
coefficient for GDP is negative and significant at the 0.05 level. To check the 
robustness of these results, control variables are introduced (Model 4 to Model 10). 
Since Urban has no explanatory power at all, it is excluded from further regression 
analysis.  
 
The results of Model 4 to Model 10 demonstrate that the explanatory power of Market 
is robust--holding other variable constant, Market could still explain part of the 
variation of FisGDP and the beta coefficients are always significant different than 
zero (at the 0.01 level). We noticed that Market alone could explain around 51.4 
percent of the variation of FisGDP, but when Density is controlled for, the partial R 
square for Market drops to mere 16.5 percent (Model 7). This tells that some of the 
variance explained by Market could even be better captured by Density. We notice 
that the beta coefficient of Density is negative (lower population density areas are 
likely to have bigger government (higher expenditure/GDP ratio), holding other 
conditions constant).Government administrative cost and cost of public services could 
go up when the population density is lower (they may need more money to provide 
the same level of services). Model 4 to Model 10 (with the exception of Model 7) all 
suffer from different degrees of multicollinearity problem, which reduce the 
significance of the control variables (apart from Density, each of the control variable   183
alone has very small explanatory power over FisGDP) as well as the significance of 
GDP. In fact, when GDP is combined with any other independent variables, its beta 
coefficient becomes insignificant. Therefore, the tendency that high income area is 
likely to have smaller government is not robust (can be easily overridden by other 
factors). Model 7 seems to be the best model as it has relatively high explanatory 
power and does not suffer from multicollinearity problem. In model 7, the two 
variables (Market and Density) together explain around 65 percent of the variation of 
the dependent variable FisGDP. Adding other variables makes only small changes in 
the adjusted R square.   
 
The testing result rejects Hypothesis 3. The result shows that holding other factors 
constant, larger sizes of provincial governments (higher levels of consolidated 
budgetary expenditure-GDP ratios across provinces) could be in part explained by 
lower (not higher) degrees of market transition; and they could not be confidently 
explained by the levels of urbanisation (the relation is not significant) or income (the 
relation is not very robust). The insignificant correlation between the size of 
government and the level of urbanization may also attribute to measurement errors of 
urbanization (where the share of non-agricultural population is used as a proxy). We 
would hark back to this issue after presenting the analysis of central-provincial 
transfers (as the result provides some insights to the variation of the sizes of 
provincial governments). 
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6. 6 Perspectives on Central-Provincial Fiscal Transfers 
This section tackles Hypothesis 4: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), holding other 
factors constant, higher amount of per capita central-provincial fiscal transfers could 
be in part explained by lower level of market transition. 
 
As discussed in the literature review (see Table 3.6 in Chapter 3), central-local fiscal 
transfers cover a large proportion of consolidated sub-national budgeted expenditure. 
The transfers constitute tax-rebates (where more affluent areas get larger share of tax 
return), equalization transfers and numerous specific purpose grants (also called 
earmarked grants). It is already known that the size of the equalization transfer has 
been very small, comparing to the tax-rebates. Given the obvious discrepancy in per 
capita fiscal revenue rankings and per capita fiscal expenditure rankings (see Table 
6.1 and Table 6.2), it is possible that the allocation principles of the earmarked grants 
are not similar to tax-rebates. But it is not clear whether the overall effect of 
central-local transfers has been equalizing or counter-equalizing and whether market 
transition could explain part of the variation in central-local transfers. The market 
transition variable could not be used to distinguish the transfer that was used to cover 
the SOE social security issue from the transfer that was used to finance specific SOE 
projects. 
 
The detailed data on actual central-local transfers are not available from any published 
statistics. We therefore proxy the size of central-provincial transfer by using the   185
difference between consolidated per capita fiscal expenditure and revenue of a 
province (the variable marked as Trans_04). Since 1994, all provinces are 
transfer-dependent on the central government so the after-transfer expenditure figure 
is always higher than the revenue figure. The differences between fiscal expenditure 
and fiscal revenue are not entirely attributable to fiscal transfers, because the fiscal 
revenue not used in one fiscal year would be rolled over to next fiscal year. By using 
the difference of expenditure and fiscal revenue as a proxy for transfer, we assume 
that the amounts of rolling-over are negligible or are proportional to the amount of 
fiscal transfers in all provinces. The model is specified as follows:   
 
Trans_04 = a + β1*Market_03_05 + βc*C + u 
 
The independent variables used in this model are imported from Table 6.12. The new 
independent control variable Rev_04 stands for per capita fiscal revenue of a province. 
All the variables, except the dummy variable, are log-transformed. Once again, 
correlation analysis comes before the regression analysis. 
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Table 6.16 Descriptive Statistics
31 5.97 8.42 6.7226 .53731
31 5.90 8.76 6.6675 .70451
31 8.37 10.74 9.3702 .55391
31 .00 1.00 .1613 .37388
31 .82 7.66 5.2387 1.46098
31 -2.78 .46 -1.6440 1.02879
31 -1.7218 -.1499 -.827970 .4282055
31 -1.84 -.21 -1.1673 .42518
31 -2.87 -1.87 -2.4967 .21239
31 9.42 10.43 9.7197 .31498
31
Trans_04
Rev_04
GDP_04
Dummy
Density_04
Trade_04
Market_03_05
Urban_04
Age65_04
Wage_04
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.
Deviation
 
 
Table 6.17 Correlations between  Trans_04 and other independent variables
1.000 .081 .050 .489 -.682 -.064 -.593 .172 -.315 .289
.081 1.000 .956 -.177 .505 .901 .436 .827 .684 .719
.050 .956 1.000 -.177 .466 .905 .514 .837 .638 .724
.489 -.177 -.177 1.000 -.599 -.227 -.266 -.146 -.408 .013
-.682 .505 .466 -.599 1.000 .510 .716 .352 .758 .119
-.064 .901 .905 -.227 .510 1.000 .553 .761 .605 .696
-.593 .436 .514 -.266 .716 .553 1.000 .203 .634 .368
.172 .827 .837 -.146 .352 .761 .203 1.000 .418 .386
-.315 .684 .638 -.408 .758 .605 .634 .418 1.000 .474
.289 .719 .724 .013 .119 .696 .368 .386 .474 1.00
. .333 .394 .003 .000 .366 .000 .177 .042 .057
.333 . .000 .170 .002 .000 .007 .000 .000 .000
.394 .000 . .170 .004 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000
.003 .170 .170 . .000 .109 .074 .217 .011 .473
.000 .002 .004 .000 . .002 .000 .026 .000 .262
.366 .000 .000 .109 .002 . .001 .000 .000 .000
.000 .007 .002 .074 .000 .001 . .136 .000 .021
.177 .000 .000 .217 .026 .000 .136 . .010 .016
.042 .000 .000 .011 .000 .000 .000 .010 . .004
.057 .000 .000 .473 .262 .000 .021 .016 .004 .
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Trans_04
Rev_04
GDP_04
Dummy
Density_04
Trade_04
Market_03_05
Urban_04
Age65_04
Wage_04
Trans_04
Rev_04
GDP_04
Dummy
Density_04
Trade_04
Market_03_05
Urban_04
Age65_04
Wage_04
Trans_04
Rev_04
GDP_04
Dummy
Density_04
Trade_04
Market_03_05
Urban_04
Age65_04
Wage_04
Pearson
Correlation
Sig.
(1-tailed)
N
Trans
_04
Rev_
04
GDP_
04 Dummy
Density
_04
Trade
_04
Market
_03_05
Urban
_04
Age65
_04
Wage
_04
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The correlation matrix (reported in Table 6.17) illustrates that there are small positive 
correlations between Trans_04 and Rev_04, and between Trans_04 and GDP_04, but 
the correlations are insignificant. This suggests that the effect from counter-equalizing 
tax-rebate may have been neutralized by other types of transfers. The correlation 
coefficients between Trans_04 and Trade_04 (negative) and between Trans_04 and 
Urban_04 (positive) are insignificant. The small positive correlation between 
Trans_04 and Wage_04 is only significant at the margin (at the 0.1 level). There is 
also a small negative correlation between Trans_04 and Age65_04 (significant at the 
0.05 level). This result shows that to a small extent, area with higher level of old aged 
population tends to be associated with lower level of fiscal transfer. The three 
independent variables dummy, Density_04 and Market_03_05 each has significant 
correlation with Trans_04. They may be interpreted as autonomous regions tend to 
receive higher level of transfers from the central government; areas with lower 
population density may receive higher level of transfers from the central government, 
and areas with higher level of SOEs (lower degree of transition) may receive higher 
level of transfers from the central government.   
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Independent
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant
***6.106
(35.045)
***8.036
(29.6)
***6.60
9
***7.513
(13.879)
***6.122
(38.146)
***7.709
(10.686)
Market_03_05
***-0.745
(-3.969)
-0.271
(-1.114)
***-0.626
(-3.493)
-0.354 (-
1.398)
Density_04 ***-0.251
(-5.016)
***-0.194
(-2.717)
-0.133 (-
1.488)
Dummy ***0.70
3 (3.019)
**0.512
(2.497)
0.284
(1.125)
Partial R
2 for
Market_03_05
0.33 N/A N/A 0.042 0.303 0.068
Ajusted R
Square
0.33 0.446 0.213 0.451 0.432 0.456
Multicollinearity No No No No No YES
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31
Table 6.18: Multiple Regression Estimates Dependent Variable: Trans_04
b. * significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at 0.01 level
a. t-statistics in parentheses
Note:
 
 
From the regression analysis (results reported in Table 6.18), one could see that 
Market_03_05 alone could explain 33 percent of the variation in central-local transfer 
(1 percent increase in the level of gross industrial output value generated by non-state 
industries leads to 0.745 percent decrease in per capita central-local transfers, when 
other variables are not controlled for). This is still lower than the 44.6 percent 
explainable by population density (Density_04).  Moreover, when Density_04 is 
controlled for, Market_03_05 becomes insignificant (see Model 4, the absolute value 
of beta coefficient for Market_03_05 also drops to 0.271 from 0.745). This may signal 
that, an important policy intention of the central government is to heavily subsidize 
those remote and less populous areas like Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu and Ningxia to 
compensate for the higher cost of public services delivery (or other reasons). Given 
the much smaller size of population in these remote areas, a not-so-large amount of   189
fiscal transfers could easily lead to high level of per capita fiscal transfers in these 
areas. Model 6 suffers from multicollinearity problem: when Market, Density and 
dummy are combined, these three variables are individually insignificant, but the 
model itself is significant. Note that none of the model has adjusted R square higher 
than 50 percent. Therefore, there must be other important factors explaining the size 
of central-local transfers.   
 
On balance, one may draw a few concluding points from above correlation and 
regression analysis. First, the equalization transfer has not played an influencing role 
at all (if equalization transfer is influential, one would see negative and significant 
correlation between per capita transfer received by a province and per capita fiscal 
revenue of the province); secondly, the effect of tax-rebates may have been 
neutralized by other kinds of transfers; thirdly, although part of the central-local 
transfers may have been devoted to social security subsidies in the SOE sector (as 
discovered by Wong and Bird 2005), the allocation basis of central-local transfers 
seems to be more determined by population density. Hypothesis 4 cannot be firmly 
supported (it is only partially supported). But in any scenario, there is a large amount 
of variation in central-local transfer that is still unexplained.   
 
A comparison between the result in Section 6.5 and the result in this section, one 
could discover that those factors that could explain the size of provincial governments 
could also in part explain the level of central-provincial fiscal transfers and those   190
factors that could not explain the size of provincial governments could not explain the 
variation of central-provincial fiscal transfers. This suggests that central-local 
transfers may be very influential in determining the variation of the sizes of provincial 
governments. We then run a simple regression using FisGDP_04 as the dependent 
variable and Trans_04 as the only independent variable. The result shows that 
Trans_04 alone could explain 70.3 percent of the variation of FisGDP_04 (significant 
at the 0.01 level) and 1 percent increase in the amount of transfer could lead to about 
0.654 percent increase in the size of provincial government. Given the relative small 
population size of several western provinces (they also have very low population 
density) and the large levels of vertical fiscal imbalance (all areas receive transfers 
from the central government to finance part of their expenditure), the central 
government's financial support over those western provinces (one could clearly 
observe much larger level of discrepancy between per capita expenditure and per 
capita revenue in several western provinces from Table 6.2) makes the population 
density variable having such as a strong explanatory power over the size of provincial 
government. Note that the market transition variable is more significant and robust in 
explaining the size of provincial government than in explaining the size of 
central-provincial transfers (both are negative relations), this suggests that part of the 
spending on the SOE sector is paid from provinces' own budgetary revenue. Since the 
determinants of the central transfer are still largely unexplained and the sizes of 
transfer are considerable, the transfer might "wipe-out" the potential explanatory 
power of those variables such as GDP, Urbanization and Trade on the size of the   191
provincial government. Further research on the determinants of central-local transfers 
would be needed to clarity this issue. It would also be useful to statistically analyse 
the sizes of government at sub-provincial levels (larger number of observations could 
enable the comparison within and in-between the sub-groups: western, eastern and the 
central governments).   
 
6.7 Concluding Comments 
This chapter covers a range of issues. The analysis of social security spending and 
social insurance coverage across provinces supports Hypothesis 1  (In the post TSS 
period (1994-2008), even certain relatively affluent locality has not been able to fully 
meet the emerging social security needs, resulting in under-provision of social 
security). It is discovered that even some relatively affluent areas have plagued with 
serious fiscal burdens induced by market transition and the social security coverage 
was still universally low (social exclusion is an universal problem across the 
provinces). The Shanghai mini-case shows that aging is another factor contributing to 
increased social security subsidies. It is also revealed that mismanagement of social 
insurance funds has been a severe problem in many areas. The important implications 
of these findings (from fiscal federalism perspective) would be discussed in the 
conclusion of Chapter 7, after analysing the evidences from Fujian's case study.   
 
Hypothesis 2 is partially confirmed (H2: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), there   192
have been negative correlations between the share of consolidated provincial 
budgetary spending on social security and health sector, and between the share of 
consolidated provincial budgetary spending on social security and education sector). 
The results from the correlation and simple regression analyses suggest that to some 
extent, the growth in social security spending has crowded-out the spending on health 
(the pressure to cover social security bid away the resources that would otherwise be 
available for health). Although it is found that there has been negative correlation 
between the level of budgeted social security spending and the level of budgetary 
spending on education, such correlation is not very significant. Additional research 
would be needed to investigate whether the trade-off effects (between social security 
and health spending) have been stronger in poor areas, because as reviewed in 
Chapter 3, there has already been under-provision of health services in poor areas. 
The research could be conducted by collecting prefecture-level data and divide the 
observations to sub-groups for statistical testing. Alternatively, one could conduct 
comparative case studies in poor areas and rich areas.     
 
The statistical results reject Hypothesis 3 (H3: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), 
holding other factors constant, larger sizes of provincial governments could be in part 
explained by higher degrees of market transition and higher levels of urbanization and 
income). The result shows that holding other factors constant, larger sizes of 
provincial governments (higher levels of consolidated budgetary expenditure-to-GDP 
ratios across provinces) could be in part explained by lower (rather than higher)   193
degrees of market transition; and they could not be confidently explained by the levels 
of urbanisation (the relation is not significant, which may be attributable to 
measurement errors of urbanization, where the share of non-agricultural population is 
used as a proxy). Larger sizes of the governments could be partially explained by 
lower level of per capita GDP, but when other variables are controlled for, the beta 
coefficient becomes insignificant, which suggests that this relation is not robust.   
 
Hypothesis 4 cannot be firmly supported (H4: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), 
holding other factors constant, higher amount of per capita central-provincial fiscal 
transfers could be in part explained by lower level of market transition). It is found 
that higher amount of per capita central-provincial fiscal transfers may be in part 
explained by lower degree of market transition. However, when the factor of 
population density is taken into account, the effect of market transition becomes 
insignificant. It is further discovered that the size of central-provincial transfers has 
strong influence over the size of provincial governments. But the determinants of the 
central transfer are still largely unexplained by above models. The statistical results 
also suggest that part of the spending on the SOE sector is paid from the provinces' 
own budgetary revenue (from the statistical analyses it is not possible to further 
distinguish the budgetary spending on productive projects undertaken by SOEs from 
the spending on the SOE social security issues). 
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Chapter 7 Social Security Development in Fujian Province--an 
Investigation of Local Fiscal Inadequacy and Unmet Social Security 
Needs 
7.1 Introduction 
As the analyses in Chapter 6 shows, Fujian is a relatively affluent province that spent 
much less on social security than many other provinces (Table 6.4, Chapter 6). On the 
other hand, its social security coverage ratios (especially the Basic Enterprise Pension 
Insurance) are lower than many of its peer (Table 6.5 to Table 6.7, Chapter 6). It is not 
certain whether lower level of spending could be explained by Fujian’s much smaller 
SOE-sector (Table 6.12, Chapter 6) or by its lower social security coverage (or both). 
Moreover, lower social security spending in Fujian may also match the relatively 
lower level of fiscal transfers it received from the central government. The Fujian case 
study, thus serves to investigate not only the fiscal needs related to the state sector, but 
also the demands from non-state sector and to what extent these demands have been 
met. This case study is designed to test Hypothesis 1: In the post TSS period 
(1994-2008), even certain relatively affluent locality has not been able to fully meet 
the emerging social security needs, resulting in under-provision of social security. The 
case study explores the evolution of the social security sub-sectors and seeks to 
uncover how the spending decisions or plans were formed and whether they were 
subject to fiscal constraints or other considerations. Most of the time-series fiscal data 
cover the whole province, while some of the interviews took place at the municipal   195
level.  
 
Fujian is a medium size province (by population) in southeast China (See Table 7.1 
for the basic indictors of Fujian in 1998 and 2006). It has nine municipalities, of 
which eight are prefecture-level city and one is vice-provincial municipality—Xiamen. 
Between 1998 and 2006, the number of county-level units (city, county and urban 
district) slightly increased from 84 to 85. The county-level units were managed by 
their respective municipalities; in recent years, a Province Managing County model 
has been introduced, which aimed to reduce the fiscal links between municipalities 
and their subordinate counties and county-level cities (Interview 7). Like other 
provinces, Fujian has become more urbanized. Its income (Regional GDP), budgetary 
revenue, budgetary expenditure, extra-budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary 
expenditure in per capita term have all experienced substantial real growth. But in 
terms of the ranking among 31 provincial units, Fujian’s per capita GDP, budgeted 
revenue and budged expenditure have declined. In 2006, its per capita GDP (21401 
CNY) ranks 9
th out of the 31 provincial units, but is still much higher than the 
population weighted average per capita GDP of the provinces (which was about 
17893 CNY in 2006). Its per capita fiscal revenue (1521 CNY) also ranks 9th and 
higher than the population weighted average per capita fiscal revenue of the provinces 
(which was about 1417 CNY in 2006). In terms of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, 
Fujian’s government size has been among the smallest (Table 12, Chapter 6). But in 
terms of extra-budgetary revenue and expenditure, Fujian has become the second   196
largest collector and spender in 2006, right behind Zhejiang province. As a coastal 
province, Fujian engages more actively in international trade than many other 
provinces and its openness level has also increased between 1998 and 2006. Fujian 
has a vibrant private sector that has experienced fast development since the 1980s. In 
1998, the state sector’s (state owned and controlled) share in gross industrial output of 
Fujian was only 33 percent. By the end of 2006, the state sector’s share of gross 
industrial output in Fujian declined to merely 17 percent, much lower than the 47 
percent provincial average.   
 
A smaller SOE sector prior to the SOE reform (initiated in late 1990s) did give an 
edge to Fujian, as it tended to require a lower level of fiscal subsidies on SOE 
restructuring. However, the spending in social security sector has not just tied to SOE 
restructuring, especially in more recent years. In order to have a thorough 
understanding, we follow a step-by-step approach to decompose the social security 
sector to sub-sectors and analyze the changes in each sector and in-between 
sub-sectors. 
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Year 1998 2006
Number of 
      Municipality 99
      County 46 45
      County-level city  15 14
      District 23 26
Population (10000 person) 3299 3558
        as share of national population 2.76% 2.68%
Urbanization rate  20.00% 32.00%
Regional GDP per capita  (Yuan) 9578 21401
         ranking among provinces 79
Regional GDP as share of national GDP 3.83% 3.30%
Regional GDP by sector
         share of Primary Industry 19.3% 11.8%
         share of Secondary Industry 42.3% 49.1%
         share of Tertiary Industry 38.4% 39.1%
Budgeted revenue per capita  (Yuan) 570 1521
         ranking among provinces 69
Budgeted expenditure per capita  (Yuan) 773 2048
         ranking among provinces 11 19
Extra-budgetary revenue per capita  (Yuan) 451 1102
         ranking among provinces 42
Extra-budgetary expenditure per capita  (Yuan) 413 934
         ranking among provinces 42
Level of state control in industrial output 33.33% 17.10%
         provincial average  n/a 47.20%
Openess level 43.43% 66.00%
         provincial average  21.60% 38.90%
Note: urbanization rate is the share of non-agricultural population, not the
"true" percentage of urban resident; so it is an underestimated figure. Level of
state control in gross industrial output is calculated as the gross industrial
output of SOE and state-controlled enterprises as share of total gross industrial
output. Openness level is computed as the sum value of import and export
divided by Regional GDP. All prices are nominal price.
Source: calculated from Fujian Finance Yearbooks 1999-2008, Fujian
Statistics Yearbooks 1999-2008, China Statistics Yearbooks 1999 and 2007
and China Finance Statistics Yearbook 2006
Table 7.1 Basic Indicators of Fujian Province
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7.2 The Changing Composition of the Budgetary Expenditure   
The analysis starts by examining the budgetary expenditure. Table 7.2 reports the 
relative size of each expenditure item between 1998 and 2006. Health Subsidy for 
public sector workers (gongfei yiliao jingfei, item 22) is taken out from the operating 
expenditure of Health (item 12), since the health subsidy is recognized as a social 
security expense by Finance Statistics Yearbook of China and Fujian Finance 
Yearbooks. Apart from item 22, the items in Table 7.2 are standardized expenditure 
items that are presented in China Statistics Yearbooks or Finance Statistics Yearbooks 
under the section of “government general budgetary expenditure”. After spinning-off, 
the operating expenditure for health becomes much smaller. There are a few features 
worth pointing out. First, the operating expenditure of a sector (e.g. education) may 
not be the total budgeted spending on this sector. The capital spending of most sectors 
are grouped in “Expenditure for capital construction” (item 1). The exception is 
capital spending on agricultural projects (Interview 7), which are counted as 
“Expenditure for supporting agriculture”(item 23). Second, the boundary between 
“expenditure for government administration” (item 14) and operating expenditure of 
many departments is actually not so clear-cut. Government administration expenditure 
covers the expenses of most government agencies and organizations (xingzheng 
danwei), while the operating expenditure of individual sector refers to the operating 
expense of the government institutions, also called public services units (shiye   199
danwei). For instance, the expenditure of departments of health and education are 
grouped under government administration expenditure but the budgeted expenses of 
public hospitals and schools are entered as operating expenditure of health and 
education respectively. The functions between department of education and public 
schools are distinguishable. This may not always be the case in many other 
departments. For example, the statistics department and its subordinate public service 
unit often perform the same task (such as conducting survey) and the employees from 
both departments may even sit in the same office (Interview 11). This raises the issue 
of the nature of the public services units (not addressed in this thesis). The spectrum 
of public service units ranged from those fully financed by the budgets to those 
self-financed. A small number of self-financed units such as newspaper publishing 
firms have been converted to public enterprises (SOEs) in recent years (Interview 8). 
We reclassify and simplify the 27 spending items to 5 major expenditure items in 
Table 7.3 for better comparison.   
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Year 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Total Budgeted Expenditure (Bn Yuan) 25.49 32.42 39.76 51.67 72.87
1 Expd for capital construction 0.098 0.090 0.090 0.079 0.076
2 Enterprise innovation funds 0.029 0.034 0.024 0.037 0.031
3 Geological prospecting expenses 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
4 S&T promotion funds 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.013
5 Urban maintenance expenses 0.038 0.032 0.028 0.028 0.032
6 Circulating funds for enterprises 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7
Expd for Dept of Industry and
Transportation 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.017 0.020
8 Expd for Commerce Dept 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
9
Expd for Dept of Culture, Sports and
Broadcasting 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.033
10 Operating expd of Education 0.180 0.191 0.204 0.195 0.187
11 Expd for Dept of Science 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007
12 Operating expd of Health (adjusted) 0.030 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.028
13 Expd of other Depts 0.044 0.046 0.058 0.055 0.050
14 Expd for Government Administration 0.093 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.081
15 Expd for Foreign Affairs 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
16 Expd for Armed Police Troops 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
17
Expd for Public Security,Court of
Justice and Procuratorial Agency
0.067 0.066 0.074 0.076 0.074
18 Price Subsidies 0.035 0.038 0.017 0.013 0.018
19 Pension and Social Relief 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.026 0.031
20 Pension for Public Sector Retirees 0.022 0.049 0.063 0.062 0.057
21 Social Security Subsidiary Expenses 0.011 0.021 0.021 0.018 0.019
22 Health subsidy for public workers 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.019
23 Expd for supporting
agriculture,forestory etc
0.072 0.067 0.063 0.058 0.053
24
Expd for supporting less developed
areas
0.006 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.006
25 Expd for National Defense 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
26 Expd for special items 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.021
27 Other Expenditrue 0.137 0.108 0.106 0.120 0.131
Table 7.2 Expenditure Items as Share of Total Budgeted Expenditure
Source: Calculated from Fujian Finance Yearbooks 1999-2008 and Fujian
Statistics Yearbooks 1999-2008
 
Items 1 to 6 are summed into “constructive expenditure”, which is often considered as 
productive investment. Items 7 to 18 are grouped as general “government operating 
expenditure”, because of their recurrent nature. Items 19 to 22 are assembled to total   201
“social security expenditure”. Items 24 to 27 become “other expenditure” in Table 6.3.   
It is now quite clear that general government operating expenditure occupies around 
half of the budgeted expenditure and this portion has been rather stable throughout 
1998 to 2006. The ratio of both “constructive expenditure” and “expenditure on 
agriculture” in total budgeted expenditure experienced real decrease. Given the strong 
growth in total budgeted expenditure (average annual growth rate around 14 percent), 
the amounts of these two spending items have also increased (though the speed of 
growth is lower than average). The only sizable expansion is social security 
expenditure, which increased from 7.5 percent of budgeted expenditure in 1998 to 
12.6 percent in 2006 (13.2 percent in 2007, as reported in Finance Yearbook of Fujian, 
2008).  
  
Annual Growth 
AriMean GeoMean
Total Budgeted Expd
(Bn Yuan)
25.49 32.42 39.76 51.67 72.87 0.141 0.140
1 Constructive  Expd 0.179 0.175 0.158 0.160 0.155 -0.015 -0.018
2 Gov Operating Expd 0.510 0.507 0.522 0.508 0.504 -0.001 -0.001
3 Social Security Expd 0.075 0.113 0.124 0.128 0.126 0.071 0.067
4 Expd on Agriculture etc 0.072 0.067 0.063 0.058 0.053 -0.037 -0.037
5 Other Expenditure 0.163 0.138 0.133 0.146 0.161 0.001 -0.002
Source: Calculated from Fujian Finance Yearbooks 1999-2008 and Fujian Statistics
Yearbooks 1999-2008
2006 Year
Table 7.3 Major Spending Items as Share of Total Budgeted Expenditure
1998 2000 2002 2004
Note: Arimean stands for arithmetic average and GeoMean is geometric average
 
The single largest source of increase comes from “pension for public sector retirees” 
(item 20 in Table 7.2; item 1 in Table 6.4), which jumped from 2.2 percent of the total 
budgeted spending in 1998 to 6.3 percent in 2002 (in just four year’s time) then 
retreated to 5.7 percent in 2006. The astonishing expansion in pension payment for   202
public sector retirees stems from the growing number of public sector pensioners in 
Fujian and several rounds of upward adjustment in pension standards (Interview 7). 
Between 1998 and 2006, the number of retirees in Fujian's government departments 
grew at 6.4 percent per annual, while the number of employees in the government 
department only increased at 1 percent per annual (author's calculation from Fujian 
Finance Yearbooks 1999-2007). Government officials of Fujian's Finance Department 
informed us that the lowest pension standard was set by the central government and 
the actual pension standards were decided by each province, where several factors 
such as fiscal capacity and cost of living were considered (Interview 6). But in terms 
of the incremental adjustment for pension of government employees, the precise 
amounts of increase were determined by the central government and the central 
government only provided subsidies to those provinces with lower fiscal capacity; 
Fujian, along with six or seven other provinces did not receive this kind of subsidy 
from the central government (ibid).    “Health subsidy for public workers”, the largest 
expenditure item within social security spending in 1998, experienced a 
less-than-average growth during the same period. These two sectors together 
accounted for 7.6 percent of the budget in 2006, up from 4.6 percent in 1998. The 
other two sectors “pension and social relief” and “social security subsidiary expenses” 
jointly made up 5 percent of the budget in 2006, a 2 percent increase since 1998. 
Unlike “pension for public sector retirees” and “health subsidy for public workers”, 
whose compositions have been constant, “pension and social relief” and “social 
security subsidiary expenses” cover a range of different sub-sectors. It is the changing   203
spending patterns in these sub-sectors that explain the impacts from market transition 
on local budget. The budgeting decisions on these sub-sectors in part reflect the fiscal 
strength or constraints Fujian’s government faced.   
 
7.3 Analyzing the Development of the Social Security Sector   
 
Year  1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007
Social Security Spending as Share of Total Budgeted
Expenditure 0.075 0.113 0.124 0.128 0.126 0.132
Total Social Security Spending 191475 365749 494107 659275 920489 1199950
1. Pension for Public Sector Retirees 55443 158782 248774 321619 417831 N/A
2. Health Subsidy for Public Workers 60827 78002 83537 109092 139530 N/A
3. Social Security Subsidiary Expenses 27232 69452 82365 94099 136960 N/A
        Subsidies on Social Security Funds 973 20605 20044 22227 22778 N/A
        Living Subsidy and Reemployment Subsidy for
the SOE Laid-Offs
9716 29827 19722 15403 0 N/A
        Subsidy on Closure of non-performing SOEs 11253 6624 9357 N/A
        Subsidy on Urban Employment Services 2247 3628 3018 17811 29338 N/A
     Other Subsidies 14296 15392 28328 32034 75487 N/A
4. Pension and Social Relief Expenses 47973 59513 79431 134465 226168 N/A
        Expenses on Military Retirees 7887 14749 18079 24864 38970 N/A
        Expenses on Social Assitance 11487 16894 25976 39037 64143 N/A
        Urban Minimun Living Standard Assistance n/a 4182 9673 13910 17319 N/A
        Other Expenses 28599 23688 25703 56654 105736 N/A
Table 7.4 The Subcategories of Social Security Spending (10000 Yuan)
Source: Adapted from Fujian Finance Yearbooks 1999-2008
Note: All the prices are nominal price (not ajusted for inflation)
 
A more detailed social security spending picture is found from Fujian Finance 
Yearbooks 1999-2008 (Table 7.4). A new categorization method was introduced for 
China's fiscal statistics in 2007, therefore only the total amount could be reported for   204
2007. The “subsidies on social security funds” refer to the subsidies on the six 
state-mandated contribution based social insurance funds (summarized in Table 7.5). 
These six insurances are co-financed by employers and employees. In Fujian, for 
pension insurance, the employers contribute 14 percent of the wage while the 
individuals contribute 8 percent; for health insurance, employers contribute 8 percent 
and employees contribute 2 percent; for unemployment insurance, employers 
contribute 2 percent and employees contribute 1 percent; the contributions to work 
injury insurance and maternity insurance are exclusively made by the employers with 
0.5 percent and 0.7 percent of the wage respectively (Interview 7).  In Fujian 
province, pension insurance for enterprise workers and the unemployment insurance 
are pooled at the provincial level, the newly introduced pension insurance for public 
sector staff and workers is pooled at the county level and the remaining three 
insurances are pooled at municipal (city) level (ibid). Pooling at the provincial level 
has prevented some municipalities in Fujian such as Sanming and Ningde from 
running deficits in their enterprise pension insurances (ibid). Both pension insurance 
and health insurance have personal accounts, which are separated from the social 
pooling portion. Though in some provinces such as Shanghai and Guangdong, 
enterprise pension insurance has been open to employees from township enterprises, 
in Fujian province to date, only the employed persons in urban areas are eligible to 
participate (Interview 7). Municipal and provincial government shoulder a very large 
portion of the financial and managerial responsibilities in social security. Throughout 
the period, all of the six accounts had operating surplus (see Table 7.5). Of course,   205
some had much higher safety margin (the balance divided by the annual payment) 
than the others. For instance, the work injury insurance ran a 976 million yuan surplus 
in 2006 and its 2006 payout was only 118 million yuan, which means that the risk of 
not meeting the payment requirement could be very low. In contrast, the balance for 
public sector pension insurance was 2050 million but its payment in 2006 was 3173 
million. This may indicate a higher chance of funding shortfall in future.   
 
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2006
Balance
Income 25.78 35.62 46.31 54.62 89.07
Payout 23.76 30.37 43.57 49.34 72.45
P.R1 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.60
P.R2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.25
Income 11.96 16.79 21.30 27.01 33.78
Payout 12.10 15.17 19.48 24.48 31.73
P.R3 0.45 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.74
Income 1.52 3.13 5.13 7.03 9.31
Payout 1.08 2.35 4.25 4.23 4.40
P.R4 0.33 0.46 0.61 0.56 0.50
Income 5.27 20.56 31.82 47.28
Payout 3.35 12.25 20.58 30.84
P.R5 0.43 0.47
Income 0.31 0.40 0.47 1.15 1.73
Payout 0.25 0.34 0.41 0.65 1.02
Income 0.82 1.14 1.47 1.93 3.26
Payout 0.29 0.41 0.61 0.76 1.18
Urban Health Insurance 72.25
Urban Basic Pension
Insurance for Enterprise
Workers
77.72
   Pension Insurance for
Public Sector Staff and
Workers
20.5
Table 7.5 Fujian's Social Security Statistics(100 million Yuan, and ratio)
Year
Note: P.R1(Participation Rate 1) excludes township enterprise workers, while P.R2 takes into
account township enterprise workers. P.R4 excludes staff and workers in government
organizations (xingzheng danwei). P.R1 to P.R5 do not consider those participants who are
retired.
Source: author's calculation from Fujian Finance Yearbooks 1999-2008 and Fujian Statistics
Yearbooks 1999-2008
Urban Maternity
Insurance
1.89
Urban Work Injury
Insurance
9.76
Urban Unemployment
Insurance
21.22
 
 
So why subsidizing the social insurance funds given that there were surplus and 
where did these subsidies go? The government officials in Fujian’s Finance 
Department and Quanzhou’s Finance Bureau offered the answers. The subsidies were 
mainly made to social security accounts of those non-performing SOEs,   206
collective-enterprises and a few self-financed public services units that were having 
financial difficulty in making social security contributions (Interview 7 & 8). The 
employers’ share of social security contribution totals 25.2 percent of the wage bills, 
which could be an extra hefty burden for most enterprises. Around 75 percent of the 
fiscal subsidies on social security went to Urban Basic Enterprise Pension Insurance. 
Because of the budget constraints, subsidies made to urban enterprise pension 
insurance have to be carefully planned and it has not been possible to increase the 
number of participants from those non-performing SOEs at one time (Interview 8 & 
11). That is why there have still been subsidies to urban enterprise pension insurance 
in more recent years. The “subsidies on closure of non-performing SOEs” were 
payments made to clear-up the wage arrears of those terminating SOEs and in some 
cases those SOEs also used the subsidies to pay-off the arrears of social security 
contributions for their employees. The government of Fujian did not make social 
insurance subsides  (in terms of the insurances depicted in Table 7.5) for private 
enterprise workers, who are becoming a dominating group in the workforce (the 
government made subsides toward some collective-owned enterprises; Interview 8). 
In Fujian province, a large amount of enterprise employees works in the township 
enterprises and they are not yet covered by any social insurance. That is why the 
participation rate (P.R2) is so much lower than (P.R1), when the number of township 
enterprises workers is taken into account. Since the data on the number of retirees is 
not available, the calculation of participation rates is restricted to those who are at 
work. The true participation rate for employees and retirees as a whole could be even   207
lower, given the fact that social insurances only started to expand in the late 1990s to 
include the non-state sector workers. Note that the participation rate for 
unemployment insurance dropped between 2002 and 2006; this is due to the higher 
speed of the expansion of non-state sector workforce than the growth in the number of 
participants (Interview 8). The participation rate for public sector pension insurance is 
not an indicator of social exclusion. Almost all the staff and workers in public 
agencies, organizations and institutions have long been fully protected with pension 
and medical care since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The 
introduction of pension insurance and urban health insurance for public sector 
workers was simply a step to establish a socially managed insurance scheme, where 
some of the public sector workers are asked to make contributions (to bear part of the 
cost). Despite the increasing participation rate (which means more contributions 
collected from employees), the pension payment for public sector retirees grew the 
fastest among the four major social security sub-sectors.   
 
When questioned about the much lower coverage rates of various forms of urban 
social insurances in Fujian (comparing to other provinces), the government officials in 
Fujian's Finance Department and Finance Bureau of Quanzhou replied that the main 
reason was that Fujian had a smaller SOE sector (comparing to other provinces) and it 
had been very difficult to persuade employed persons from non-state sector to 
participate (Interview 6, 8 and 9) (the obstacles are discussed later in this chapter). 
The officials also emphasized that social security issues could be very costly and the   208
government could only provide limited fiscal support for the collective-enterprise 
sector as a result of fiscal constraints; subsidizing the private sector at large would be 
totally impossible (Interview 8 &9). A case study on SOE privatization in Quanzhou, 
the second richest municipality in Fujian by per capita income in 2006 (second to 
Xiamen), helps us deepen the understanding of the impact of social security reform on 
local budget as well as the "creative" response from the government (several 
government officials in Fujian referred this case as one of the examples that 
demonstrate the immense cost of social security; the case presented here is the only 
case for which the complete government internal report was acquired). The basic 
statistics of Quanzhou city is presented in Table 7.6 for reference. 
 
Year 1995 1998 2006
Number of  County-level units 8 11 11
Registered Permanent Resident (10000 person) 626 654 670
Resident Population (10000 person) n/a n/a 769
        as share of Fujian's population n/a n/a 0.216
Urbanization rate  n/a n/a 0.48
Share of Non-Agricultural Population 0.12 0.135 0.288
 GDP per capita  (Yuan) 7995 11843 24847
         ranking among the 9 cities 3 3 2
GDP as share of Fujian's GDP 0.237 0.245 0.250
GDP by sector
         share of Primary Industry 0.120 0.102 0.051
         share of Secondary Industry 0.527 0.561 0.586
         share of Tertiary Industry 0.353 0.337 0.362
Budgeted revenue per capita  (Yuan) 323 428 1388
         ranking among the 9 cities 4 3 3
Budgeted expenditure per capita  (Yuan) 268 443 1563
         ranking among provinces 4 3 3
Level of state control in industrial output of Quanzhou 0.26 0.20 0.11
Level of state control in industrial output of Fujian n/a 0.33 0.17
Note: urbanization rate is the true percentage of urban resident;  Level of state control in
gross industrial output is calculated as the gross industrial output of SOE and state-
controlled enterprises as share of total gross industrial output. All prices are nominal
Source: calculated from Fujian Finance Yearbooks 1999-2008, Fujian Statistics
Yearbooks 1999-2008, Quanzhou Statistics Yearbooks 1996-2007
Table 7.6 Basic Indicators of Quanzhou Municipality
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The nationwide SOE reform began in the mid-late 1990s. Yet in Quanzhou city, SOE 
reform started as early as in 1992. By the time of 1992, the number of manufacturing 
SOEs controlled by Quanzhou’s municipal government had dropped to 37, because of 
the fierce market competitions and the fact that these manufacturing SOEs operated in 
non-monopolized sectors such as food processing, manufacture of food, textile, 
leather and transport equipment (Interview 11). The municipal government made a 
very bold decision in 1992, which was to reform (privatize) all the 37 firms at one 
time in order to “spin-off the non-performing SOEs”. Thus a sharing-holding limited 
company called Zhongqiao Corporation was incorporated in 1992, with the Hong 
Kong based foreign company (Zhongce group) controlling 60 percent of the shares 
and Quanzhou’s Public Investment Corporation controlling the remaining 40 percent. 
The corporation was established to reform (take over) the 37 non-performing 
manufacturing enterprises owned by Quanzhou municipal government. This was 
essentially a privatization of all the 37 local SOEs, since the government handed over 
the controlling position to the foreign company.   
 
After 1996, the company had started to incur losses and this situation deteriorated 
year by year, however. By the end of 2005, Zhongqiao was on the brink of bankruptcy 
and unable to pay back the loans borrowed from commercial banks (around 150 
millions yuan; worth almost 50 percent of Zhongqiao’s net asset). Zhongqiao had 
around 13000 employees in 1992 and most of these employees were still treated as 
SOE workers despite the privatization (there were no formal laws and regulations on   210
SOE privatization in 1992) (Interview 12). Since 1995, Zhongqiao has started to 
lay-off the redundant workers and by 2006 only around 2000 workers were at work. 
None of Zhongqiao’s employees, retired workers or those laid-offs had been covered 
by any social insurances or minimum living stipends. For the last ten years, the 
tension between Zhongqiao’s employees and the company has escalated and the 
organized employees have made several appeals to Quanzhou’s Public Investment 
Corporation, and several petitions to the municipal government and provincial 
government. After being turned down by their company, the employees demanded the 
fiscal subsidies (to cover their social insurances and living stipends) from the 
government, on the basis that they were still counted as SOE workers. But with so 
many years’ of non-payments, the amount of contributions required had grown to a 
huge figure by 2002 and the municipal government was totally unable to meet such 
demand using the fiscal revenue. Fearing the potential consequence of social 
instability, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) of Quanzhou stepped in to negotiate with the foreign investors in 2003 in 
order to find a viable solution. After many rounds of negotiation, in 2007 the 
government bought back the firm from the foreign investors at a deep discount, sold 
off the assets and completely terminated the operation of Zhongqiao Corporation. 
With one billion loan from China Development Bank, an urban regeneration project 
was also launched to convert the Zhongqiao’s factory sites to commercial estate. In 
2007, a total amount of around 0.55 billion yuan (in part raised from the asset sales 
and in part came from the loan) was spent to settle the social insurances and the   211
minimum living stipends issues for all the 13000 workers. From Quanzhou’s 
Department of Finance, we learnt that Quanzhou’s budgetary expenditure for 2006 
was 10.48 billion yuan, of which around 0.67 billion yuan was devoted to social 
security (not including health subsidies for public sector workers). If the 0.55 billion 
yuan were included in the 2006 budget, the social security spending would have gone 
up by 82.1 percent and the total spending would have gone up by 5.2 percent 
(Interview 12). Also note that in provincial consolidated budgetary expenditure, the 
“subsidies on social security funds” for 2006 was only around 0.23 billion yuan 
(Table 6.4), less than half of the 0.55 billion yuan.   
 
Two government officials from SASAC of Quanzhou told us that if the workers were 
recognized as non-SOE workers, the government may not have been liable for the 
issue; but if the firms were not privatized in 1992, then the social security spending 
for the past ten years would have been considerably more (the average number of 
employed person working in state-owned enterprise of Quanzhou city was only 
around 26000 for the past ten years) (Interview 11, 12 & 13). From Table 7.6, one 
could see that the share of SOE and state-controlled enterprise in total gross industrial 
output was only about 26 percent in 1995, 20 percent in 1998 and 11 percent in 2006. 
The government expected the urban regeneration project to make a small profit, 
otherwise it would be very difficult to pay off the one billion loan. The role of 
SASAC in the process was very important. It is revealed that many options were 
considered between 2001 and 2003 but most of them became dead ended because of   212
inadequate fiscal resource to make the payment demanded by the workers (Interview 
12 &13). The pressure from the municipal government on SASAC was considerable, 
due much to the petitions and protests. In 2003, the final plan won full approval from 
both the municipal government and the provincial government. The strong 
government intervention in the negotiation finally made the investors give up their 
shares at a deep discount (the discount was a result of recognizing the cost of social 
security). “If the government did not step in, the corporation would never be able or 
be willing to pay the social insurance contributions for its employees” said one of the 
government officials in SASAC (Interview 13). 
 
The government officials in SASAC were confident that the one billion loan could be 
paid back in a few years' time, because "the property market has been on an upward 
trend"(Interview 13). However, property business could be very risky and using bank 
loans to cover the social security issues has essentially shifted some of the risks to the 
state-owned banking system from the government of Quanzhou. The Zhongqiao case 
is special because of the dual-identity of its employees. But it is not uncommon that 
the government would force SOEs to raise the funds from other sources (to make up 
the social security requirements) before offering fiscal subsidies (Interview 11). Apart 
from budgetary subsides (which acts as the last resort), there have been two other 
major methods used by Fujian’s local governments to raise the funds to cover social 
security issues, namely, the income from sale of SOE assets and the revenue from the 
sale of land lease (part of the off-budgetary revenue) (ibid). It was emphasized in   213
several government internal reports that in Fujian province these multiple channels of 
fund-raising had greatly increased the number of participants from SOEs and 
mitigated the fiscal burden.   
 
There are still quite a lot of employees or retirees from non-performing SOEs and 
collective-enterprises, who are not covered by the new urban health insurance (trial in 
two cities of Fujian in 1998 and formally adapted in Fujian in 2000). One internal 
report of Fujian's Finance Department issued in March 2009 (obtained during my 
second fieldwork in 2009) revealed that the number of employees or retirees from 
SOEs and collective-enterprises not yet covered by the urban health insurance had 
been around 300800 (by the end of 2008), which was around 5 percent of Fujian’s 
total employed persons by 2008. A number of solutions were planned in the report. 
First, multiple channels of fund-raising were proposed to help alleviate the problem. 
In addition, the report recommended that the social insurance contribution rates for 
these enterprises to be reduced. It was also suggested that employees of these 
enterprise participate in Urban Resident Health Insurance (formally established in 
2008) or New Rural-Cooperative Health Insurance (both insurances require lower 
contribution rates than the Urban Health Insurance but also have lower 
reimbursement). It was estimated that at least a total amount of 0.994 billion CNY 
would be required from the budget to make all the 300800 workers covered with 
health insurances. The provincial government alone would have to spend 0.395 billion 
CNY and the remaining 0.599 billion would have to be shouldered by municipal and   214
county-level governments. The government planed to fully solve this issue within five 
years (it was not possible for the government raise the funds and make all the 
payment at once) (Interview 14 &15). 
 
7.4 The rising fiscal requirements from the non-SOE sectors 
We notice that the “living subsidies and reemployment subsidies for the SOE 
laid-offs” peaked in 2000 and reduced to zero in 2006 (Table 7.4). It may be incorrect 
to say that the SOE reform in Fujian was fully complete in 2004, but from 2004 there 
has no further laid-offs from the SOEs (Interview 14). The budgetary spending on 
employment and reemployment services after 2004 has continued to grow at a fast 
pace, however. Former training and employment services for the laid-offs have 
become available for the general public and the demand for these services has been 
enormous, most of which sourced from the migrant peasant workers who are 
searching for jobs in urban areas (ibid). The major employment services include job 
introduction, skill verification, (re)employment training and low-interest personal 
loans (part of the interests paid by the government). In Fujian, the number of persons 
benefited from these services has increased from 0.214 million in 2003 to 0.499 
million in 2005 and to 1.57 million in 2007; in 2007, around 0.57 million 
beneficiaries were peasant workers (Interviews 14). Correspondingly, the “subsidies 
on urban employment services” surged near ten times between 2002 (0.03 billion 
yuan) and 2006 (0.29 billion yuan). This does not cover all the subsidies in   215
employment services; for instance, the subsidies to private-ran employment training 
services are entered into “other subsidies” of Table 7.4 (Interview 6 & 7). Local 
governments have long been aware of the demands for urban employment training 
and services from the peasant labour (who are desperate to acquire or upgrade new 
skills to seize the emerging job opportunities), but budget constraints meant that they 
could only expand the services on a gradual basis. There were few employment 
services in Fujian before 1998, although by that time Fujian had already have a 
sizeable job market outside the state sector (Interview 14). The formal SOE reform 
made reemployment training imperative for those laid-offs, who were in their 
mid-ages and were less-skilled, thus following the Shanghai’s experience, 
municipalities in Fujian built Reemployment Services Centres to coach the laid-off 
workers and offer them job information (for free). The Reemployment Service 
Centres for SOE laid-offs were closed in 2002 but the government still subsidized 
general employment training and services (ibid).  It is revealed that the migrant 
workers had been in the greatest needs of employment coaching. Like the ways in 
gathering funds for social security accounts, the governments also raise funds from 
local enterprises (known as donation from the society) to run these employment 
training activities in order to mitigate the fiscal burden (Interview 14). 
 
From Table 7.4, one could also spot that “Pension and Social Relief Expenses” more 
than quadrupled between 1998 and 2006. This expenditure item covers a wide range 
of social security functions. “Expenses on military retirees” refers to pension and   216
medical care subsidies paid to retired soldiers as well as the operating expenses of the 
related public services units. Higher pension standard has been the driving force of the 
growth in this expenditure item. “Expenses on social assistance” includes all the 
spending on natural disaster reliefs, the operating expenses for adopting institutions 
and urban and rural medical care assistance. Most spending went to natural disaster 
reliefs; less than 40 million yuan went to urban medical care assistance in 2006 
(Interview 7). Both urban and rural medical assistance were established in 2003 to 
complement the Urban Health Insurance scheme and the New Rural Co-operative 
Health Insurance (NRCHI) program. The intention is to build a medical safety net for 
those who not covered by any kind of health insurance and to help boost the 
participation rates of health insurances. But our interviews find that in Fujian only 
those who are registered permanent residents (those with local hukou) are eligible for 
the assistance, migrant workers from other provinces who are only considered as 
residence population (not permanent population) are excluded for medical assistance. 
To some extent, the reason has still been under-funding. The governments of Fujian 
fear that once migrant workers are included, the medical bills would immediately 
become unaffordable, as there is a large number of migrant workers in Fujian. The 
government officials in Quanzhou's Finance Bureau admitted that the amount of 
medical assistance expense was far from adequate, as many hospitals reported that 
they required much more funding to keep the program going, otherwise the medical 
assistance requests from the eligible local residents (with local hukou) would have to 
be turned down (Interview 15).    In a recent article published by Financial Times (the   217
Chinese version, date of publication 25/06/2009), the journalist revealed a paradox in 
medical assistance program: local governments set up strict eligibility thresholds and 
maximum level of payment to prevent the funds from running out too quickly and the 
result was that the funds ended up with large amount of surplus, and those in need 
have been excluded from the services (http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001027196, 
accessed: 26/06/2009). The central government, in response to this phenomenon, 
issued a new proposal on 22
nd June, 2009, requiring higher level of governments to 
stop subsidizing the medical assistance funds of lower level governments if there are 
large amount surplus. The intention of this proposal was to urge local governments to 
remove the barriers and support those who are in need of assistance. As the author 
reported, the central problem is still the inadequacy of funding. The article also cited 
an estimated figure of 35.6 billion yuan requirement for rural medical assistance alone 
(not including the urban medical assistance needs) in China and compared it with the 
7.12 billion yuan spent in both urban and rural medical care by all levels of 
government in China in 2007, to illustrate the severe inadequacy of funding problem. 
 
The fiscal inadequacy is also evidenced in the way in which Fujian implements urban 
and rural Minimum Living Standard (MLS) scheme. The MLS scheme is a 
means-tested income support benefits program aiming to provide subsidies to those 
families or individual living below an approved minimum living standard line. The 
minimum living standard lines are set by each municipal government, normally 50 to 
60 percent of the local minimum wages (Interview 9). Like the medical assistance   218
program, the MLS scheme covers only the registered permanent residents. The MLS 
scheme was firstly experimented in Shanghai in 1993 and then introduced to other 
cities in China. After three years’ trials, Fujian formally adopted the MLS scheme for 
urban residents in 1998 and in 2004 a separated MLS scheme was initiated for rural 
residents (ibid). The amount of spending for urban MLS is reported as an independent 
item in Table 7.4, while the amount of spending for rural MLS is included in “other 
expenses” in the same table. Interview 9 reveals that in 2006, Fujian devoted 0.23 
billion yuan to rural MLS, higher than the 0.173 billion yuan of urban MLS. 
Comparing to other social security items, the expenditure size of urban MLS has been 
quite small. This is in no way an indication of low demand, however. A report from 
Fujian’s Finance Department claimed that since 2003 all eligible individuals and 
families for urban MLS have received the benefit payments (yingbao jinbao) and the 
payment standards have become higher in more recent years to provide a better 
support for those poor families. In other words, before 2003, at least some of the 
eligible persons or urban households were unable to receive the benefits from the 
government (not to mention those who have been excluded from this scheme). It was 
estimated that around 50 percent of claimants for urban MLS were former laid-off 
employees (Interview 9 & 14). The laid-off employees could receive basic living 
stipends for up to five years and if they are still unable to find a job, they would 
become eligible for the urban MLS, which offers a lower benefit level than the basic 
living stipends.   
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Income   1368 4362 9990 45043 132315
     Fiscal subsidy 386 2702 6865 33493 99457
     Personal contribution 532 1272 2645 10637 30552
     Collective-economy subsidy 420 220 372 306 54
     Others 30 168 108 607 2252
Payout 1195 1907 8582 19179 87114
Number of Participants  39 138 233 999 2247
Table 7.7 Basic Statistics of Fujian's New Rural Cooperative Health Insurance
(NRCHI) unit: 10000 Yuan, 10000 pernson
Source: Fujian's Department of Finance (author's interview in 2008 & 2009)  
 
Perhaps, Fujian’s most costly social security investment in more recent years is the 
New Rural Cooperative Health Insurance (NRCHI) scheme (established in 2003). 
Again, this item was not reported separately in Fujian Finance Yearbooks but bundled 
in the “other expenses” (see Table 7.4). The “other expenses” also comprises the 
operating expenses of certain social security service units. As its name implies, the 
NRCHI scheme is a health insurance program for rural residents (in fact a small 
number of urban residents also participate in this program because they are unable to 
pay the higher contribution fees required by urban health insurance) and is jointly 
financed by the rural collective-economy, individuals and the government. The old 
rural cooperative medical insurance was solely based on rural collective-economy and 
started to demise when privatization of rural-collective enterprises began in the 1980s. 
For the past two or three decades, most rural residents have to pay for the growing 
medical expenses in full, despite that their real income has also increased. The 
establishment of NRCHI scheme thus signals that the government has finally started 
to take up the health responsibility for the rural population. Thanks to the subsidy, the 
number of participants lifts to 22.52 millions in 2007 (around 87 percent of the total   220
rural residents, author’s estimation) from merely 0.3 million in 2003 (see Table 7.6). 
Indeed, the fiscal subsidy has become the most significant source of finance for 
NRCHI since 2004. The rural resident contributes 10 to 15 yuan per person, per 
annual to the program (depends on their levels of income, 15 yuan for relative 
well-off families and 10 yuan for poorer household) , which would then entitle them 
the access to subsidized or free medical treatments (operated in designated hospitals 
and clinics). The governments on the other hand, allocated 50 yuan to each of the 
participants in 2007 and increased it to 80 yuan per person in 2009. Most of this 
responsibility rests on the provincial level government, as required by the central 
government. The central government also made some subsidies toward Fujian's 
NRCHI. The central government did not make subsidy to support Fujian's SOE 
restructuring process, as Fujian has a much smaller SOE sector. The central and 
provincial level governments accounts for around 70 percent of the total fiscal 
spending on NRCHI in Fujian and the remaining 30 percent is the responsibility of 
municipal and county-level governments. The growing fiscal subsidy for NRCHI may 
explain much of the increase in social security spending since 2006. In 2008, the 
provincial level alone invested 1.12 billion yuan in NRCHI (Interview 15, the 
consolidated figures not yet released), which was already larger than the total 
investments made by all three layers’ of government in 2007. The demand for medical 
treatment by rural residents is noticeable in the large payment of NRCHI (Table 7.7). 
Without the governments’ subsidy (in particular the subsidy from central and 
provincial governments), the NRCHI program could not be operated at all, because   221
the subsidies from collective-economy and the funds from donations (“others” in 
Table 7.7) have been far too small.   
 
7.5 Social Security—the Managerial Issues 
We have discussed the fiscal challenges of social security reforms in Fujian during the 
last decade. The managerial challenges are not to be ignored, however. The social 
security system in China has been fragmented since the founding of PRC and it has 
been decentralized since the 1980s. Local Departments of Labour and Social Security 
manage the six major insurances depicted in Table 7.5. Local Departments of Civil 
Affairs are in charge of the welfare of military retirees, disaster reliefs, social welfare 
institutions (such as adopting institutions) and all social assistance programs (such as 
urban and rural MLS schemes). Local Finance Departments coordinated with these 
social security departments in the areas of account-keeping, treasury management and 
financial planning. In recent years, local tax bureaus have also been involved to 
collect social insurance contributions (in some provinces).   
 
In Fujian province, the collection of pension and unemployment insurance 
contributions were handed over to local tax bureaus from the Department of Human 
Resources and Social Security in 2001, as it had been very difficult to collect social 
insurance contributions from the employers and employees, and non-compliance in 
making contributions had significantly increased the risks of funding shortfalls   222
(Interview 9). Local tax offices have informational advantage over local business 
entities, so after 2001, the chances of non-compliance have been reduced. But the 
collection of social insurance contributions could be an extra burden for the tax 
offices. The officials in Quanzhou’s Finance Bureau mentioned that private 
enterprises were reluctant to make contributions for their “non-core” workers and on 
the other hand, peasant workers were equally reluctant to participate if they do not 
plan to stay in Fujian for long (when moving to other provinces, the participants could 
only withdraw a small fraction of the accumulated contributions, which means most 
of the contributions would be confiscated ); thus individual companies tended to 
under-report the number of their full-time employees to reduce the social insurance 
payments. The tax collector would therefore need further efforts in making 
investigation and making enforcement, which have been a challenging job, given the 
vast number of small family-based enterprises.   
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7.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we analyse the recent development of the social security sector, using 
Fujian province as a case. The findings in this chapter corroborate the findings in 
section 6.3 of Chapter 6 and they firmly support Hypothesis 1: In the post TSS period 
(1994-2008), even certain relatively affluent locality has not been able to fully meet 
the emerging social security needs, resulting in under-provision of social security. 
 
In Chapter 6, it is spotted that there have been serious social exclusions in social 
insurances across the 31 provincial units. The case study on Fujian confirms that low 
levels of social insurance coverage could be largely attributable to local fiscal 
inadequacy problem. It is demonstrated that the social security could be very costly 
for the government: even with such a small SOE sector and several years after the 
SOE restructuring, the social security needs of many SOE employees or former SOE 
employees in Fujian province have yet to be met. By examining the allocation of 
resources in each of the social security sub-sectors as well as the development of 
those social security sub-sectors, this case study generates a few additional insights. It 
is found that current social security system in Fujian creates a pecking order of 
meeting the fiscal needs associated with different social groups (intra-locality 
interpersonal inequality in access to social security). The employees of government 
agency, organization and institutions are best protected, as the government fully 
assume their welfare responsibility. This small population section consumes a very 
large proportion of social security expenditure in Fujian and is often the first to   224
benefit from the upward adjustment in welfare payment standards. This group’s 
welfare interest has been guaranteed by the state ever since the founding of People’s 
Republic of China and has not been affected by marketization. Their participation in 
various social insurances has simply been a managerial change, though some of the 
employees are required to make social insurance contributions to bear part of the cost. 
The SOE employees and ex-employees are also protected: although there are risks 
that their social security needs could not be met immediately or in the short term; the 
government makes commitment to cover their needs in a number of years' time. Fiscal 
inadequacy dictates that the government’s help only comes after other possible means 
have been attempted (the emphasis of multiple channel fund-raising). The more 
extreme case of Zhongqiao clearly illustrates that in the face of hefty social security 
burdens (and the potential threat to social stability), the government could be forced to 
adopt measures that may create detrimental effects (such as shifting part of the risk to 
the state-owned banking system).   
 
The governments could only assume very limited responsibility for the welfare of  
the non-state workers, individuals and households, despite the enormous demand from 
these large groups of population as a result of market transition. First, the 
governments did not assist non-state enterprise workers in participating in the social 
insurances by providing subsidies (they did provide some support to workers of 
collective-owned enterprises), but act as the mediator between the labour and the 
capitalist to encourage and enforce the participation of social insurances. Secondly,   225
the social assistance programs (such as minimum living standard lines and medical 
assistance) are restricted to registered permanent population only and are restrictive in 
making payments in order to curb the expenditure growth. Comparing the amount of 
investment made to the public sector employees, the expenditure on social assistances 
was very small (and inadequate). The migrant workers, arguably the weakest social 
group in urban areas, receive little or no fiscal supports from the government (in terms 
of social security).Thirdly, the implementation of many social security programs for 
these population sections have to come in stages; such a gradual approach is needed 
because there has inadequate fiscal resources to carry out these schemes at one time.   
 
The implication from the analysis in Chapter 6 and from this chapter is that there has 
been vertical fiscal imbalance problem in China (the expenditure needs of the 
subnational governments exceed their fiscal capacity) and such problem has not yet 
been properly tackled via central-local transfers or via the reassignment of tax bases 
to the local governments. Market transition has provided a context in which the social 
security needs could grow in a very fast pace and could be underestimated. By 
devolving the social security responsibility to subnational governments, the central 
government could have under-estimated the magnitude of the fiscal impact. While the 
conventional reasoning from the first generation theory of fiscal federalism (see Oates, 
1972, 1999, 2005) is that redistribution at the local levels would lead to loss/exodus of 
tax bases and would ultimate make the policy unsuccessful, in the Chinese case, 
redistribution at the local levels contributed to interpersonal inequality in access to   226
social insurances and social assistance. This is because, in the face of fiscal 
constraints and growing social security needs, local governments tended to 
under-provide the services for those who need them most or restrict the access to 
those services in order to curb the expenditure growth. Redistribution at the national 
level could mitigate this interpersonal inequality problem if a more uniform level of 
services is provided by the central government (as suggested by the first generation 
theory of fiscal federalism).   
 
The evidence of mismanagement of social insurance funds at the local levels further 
suggest that while fiscal decentralization facilitates preference-matching and policy 
innovations, it may not necessarily lead to effective management of public services. 
This is because highly decentralized management of social insurance funds could 
greatly increase the cost of monitoring by the government and increase the risks of 
funding shortfall (which could also be the result of inadequate social pooling).   
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Chapter 8 Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation investigates the fiscal impact of market transition on local social 
security sector and verifies fiscal inadequacy and unmet social security needs in 
China's relatively affluent areas during the post Tax-Sharing reform era (1994-2008). 
It also applies statistical analysis to ascertain a few inconclusive issues raised by the 
literature. In this concluding chapter, we recap the research background and the 
hypotheses, then discuss the major research findings, policy implications and 
limitation of this research.     
 
8.1 From Research Background to Hypotheses, a Summary   
There are ample evidences from developing and transition countries that fiscal 
decentralization could result in unmet fiscal needs in poorer local areas, if a proper 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system is not in place. The problem of unmet fiscal 
needs at the local levels may also be the outcome of poor local governance (when the 
institutions of local democracy are weak or absent), where local resources are 
captured by the local elites or interest groups. In the case of China, the problem of 
unmet fiscal needs has been observed and extensively studied in poor areas of China, 
with a special focus on the education and health sector. In an over-simplified reading, 
scholars using first generation theory of fiscal federalism expect the adoption of a 
rule-based and more redistributive intergovernmental fiscal transfer system to support 
poor areas (so that they would be able to provide a minimum level of education and   228
health services). Scholars using political economy approach (the second generation 
theories of fiscal federalism) offer two different lines of reasoning. One of the 
approach (Tsui and Wang, 2004) contends that local governments favour capital 
investment at the expense of education and health services because economic 
construction has been assigned a much larger weight in the top-down cadre 
management system. Another approach ( Liu et al, 2006) claims that to some extent, 
government staff expansion in poorer areas as a result of central mandates such as 
birth control and grain procurement leads to fiscal inadequacy and unmet fiscal needs 
problem in poor areas (staff expansion consumes too much fiscal resource which may 
otherwise be available for the provision of public services).   
 
This research argues that existing studies while contributing enormously to the 
understanding of fiscal inadequacy and unmet fiscal needs in poor areas of China, 
tend to under-estimate or even neglect (the political economy approaches) one of the  
very important fiscal needs induced by market transition—the expenditure need of the 
widespread introduction of social security since the mid-late 1990s. The social 
security needs induced by market transition is an insight from the regulation theory. 
Although social security is a conventional central government responsibility (from 
fiscal federalism perspective and in practice), in China it has largely been devolved to 
the subnational governments during the fiscal reforms. While a few authors such as 
Wong (2005), Wong and Bird (2005) raise the concern that decentralized provision of 
social security could be a serious problem for local public finance and find that   229
sizeable amount of the central-local transfers were used to cover the social security 
issues of the SOE sector, there is no systematic enquiry on the magnitude of fiscal 
needs in the social security sector at the local levels. This research is designed to fill 
this gap by examining the issue in more affluent areas of China, as it believes that 
decentralization of social security is excess, especially in the context of market 
transition and it may create heavy fiscal burden and unmet social security needs even 
for relatively affluent areas. In other words, from the first generation theory of fiscal 
federalism perspective and the insights of regulation theory, this research believes that 
the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels of China is not only an issue of 
horizontal fiscal imbalance, but more likely to be a vertical fiscal imbalance issue, 
where the expenditure side of the subnational governments as a whole has been 
impacted by the increased social security responsibility induced by market transition. 
Therefore, the central hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) of this research is "In the post TSS 
period (1994-2008), even certain relatively affluent locality has not been able to fully 
meet the emerging social security needs, resulting in under-provision of social 
security".  
 
This research also recognizes that while the two political economy approaches are 
relevant to the problem of unmet fiscal needs at the local levels, especially in poorer 
areas, they have neglected other important variables such as market transition, income 
growth and urbanization. An alternative explanation to the reasoning of government 
staff expansion might be that market transition, urbanization and income growth have   230
created demand for various forms of public services and investments that require 
additional administrative capacity (more staff). Likewise, an alternative explanation to 
the investment-education and investment-health trade-off proposition may be that the 
pressure to cover social security issue bid away resources that would otherwise be 
available for education and health. Thus two hypotheses (Hypothesis 2 and 3) are 
proposed to complement existing political economy perspectives. Finally, Hypothesis 
4 is used to test to what extent the variation of central-provincial transfers could be 
explained by the variation of relative sizes of the local SOE sector. This test is used to 
ascertain an untested proposition from Wong and Bird (2005), where they argue that 
the aim of fiscal equalization via central-local fiscal transfers may have been 
compromised by sizable transfers that went to social security subsides in the SOE 
sector. Hypothesis 2, 3 4 are listed as follows: 
 
H2: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), there have been negative correlations 
between the share of consolidated provincial budgetary spending on social security 
and health sector, and between the share of consolidated provincial budgetary 
spending on social security and education sector. 
 
H3: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), holding other factors constant, larger sizes of 
provincial governments (expressed as higher levels of consolidated budgetary 
expenditure-to-GDP ratios across provinces) could be in part explained by higher 
degrees of market transition and higher levels of urbanization and income. 
 
H4: In the post TSS period (1994-2008), holding other factors constant, higher 
amount of per capita central-provincial fiscal transfers could be in part explained by   231
lower level of market transition. 
 
8.2 Discussions of the Findings, Implications and Limitations of this Research 
At the national level, two salient trends are spotted: the first is that the social security 
sector has grown to a sizeable budgetary sector in more recent years and most of the 
expenditure of social security has been absorbed by the local governments; secondly, 
though the social insurance coverage has expanded very fast in the past two decades, 
the overall coverage ratios are still quite low (which indicate the social exclusion 
problem). The hypotheses are not addressed at the national analysis but tackled in 
cross-provincial analysis and the case study of Fujian province. Hypothesis 1, our 
core hypothesis is firmly supported. The results of the statistical analyses (testing 
Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4) are mixed. In what follows, the statistical results (and their 
implications) for Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 are discussed first. We then examine the 
results of hypothesis 1 and the important policy implications.   
 
Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. There were negative correlations between the 
share of consolidated provincial budgetary spending on social security and health 
sector, and between the share of consolidated provincial budgetary spending on social 
security and education sector. However, the correlation between spending on social 
security and education was only statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The result 
suggests that to some extent, the growth in social security spending may have 
crowded-out the budgeted spending on health at the local levels. This may have   232
created further challenge in poorer areas, as under-provision of health services has 
already been the case in many poor areas. Additional research is needed to compare 
the trade-off effects in poor areas and rich areas to reach a more affirmative 
conclusion. The research could be conducted by collecting prefecture-level data and 
divide the observations to sub-groups for statistical testing. Alternatively, one could 
conduct comparative case studies in poor areas and rich areas. 
 
Hypothesis 3 is firmly rejected. The result shows that holding other factors constant, 
larger sizes of provincial governments (higher levels of consolidated budgetary 
expenditure-GDP ratios across provinces) could be in part explained by lower (rather 
than higher) degrees of market transition; and they could not be confidently explained 
by the levels of urbanisation (the relation is not significant, which may be attributable 
to measurement errors of urbanization, where the share of non-agricultural population 
is used as a proxy). To a small extent, larger sizes of the governments could be 
explained by lower level of per capita GDP, but when any other independent variable 
is controlled for, the beta coefficient becomes insignificant, which suggests that this 
relation is not robust at all. Based on these unexpected results, one may argue that 
market transition tends to constraint the sizes of provincial governments. But why this 
is the case remains an unanswered question and would call for additional research. 
The government staff expansion hypothesis, as originally raised by Liu et al (2006) 
has not been addressed because the staff number data in many provinces are not 
available. Even if the size of government (measured by the levels of consolidated   233
budgetary expenditure-to-GDP ratio) is perfectly and positively correlated with the 
relative staffing level of the government, one could not confidently state that 
government staff expansion is more serious in low income areas (as the explanatory 
power of per capita GDP is not robust at all).   
 
Hypothesis 4 could not be firmly supported. It is found that higher amount of per 
capita central-provincial fiscal transfers may be in part explained by lower degree of 
market transition (higher share of SOE sector). However, when the factor of 
population density is taken into account, the effect of market transition becomes 
insignificant. This suggests that although part of the central-local transfers may have 
been devoted to social security subsidies in the SOE sector (as discovered by Wong 
and Bird 2005), the allocation basis of central-local transfers seems to be more 
determined by population density. It is also found that the equalization transfer has not 
played an influencing role and the effect of tax-rebates may have been neutralized by 
other kinds of transfers. In any case, there is still a large amount of variation in 
central-local transfer unexplained by our models. It is further discovered that the size 
of central-local transfers could explain much of the variation of the sizes of provincial 
governments. Therefore, exploring the other possible determinants of 
central-provincial fiscal transfers could help shed light on the size differences of 
provincial governments. This is another direction for future research. In a nutshell, 
though the results from these statistic analyses are mixed, they do generate several 
unexpected but interesting findings and could provide directions for future research.     234
Hypothesis 1, our core hypothesis, is firmly supported with the evidences from 
cross-provincial analysis, the Shanghai mini-case and the case study of Fujian 
province. The cross-provincial analysis shows that all the provinces have adjusted 
their budgetary expenditure structure to accommodate the growing levels of social 
security needs induced by market transition. However, there has still been serious 
social exclusions in social insurances across the 31 provincial units. The case study on 
Fujian confirms that low levels of social insurance coverage could largely be 
attributable to local fiscal inadequacy problem. Social security could be very costly 
for the government: even with a small SOE sector and several years after the SOE 
restructuring, the social security needs of many SOE employees or former SOE 
employees in Fujian province (a relatively affluent province) have yet to be met. It is 
found that current social security system in Fujian creates a pecking order of meeting 
the fiscal needs associated with different social groups (intra-locality interpersonal 
inequality in access to social security). The employees of government agency, 
organization and institutions are best protected, as the government fully assume their 
welfare responsibility. This small population section consumes a very large proportion 
of social security expenditure in Fujian and is often the first to benefit from the 
upward adjustment in welfare payment standards. This group’s welfare interest has 
been guaranteed by the state ever since the founding of People’s Republic of China 
and has not been affected by marketization. The SOE employees and ex-employees 
are also protected: although there are risks that their social security needs could not be 
met immediately or in the short term; the government makes commitment to cover   235
their needs in a number of years' time. Fiscal inadequacy dictates that the 
government’s help only comes after other possible means have been attempted (the 
emphasis of multiple channel fund-raising). The more extreme case of Zhongqiao 
illustrates that in the face of hefty social security burdens, the government could be 
forced to adopt measures that may create detrimental effect (shifting part of the risk to 
the state-owned banking system).   
 
The governments could only assume very limited responsibility for the welfare of  
the non-state workers, individuals and households, despite the enormous demand from 
these large groups of population as a result of market transition. The governments did 
not assist non-state enterprise workers in participating in the social insurances by 
providing subsidies (they did provide some support to workers of collective-owned 
enterprises), but act as the mediator between the labour and the capitalist to encourage 
and enforce the participation of social insurances. Moreover, the social assistance 
programs (such as minimum living standard lines and medical assistance) are 
restricted to registered permanent population only and are restrictive in making 
payments in order to curb the expenditure growth. Comparing the amount of 
investment made to the public sector employees, the expenditure on social assistances 
was very small (and inadequate). The migrant workers, arguably the weakest social 
group in urban areas, receive little or no fiscal supports from the government (in terms 
of social security).   
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The Shanghai mini-case illustrates that the substantial fiscal requirements from the 
social security sector could even go beyond the capacity of China's richest provincial 
unit. Population aging contributed to the problem. The social security fund scandals in 
Shanghai and in other areas show that mismanagement of social insurance funds at 
the subnational levels (partly as a result of ineffective monitoring) have become a 
serious problem as it could significantly increase the risks of funding shortfall and 
may create unexpected fiscal pressure for the government.   
 
The findings from cross-provincial analysis, the Shanghai mini-case and the case 
study of Fujian province demonstrate that there has been vertical fiscal imbalance 
problem in China (the expenditure needs of the subnational governments exceed their 
fiscal capacity) and such problem has not yet been fully tackled via central-local 
transfers or via the reassignment of tax bases to the local governments. Market 
transition has provided a context in which the social security needs could grow in a 
very fast pace and could be underestimated. By devolving the social security 
responsibility to subnational governments, the central government may have 
under-estimated the magnitude of the fiscal impact from market transition, thus 
allocating inadequate resources for the local governments to cover the social security 
issues. While the conventional reasoning from the first generation theory of fiscal 
federalism (see Oates, 1972, 1999, 2005) is that redistribution at the local levels 
would lead to loss/exodus of tax bases and would ultimate make the policy 
unsuccessful, in the Chinese case, redistribution at the local levels contributed to   237
interpersonal inequality problem in access to social insurances and social assistance. 
This is because, in the face of fiscal constraints and growing social security needs, 
local governments tended to under-provide the services for those who need them most 
or restrict the access to those services in order to curb the expenditure growth (the 
interests of the stronger social groups would be protected first). Redistribution at the 
national level could mitigate this interpersonal inequality problem if a more uniform 
level of services is provided by the central government (as suggested by the first 
generation theory of fiscal federalism).   
 
There are three additional reasons for reassigning the social security function to the 
central government of China. First, as reviewed in Chapter 3, the central government 
has recentralized much of the productive tax base since the 1994 Tax-Sharing reform, 
thus it tends to have stronger fiscal capacity than the local governments. Secondly, 
since the mid-1980s, most of the profitable and monopolistic SOEs have been 
transferred to the central government (also briefly discussed in Chapter 3). Until the 
end of 2007, none of these giant corporations had paid dividends to the government, 
despite the fact that they generated billions of profits. It is reported that the profits of 
all the SOEs controlled by the central government reached 754.7 billion Yuan in 2006 
(Xinhua,  http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2007-09/15/content_6724787.htm 
released on 15th September 2007, accessed on 24 November 2007). Thus there has 
been serious structural imbalance, where the central SOE sector has accumulated huge 
surplus while the social security sector suffers from serious fiscal inadequacy problem.   238
Thirdly, the shortfall problem of social security funds may call for centralized 
management of social security funds. On one hand, higher level of social pooling is 
desirable as it could utilize the payments from contributors to cover the withdrawing 
needs to a greater extent. In Fujian, pooling the enterprise pension insurance at the 
provincial level rather than at the prefecture-level (still a popular practice in several 
provinces and still the practice for other social insurances) has prevented two 
municipalities from running deficits in their pension funds. On the other hand, 
centralized management of social insurance funds may reduce the chance of 
mismanagement as it could be easier and much more cost-effective to monitor and 
manage a few social insurance funds than hundreds of funds.   
 
This research has a number of limitations. First, constrained by time and availability 
of data, it is not possible for us to conduct another case study in a rich province with 
larger SOE sector (such as Liaoning) for comparison. Comparative case studies may 
help deepen the understanding of local fiscal inadequacy problem arising from market 
transition. Secondly, this research relies extensively on statistical data, therefore, it 
provides no description/analysis of the consequence of social security exclusion from 
the perspective of those marginal groups. Thirdly, this research bypasses the 
neo-Marxist theory (such as O’Connor 1973) on the fiscal crisis of the advanced 
capitalistic state (see Block 1973 for the extensive review). In other words, while this 
research recognises the inevitability of introducing social security by the state in a 
market economy, it has not been able to explore whether this will give rise to fiscal   239
crisis for the Chinese state, and whether (and to what extent) the devolution of social 
security function in China has been devised as a strategy to constrain the social 
security expenditure and/or to prevent the fiscal crisis of the state. These important 
questions merit further research. 
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